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This dissertation proposes that British novelistic realism of the nineteenth century is not 
an authoritative form designed to represent a fixed reality and elicit readers’ assent to it. Instead, 
realist novelists, including Walter Scott, George Meredith, George Eliot, and Rudyard Kipling, 
use formal practices I call “wise folly” to perform an ambivalent authority that invites 
disagreement. With a history that can be traced through such earlier sources as Plato’s dialogues, 
Erasmus’s writings, and Shakespeare’s fools, wise folly unfixes standards of wisdom and folly in 
a work and complicates ethical judgments. Through close readings of forms of wise folly in 
realist novels, this dissertation revises conventional conceptions of the realist narrator as a 
rhetorically coercive voice and realism as a pretense to omniscience, proposing instead that 
realist novels, as formed objects apprehended by readers, are a means for negotiating diverse 
views of reality. 
The introductory chapter, “Wise Folly and Narrative Discourse,” outlines the concept of 
wise folly and, through readings of Tristram Shandy and Vanity Fair, explains its role in the 
emergence of a specifically realist narrative discourse. The second chapter, “Narrative Authority 
and George Meredith’s Gnomes,” examines gnomic utterances such as aphorisms, maxims, and 
epigrams in Meredith’s work, arguing that Meredith uses these utterances to construct an 
ambivalent narrative authority. The third chapter, “George Eliot’s Pharmacy,” explains the 
  
function of scapegoat figures who occupy the margins of Eliot’s novels and who, from those 
margins, trace the limitations of the dominant ethics in the novels. The fourth chapter, “Learning 
We Are Fools,” addresses the desultory status of literary quotation and allusion in the novels of 
Scott and Meredith, where the literary can be a source of folly and where education is an 
inherently intertextual process, fraught with error, through which one acquires means to 
understand the world. The fifth chapter, “If: Aesthetics and Ideology Revisited,” situates play in 
Kipling’s Kim within the context of wise folly and aesthetic theory, and describes Kipling’s 
canny treatment of knowledge in Kim, which employs Orientalist and other modes of knowing 
even as it imagines the impossibility of sure knowledge. 
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Chapter One 
Wise Folly and Narrative Discourse 
 
Fool, n. A person who pervades the domain of intellectual speculation and 
diffuses himself through the channels of moral activity. He is omnific, 
omniform, omnipercipient, omniscient, omnipotent. He it was who 
invented letters, printing, the railroad, the steamboat, the telegraph, the 
platitude, and the circle of the sciences. He created patriotism and taught 
the nations war—founded theology, philosophy, law, medicine, and 
Chicago. He established monarchical and republican government. He is 
from everlasting to everlasting—such as creation’s dawn beheld he fooleth 
now. In the morning of time he sang upon primitive hills, and in the 
noonday of existence headed the procession of being. His grandmotherly 
hand has warmly tucked-in the set sun of civilization, and in the twilight 
he prepares Man’s evening meal of milk and morality and turns down the 
covers of the universal grave. And after the rest of us shall have retired for 
the night of eternal oblivion he will sit up to write a history of human 
civilization. (Bierce, “Fool”) 
 
I will not be arguing in this dissertation that folly pervades and presides over everything 
constitutively human, and that the closest achievable approximation of wisdom is the recognition 
of human folly, including one’s own. This idea loses much of its purpose when one simply 
asserts it. When one performs it, however, wears it as a mask, dramatizes it in fiction, or weaves 
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it into a dialogue of different ideas, spoken by different voices, the idea can catalyze inquiry into 
the constitution of wisdom. Socratic irony is an example of this process, conditioned by the 
historical and discursive context of Plato’s writing and the particular concerns of his dialogues, 
but it is only one example, and though Plato’s practices predate the others that will be examined 
here, they belong to a larger pattern that I call, descriptively, “wise folly.” The terms “wisdom” 
and “folly” are useful because they are amenable to contextual definition. I deploy them in the 
abstract with deliberate looseness: “wisdom” names some conjunction of right thought and 
action, and is associated with terms that are conventionally valued positively and sought after by 
normative ethical philosophy, such as knowledge, intelligence, virtue, and the good; “folly” is 
antithetical to wisdom, associated with ignorance, stupidity, vice, and error. These terms define 
an axis onto which the specific values pursued in literary works will be mapped, while also 
permitting me to trace diachronic, intertextual continuities between these works’ configurations 
of ethical categories. While wisdom in George Meredith’s novels differs from wisdom in George 
Eliot’s, Walter Scott’s, or Rudyard Kipling’s, these authors all toy with and complicate 
fundamental ethical oppositions without annihilating them, inviting readers’ dissent from values 
and philosophical claims apparently endorsed by their novels. Wise folly raises the possibility 
that, precisely because the narrator pretends to be a novel’s primary source of wisdom, the 
narrator is liable to misjudge the world of the novel and its characters. Wise folly realizes this 
world by making it an object of debate, liberating it from the ostensibly definitive claims of the 
narrative discourse. 
Ambrose Bierce’s definition of “Fool” in The Devil’s Dictionary, by personifying human 
folly as a demiurge, captures the universalizing gesture of wise folly. His definition of “Folly,” 
which begins “That ‘gift and faculty divine’ whose creative and controlling energy inspires 
 
 
3 
 
Man’s mind, guides his actions and adorns his life,” also personifies the concept by concluding 
with a sonnet apostrophizing “All-Father Folly.” “Wise folly” alludes to the figure of the wise 
fool, and because it names the performance of an idea rather than the idea itself, the folly is often 
accompanied by a fool who carries out the performance—Socrates, Chaucer’s Geffrey, 
Erasmus’s goddess Folly, Shakespeare’s clowns, Tristram Shandy. I choose these extremely 
canonical examples because they are readily available, not only to scholars and students of 
literature, but also to the authors who practise wise folly in the British realist novel, though I 
hope by the end of this study to have elaborated a concept widely adaptable to describing works 
in various literary traditions. Criticism has often dealt with wise fools where they appear: 
William Empson’s “The Praise of Folly” and “Fool in Lear” in The Structure of Complex Words 
unpack “fool” as a complex word in Erasmus and Shakespeare; and Jonathan Bate’s 
“Shakespeare’s Foolosophy” considers how Lear’s Fool might convey an alternative philosophy 
or an alternative to philosophy. Notable extended histories and typologies of the fool in its own 
right include Enid Welsford’s The Fool: His Social and Literary History, Sandra Billington’s A 
Social History of the Fool, and William Willeford’s The Fool and His Scepter: A Study in 
Clowns and Jesters and Their Audience. More recently, Beatrice K. Otto has explored the figure 
in Fools Are Everywhere, taking a pragmatic view of its universality: “I do not say that the jester 
exists in all times and places: the crux is rather that he is not the product of any particular time or 
place. The preconditions for the emergence of jesters are minimal—some courtlike institution in 
the form of a head honcho with a partly dependent entourage” (xvii). Michael André Bernstein’s 
Bitter Carnival: Ressentiment and the Abject Hero attempts to counter the seductiveness of the 
wise fool or Saturnalian hero, explaining how the figure gives rise in later modernity to a 
dangerous variant, “the abject hero,” and how it can be used rhetorically to paint violence like 
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Charles Manson’s as carnivalesque rebellion. Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism surveys 
buffoon types; and the fool, clown, and rogue appear prominently in Mikhail Bakhtin’s accounts 
of the carnivalesque. 
For the most part the current study will take a different approach to the subject, one less 
concerned with the history of the fool as a social institution or literary type. Bakhtin helps to 
explain why: 
[T]hese three dialogic categories [gay deception, malicious distortion, and naive   
 incomprehension] that had organized heteroglossia [speech diversity] in the novel at the 
 dawn of its history emerge in modern times with extraordinary surface clarity and are  
 embodied in the symbolic images of the rogue, the clown and the fool. In their   
 further development these categories are refined, differentiated, cut loose from   
 their external and symbolically static images, but they continue to preserve their   
 importance for organizing novel style. (The Dialogic Imagination 405) 
I follow Bakhtin in viewing language dialogically—that is, I understand the meaning of 
utterances through their responsive and anticipatory relationships to other actual and potential 
utterances, and I link utterances to definite speaking positions that entail different ideologies. 
Bakhtin suggests here that the speaking positions of the fool, clown, and rogue, their roles in 
dialogue or their associated “dialogic categories,” are separable from their “external and 
symbolically static images,” and that at some point in the literary history of modernity the 
positions do in fact separate from the symbols and images. Although this dissertation does not 
maintain Bakhtin’s distinctions between the fool, clown, and rogue, employing instead the single 
figure of the wise fool, it proposes the rise of the British realist novel as a moment during which 
the dialogic category of wise folly acquires greater literary importance than caps and bells, 
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motley coats, phallic sceptres, or any other instances of the carnivalesque symbolism Bakhtin 
explores. We will see that this imagery does not altogether vanish, and Chapter Four will dabble 
in typology in order to consider the function of two wise fool characters in Waverley and The 
Ordeal of Richard Feverel, but the autonomy of wise folly as a dialogic category or role means 
that wise folly is not always performed by characters who have a consistent identity as wise 
fools. Wise folly may be performed by different characters at different moments and by the 
narrators of realist novels, whom, like Harry Shaw, I usually see as “creatural” and in possession 
of human traits even when less directly characterized than intradiegetic characters.
1
 (The 
Christian resonances of “creatural” suggest a fallen existence, which is relevant: the state of 
irreducible folly that wise folly imagines can be understood as a secular version of original sin, 
though wise folly often promises no external saving grace.) Wise folly may, finally, be attributed 
to the author, the implied author, the intentionality of the work, or its design. Some such concept 
will be necessary to this study, which deliberately and self-consciously employs a mode of 
intentional reading throughout in order to describe what the function of wise folly in realism 
appears to be. 
 Spelling out the assumptions of this mode of reading will also clarify what it means to 
talk of wise folly as a performance, role, dialogic category or—perhaps the best but most 
troublesome term—a form. I draw from Jonathan Loesberg’s reinterpretation of Kant in A Return 
to Aesthetics in order to conceive of form as the iterable components of a design, apprehending 
that design hypothetically as an appearance of design without assuming the intentions of a real 
designer. Such a design may be coextensive with a particular work, but it may also be 
                                                     
1
 See, for example, Narrating Reality p. 246: “As the narrator of Scenes of Clerical Life moves from ‘Gilfil’ to 
‘Janet’s Repentance,’ we see her giving up a position that allows her the imaginative freedom to create a detached 
imitation of the past, in exchange for the moral force that stems from our amazement that such an immensely 
intelligent and perpicuous intellectual presence is willing to submit to the creatural limits of a given time and place.” 
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coextensive with a larger category or cluster of phenomena, so that one may talk both of the form 
of a realist novel and the realist novel as a form. Loesberg’s aesthetics will receive more detailed 
treatment at the end of Chapter Five, where it will help to specify the hero’s approach to the 
phenomenal world in Kipling’s Kim and the approach to reading realist novels that this 
dissertation proposes. For now it is important to state that the end to which I apply aesthetic 
theory, and the formalist method I derive from it, is description: the purpose of the following 
chapters will not be to locate or assess the beauty of works, but to describe their features, and 
those of the generic category that contains them, in a way that becomes possible when they are 
apprehended aesthetically, their apparent designs traced and articulated. If my readings help to 
make beauty or other aesthetic qualities of these works available, they will do so as a side-effect. 
Forms in this project have the ontological status of geometrical shapes apprehended in the 
material world: circles do not exist in the same sense that wheels do, but circles describe wheels. 
The crucial difference, which prevents this analogy from claiming for literary criticism the rigour 
of mathematical description, is that shapes have stable definitions within the coherent language 
of mathematics, while I take literary form to be defined dialogically in an ongoing discursive 
process that occurs in historical time. The meaning of comedy, for instance, inheres neither in 
any particular comedy nor in any theoretical definition of it, but is negotiated by authors, 
theorists, critics, and instructors, who contribute to a social understanding of the form by 
instantiating it, writing about it, and teaching it. This project draws from prior accounts of 
realism and examines works usually considered realist in order to propose a new understanding 
of what constitutes realism. 
 The fool is an agent of carnivalesque “uncrowning,” in Bakhtin’s term, a joyful ritual 
destruction of the old and its authority. My argument, therefore, branches from George Levine’s 
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in The Realistic Imagination, where he claims that disenchantment, especially of the conventions 
and ideals of romance, is a central aim of realism. This view of realism makes the genre into a 
“quest beyond words, against literature” that is ultimately futile, if self-consciously so (Levine 
22). This quest resembles the quest for wisdom, seen from the point of view of wise folly: one 
can only become further entrapped in the paradoxes of the form, the margin of wisdom fading 
forever and forever as one moves, leaving only manifold follies to be discovered. The crucial 
difference between my argument and Levine’s is that I do not consider realism itself to be 
asserting univocally the premises of wise folly or to be engaged in a struggle to escape the 
fictionality and conventionality that it must necessarily employ. Imagining that one approaches 
reality through language and conventions, realism uses the language and conventions of wise 
folly to organize the approaches to reality that it represents. Realism in this view is still 
extremely self-conscious, but far less anxious and self-conflicted, since it is not itself attempting 
to capture a reality definitively, or even primarily to “explore or create a new reality” (20). 
Though a realist novel does posit a reality, which I will refer to as the “imagined reality,” it 
explores not this reality itself but differing, sometimes incommensurable views of it. This 
emphasis on the processes through which one (always among others) attempts to understand 
reality recalls Shaw’s Narrating Reality. For Shaw, realism does not transparently or exactly 
represent moments in history, but represents historicity and the metonymic connections between 
things, engaging its readers with the experience of life in history: “For the central claim of realist 
fiction is that the set of mental operations it elicits in us can adequately apprehend the reality of 
society as it moves through history” (Narrating Reality 16). The current study owes much in its 
treatment of the realist novel to Shaw’s work, including an emphasis on human narrators, a 
recognition that realist novels “are doing work with respect to the real world that more abstract 
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modes of thought can’t do,” and, consequently, a determination not to allow the abstraction of 
theoretical terms and claims to obscure or homogenize the peculiarities of realist works (ix). 
 In arguing for the perspectivalism of realism, I am in dialogue with a third important 
book about the form, Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth’s Realism and Consensus in the Realist Novel, 
which theorizes realism on an analogy with realistic perspective in early modern visual art. 
Ermarth suggests that the realist narrator functions to establish the identity of objects in “neutral” 
time and space. With the advent of realistic representation, “The details that formerly were 
understood as discrete cases now come to be understood as partial expressions of hidden wholes: 
wholes, or identities, which are independent of any particular form of visual apprehension or, as 
in the novel, of apprehension by a single consciousness in a single moment” (Ermarth 16). The 
wholes are hidden in that objects cannot be seen from all perspectives at once, but consensus is 
possible in realistic time and space—everyone would theoretically see the same thing from the 
same perspective. The narrator functions to establish the possibility of this consensus: “The 
narrator’s privilege is . . . an extension of ordinary consciousness, one theoretically available to 
anyone able to go the distance” (71). This account of realism explains how realist works posit 
imagined realities that are understood to exist independently of the narrator’s single perspective: 
“While the single point of view . . . is essential to the rationalization both of sight and of 
consciousness, still both the spectator and the narrator look upon a world they have not made” 
(85). In contrast to Ermarth, however, my concern, undoubtedly influenced by a Bakhtinian 
predisposition, is with the possibility of dissent more than the possibility of consensus. The 
consensus that Ermarth discusses is purely theoretical, a way to establish the persistence of an 
imagined reality that contains the diegesis. But she requires the narrator to be “Nobody” and the 
formal patterning of a realist novel to belong to no-one in order for realism to succeed: “To the 
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extent that the narrator takes personal possession of these forms, as Thackeray’s narrator does for 
a moment at the end of Vanity Fair, their realism is compromised, they are unrealized because 
their projective extension, their futurity, is compromised” (84). I will argue presently that 
Thackeray’s narrator’s possession of Vanity Fair, as a place, a performance, and a way of seeing, 
creates a characteristic nineteenth-century British realism by foregrounding not the imagined 
reality, where perspectives may theoretically converge, but individuated perspective itself. 
 Meredith, Eliot, Scott, and Kipling function in this dissertation as cases: they are not 
meant to be a representative or necessary selection, except possibly the paragonal Eliot, without 
whose inclusion the argument would be incomplete; nor do they illustrate a historical narrative. 
These authors’ works are continuous enough to motivate general theoretical claims and different 
enough to demonstrate the various ways that wise folly can be deployed in realist novels, 
according to each author’s brand of realism. These authors are historically important, but many 
important British realists are not represented here, perhaps most notably Charles Dickens, whom 
one might rightly expect to be a practitioner of wise folly, though his relationship to the form is 
complicated to the degree that his relationship to realism is complicated. It will not be possible to 
examine novels by Dickens and other writers in detail in this project; its general claims, 
accordingly, are not intended to assimilate realism to a single rigid model. As Levine writes, 
“The variousness of the manifestations of realism make anything short of a detailed study of all 
the novels a distortion, yet I think certain patterns are discernible” (The Realistic Imagination 
22). Wise folly is one of these patterns. 
 The formal category of wise folly, unlike that of realism, does not already belong to an 
explicit critical tradition. It does, however, express continuities among a diverse variety of 
works. In theorizing wise folly, therefore, I will often turn to practical touchstones instead of to a 
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body of existing theory, and will do so here in this introductory chapter. Erasmus and 
Shakespeare are the landmark theorist-practitioners of wise folly, and European Renaissance 
humanism is the crucible of the form, fusing together Christian and classical elements of it. In 
Praise of Folly, the goddess Moria makes a universalizing gesture similar to Bierce’s, proposing 
folly as the definitive human condition and asserting herself as the “‘Alpha’ of all the gods” (19). 
Her first move after introducing herself and her genealogy is to claim sex, and thus procreation, 
under her domain: even gods and philosophers must “be fond and foolish for a while” if they 
want to generate life, and the “propagator of the human race is that part which is so foolish and 
absurd that it can’t be named without raising a laugh” (19-20). To laugh at bawdy is to take a 
humorous view of sex, and Folly parlays this view into a major premise for her claims about 
humanity’s essential folly. 
 Folly’s next move is to argue for the importance of folly in all of life, not just at the 
origin of it, particularly the necessity of folly to pleasure: 
But I shouldn’t claim much by saying that I’m the seed and source of existence 
unless I could also prove that whatever advantages there are all throughout life are 
all provided by me. What would this life be, or would it seem worth calling life at 
all, if its pleasure was taken away? I hear your applause, and in fact I’ve always 
felt sure that none of you was so wise or rather so foolish—no, I mean so wise—
as to think it could. (21) 
The double about-face of “I’ve always felt sure that none of you was so wise or rather so 
foolish—no, I mean so wise” exemplifies how wise folly operates on its central ethical binary. 
Folly’s uncertainty about the proper adjective arises from the instability of the ethical stance she 
is meant to represent. The terms “wisdom” and “folly” remain antithetical to each other, but slip 
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into each other’s position unexpectedly. Stoic philosophers are “wise” to think life is worth 
living without pleasure, because they are pretending to superior wisdom in holding themselves 
aloof from the pleasures of the world. By correcting the word “wise” to “foolish,” Folly enacts a 
conventional Saturnalian reversal: those who hold themselves to be wise are dialogically accused 
of foolishness by a heckling interlocutor. Because Folly is Folly, however, and is supposed to 
consider foolishness to be wisdom, she returns to “wise,” which now means a wisdom achieved 
through foolishness. These philosophers become “morosophoi,” or “foolish-wise,” a term which 
parodies “philosophers” (13). But the philosophers themselves are no different whether Folly 
calls them wise, foolish, or a different sort of wise, and we can see how these terms might chase 
each other in a circle perpetually: Folly could have replaced the second “wise” with “foolish” on 
the same grounds she revised the first one. 
 A. H. T. Levi claims that Erasmus’s mock encomium has an “imperfect unity of tone,” 
since at times Folly appears to be speaking Erasmus’s beliefs directly and at times she appears to 
be reversing them ironically (xv). This imperfect unity is crucial to Folly’s role. Folly’s discourse 
is incoherent, but it is a controlled incoherence that allows Folly to give the terms “wisdom” and 
“folly” contradictory senses in different contexts. Because of this incoherence Folly is more than 
an inversion function that simply articulates the opposite of whatever Erasmus intends. Rather, 
Folly is a remarkably versatile mask for Erasmus, who can combine in one document a 
celebration of life, sex, food, and drink; a sarcastic attack on corruption in the Roman Catholic 
church, including Pope Julius II’s war-waging; and a defense of Christian virtue as a turning-
away from the world and worldly knowledge. Of these three stages in the work the second is the 
easiest to make sense of, since it is a targeted satire (though even here Folly at times condemns 
the church leadership and at times praises it sarcastically). The other two stages express more 
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general world-views that are altogether at odds with each other. Levi argues that “Folly’s final 
panegyric of unlettered Christian piety is the entirely serious if now mature derivative of his 
[Erasmus’s] boyhood piety,” which is to suggest that Erasmus is not in solidarity with Folly in 
the first stage of the work and is speaking through her in the third (x). Yet the form that shapes 
Folly’s discourse by making wisdom and folly into an unstable compound creates a rich potential 
of meaning in the work that cannot be explained purely in terms of Erasmus’s specific beliefs. 
Praise of Folly is a strangely dialogical monologue. It permits readings that are inconsistent with 
Erasmus’s particular religious beliefs, but this possibility itself seems consonant with the most 
generous attitudes of his evangelical humanism, which respects even pagan thinkers for their 
thought and maintains that they will not be damned for their beliefs (xxxi). When we are caught 
in the encomium’s dizzying structure, where wisdom becomes folly which becomes wisdom 
again, we can only get so far by wondering what Erasmus really intended at every point—in the 
end, we may have no good option but to consider what Folly says, and make up our own minds. 
 The effect of deploying wise folly in a work is not necessarily to stage a carnivalesque 
rejection of authority, but almost always to complicate the distribution of authority, which 
introduces the possibility of dialogue. Though Chaucer does not use the language of wise folly 
that Erasmus will develop, he creates a persona that functions similarly to Erasmus’s goddess. 
“The House of Fame” is spoken by “Geffrey,” a fictionalized Chaucer and an ostensibly 
incompetent poet who is especially incompetent at love poetry. In a dream vision Geffrey is 
visited by an eagle whom Jove has sent to aid him since in the eagle’s words “ful lyte” is inside 
Geffrey’s head (621). The problem, according to the eagle, is that Geffrey spends all his time 
working and buried in books. He has never experienced love himself, and he has heard no real 
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“tydynges / Of Loves folk” (644-45). So the fantastical eagle takes him to the House of the 
Goddess Fame where he can hear some tydynges. 
 Geffrey’s foolishness is in his poetic naiveté, which is associated with a sexual 
innocence, and therefore his suitability as the speaker of the “House of Fame” is called into 
question. The admixture of wisdom in Geffrey’s folly becomes apparent, however, when he 
arrives at the House of Fame. Ranged on pillars of various metals are historians and great poets 
such as Homer, Ovid, and Virgil, who literally support on their shoulders the fame of the heroes 
and gods they sang. The pillars represent the stature of the epic poet, whose fame is implicated 
with that of the epic subject in a guarantee of mutual greatness. An unsuccessful love poet, 
Geffrey has no place in this allegorical tableau. And precisely because Geffrey is not on a pillar, 
he can walk around unencumbered. 
 The gain in Geffrey’s loss is not merely freedom from the burdens of fame but an 
alternative model of poetic speech. When an anonymous person at the goddess’s court asks 
Geffrey if he has come to win fame, the humble poet replies in a decisive negative. Geffrey 
disclaims all interest in making a reputation for himself or, more literally, putting his name in the 
hands of others. Moreover, he imagines that he can drink up his own lived experiences and 
thoughts, swallow them into himself instead of sharing them in his poetry, and suggests that this 
self-cannibalism is consistent with his understanding of his craft. All of which is a loose 
paraphrase of the following speech: 
  Sufficeth me, as I were ded, 
  That no wight have my name in honde. 
  I wot myself best how y stonde; 
  For what I drye, or what I thynke, 
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  I wil myselven al hyt drynke, 
  Certeyn, for the more part, 
  As fer forth as I kan myn art. (1876-82) 
Clearly Geffrey understands his craft differently than does Jove’s eagle, who would prefer 
Geffrey to base his poetry in his real knowledge and experience. Geffrey’s apparent self-
abnegation, however, is ambiguously also a self-assertion. With only a shift of emphasis in the 
reading of this speech, the modest Geffrey becomes strident, vehemently protecting himself from 
his readers. (I kan myn art!) A posture of “Oh, don’t mind me” precariously coexists with a hint 
of “How dare you mind me” that is anything but self-effacing.  
 This desire to detach his life and his identity from his own speech belongs to Geffrey as a 
character, but of course insofar as Geffrey is the speaker of this dream vision, he is not 
succeeding: what he narrates is his own quest, as a character, to become a better poet. The 
underlying logic resembles that of occupatio, a favourite figure of Chaucer’s which consists in 
his promising that he will not do precisely what he is doing. Geffrey has tangled up “The House 
of Fame” with the problem of his own status and authority such that the poem we are reading, 
ironically, cannot be independent of Geffrey in the way he ostensibly wishes his poetry to be. 
But neither does Geffrey the speaker exemplify the eagle’s model of poetic creation: he is not 
quite reporting his own lived experience or anyone else’s. He is reporting a dream vision, and he 
admits he does not know whether it is a true revelation or, as it were, an undigested bit of beef. 
The dream vision allows Chaucer’s wise-foolish narrator to be authorial, explicitly at the origin 
of the story, but also peripheral and passive. He claims that his “Thought” wrote the dream and 
shut it in the “tresorye” of his “brayn,” to which he evidently does not have a key (523-25). 
Consequently, in this poem, Geffrey can defy the eagle’s complaints. It does not matter what the 
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poet knows or has experienced: in his vision he sees what he sees; and as speaker he speaks it. At 
the same time, by displacing authority from himself, Geffrey gives an illusion of autonomy to the 
story: for example, when relating Dido’s lament for Aeneas, which Geffrey witnesses in the first 
part of his vision, he insists that he repeats Dido’s words just as he dreamt them: “Non other 
auctour alegge I” (314). Geffrey’s poetic incompetence allows him to filch the story of Aeneas 
and Dido off of Virgil’s tinned iron pillar, to dialogize it by creating a version of it in his own 
voice and out of his own thought, while partially disguising the presumption of this act by 
claiming that he merely dreamt it. 
 The foregoing examples demonstrate wise folly in use, deployed specifically to shape the 
discourses of the works’ speaking personae, allowing these speakers to initiate dialogues with 
other discourses of authority without simply setting up warring authorities. Wise folly is useful 
for this purpose because it characterizes the speakers of the works as ambiguously both wise and 
foolish, mitigating the authority that would normally accrue to them by virtue of their being the 
works’ sole speakers. This function of wise folly is perhaps the most important to the realist 
novel, where wise folly informs narrators who, far from providing the definitive word on the 
worlds or “diegeses” of their fictions, initiate ethical dialogues with their readers about these 
worlds and, by analogy, the worlds of the readers. The following two examples suggest a 
narrative of how, in the development of the British novel, speaking positions such as Folly’s and 
Geffrey’s become integral to realist narrative discourse. The first is Laurence Sterne’s Tristram 
Shandy, a precursor to the nineteenth-century British novel with components of Menippean satire 
or “anatomy” (Frye 312).2 The second is William Makepeace Thackeray’s Vanity Fair, perhaps 
                                                     
2
 “Tristram Shandy may be . . . a novel, but the digressing narrative, the catalogues, the stylizing of character along 
‘humor’ lines, the marvellous journey of the great nose, the symposium discussions, and the constant ridicule of 
philosophers and pedantic critics are all features that belong to the anatomy” (Frye 312). Menippean satire is, for 
 
 
16 
 
the nineteenth-century British realist novel in which the symbolic heritage of wise folly remains 
most in evidence. Both narrators portray themselves as jester-performers, and they use their 
performances to trouble any ready distinctions between their narrative discourses and the stories 
they tell, making the wise folly of their narration into a defining property of the narratives. 
Tristram explains his digressive narrative style with reference to a fool’s cap: 
Therefore, my dear friend and companion, if you should think me somewhat 
sparing of my narrative on my first setting out,—bear with me,—and let me go 
on, and tell my story my own way:——or if I should seem now and then to trifle 
upon the road,——or should sometimes put on a fool’s cap with a bell to it, for a 
moment or two as we pass along,--don’t fly off,—but rather courteously give me 
credit for a little more wisdom than appears on my outside;—and as we jogg on, 
either laugh with me, or at me, or in short, do any thing,——only keep your 
temper. (Sterne 10-11) 
This is one of two occasions when Tristram mentions his hat. The fool’s cap is part of a live 
performance that Tristram imagines himself to be giving even as he writes: at times he will refer 
to his pen and ink, and at other times he will interact with a variety of addressees, including at 
least one man, one woman, and one young girl. Tristram Shandy is much like Praise of Folly in 
that it is writing masquerading as speech. Like Erasmus, Sterne forms his work by means of an 
idiosyncratic speaker and defines this speaker through the language and images of wise folly: in 
donning the fool’s cap and claiming “a little more wisdom than appears on my outside,” Tristram 
clearly situates himself in the position of the wise fool. Tristram is in other respects like 
Chaucer’s personas: Tristram combines the paradoxes of Folly’s rhetoric with the creative and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Bakhtin, one of the carnivalesque sources of the novel, and its tendency to target human intellectual effort in its 
satire places it within the history of wise folly. 
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narrative burdens of the Chaucerian poet. Like a hyperbolic Geffrey, Tristram has trouble with 
the creative process and produces a story that is itself a record of this trouble. Tristram’s odd 
approach to autobiography is part of a general oddity that is frequently allied with suggestions of 
sexual inadequacy: the story of his misfortunes, including his interrupted conception, his crushed 
nose, his truncated name, and his circumcision by a sash window, is largely the story of “things 
be[ing] cut shorter” (Shakespeare, King Lear 1.1.50).3 Unlike Geffrey, however, Tristram has no 
desire to “drynke” from his work all that pertains to himself. On the contrary, the work is 
supposed to be about Tristram, and his difficulty is in deciding how to tell his story. 
What is unique about Tristram’s combination of the wise-foolish forms we have seen in 
Erasmus and Chaucer is how completely these forms shape his narrative. Tristram explains the 
structure of this narrative in Volume 1: “the machinery of my work is of a species by itself; two 
contrary motions are introduced into it, and reconciled, which were thought to be at variance 
with each other. In a word, my work is digressive, and it is progressive too,—and at the same 
time” (Sterne 58). Tristram’s paradox can be solved by redefining progression and digression. 
He presumes the view of narrative that narratology expresses in the terms “story” and 
“discourse.”4 There’s the story, and there’s the telling of it, and if we think of Tristram Shandy 
this way then there’s lots of telling and little story; Tristram takes volumes to cover his birth. 
This excess in the narrative discourse is its digressiveness. To view the digressions as 
progressive is to view the telling as the story, to refuse to separate them. Tristram Shandy is the 
story of Tristram’s communicative act, and this story progresses as long as Tristram writes (or 
                                                     
3
 If I read the blanks rightly, at one point Jenny also consoles Tristram for impotence: “the most oppressive 
[disaster] of its kind which could befall me as a man, proud, as he ought to be, of his manhood” (Sterne 415). 
4
 Because “discourse” will most frequently be used in Bakhtin’s sense, to indicate a linguistic unity or way of 
speaking (the particular language of a character, of wise folly, of narratology, for example), the phrase “narrative 
discourse” will be used where narratological usage simply calls for “discourse.” An exception will be the related 
term “discourse space,” which is not liable to create the same confusion. 
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speaks). In asking us to befriend him, to bear with him, to laugh either with or at him, Tristram 
also suggests that the telling is inseparable from the teller: to read Tristram Shandy is to become 
acquainted with an eccentric person who has assumed the mask of the wise fool. 
Tristram Shandy suggests a model of the novel as a dialogue between the narrator and the 
reader. Tristram’s speaking position, in all its strangeness and complexity, informs every aspect 
of the novel. Tristram invites us to take our place opposite this speaking position; he encourages 
an active reading in which we participate as persons, not mere receptors. In addition to his direct 
addresses and overtures of friendship, Tristram uses euphemisms, blanks, and oblique 
descriptions to get us to fill in the gaps. He wishes us to “think as well as read” (49). Later 
narrators of the novel may be less idiosyncratic than Tristram, apparently more successful at the 
self-erasure that Geffrey strives for, but Tristram is an important step in the development of even 
the extradiegetic heterodiegetic realist narrator, that disembodied narrator traditionally named 
“omniscient.” In novels by Scott, Eliot, Meredith, and Kipling, the narrative discourse is 
similarly central to the narrative and, despite appearances, similarly shaped by wise folly. 
The narrator of Vanity Fair will provide a link between Tristram Shandy and, for 
instance, George Eliot’s apparently magisterial narrators. Thackeray’s narrator does not tell his 
own story, but he does frequently intrude as the author of it. He teases the narratee with his 
power to manipulate the puppets of the diegesis and to “know everything,” as he puts it. At other 
times, he seems briefly like an intradiegetic character collecting gossip: he attributes his 
information about Gaunt Square, for example, to his “informant” Tom Eaves (Thackeray 589). 
Once, in a memorable episode, the narrator even claims to have met the protagonists of Vanity 
Fair personally in Germany: “It was on this very tour that I, the present writer of a history of 
which every word is true, had the pleasure to see them first, and to make their acquaintance” 
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(793). One way to reconcile these different narrative roles is to recognize the cheek of the 
narrator’s speech. It is clear enough that the narrator’s claims, in his authorial capacity, to “know 
everything” and tell the truth should be taken with a grain or two of salt. Not only Tom Eaves but 
also kitchen staff in general are said to “know everything” in Vanity Fair, as is the minor 
character Tapeworm, who “knew everything—and a great deal besides, about all the world” 
(849). What is constant about this narrator is that he is a duplicitous performer whose function 
does not quite reduce to any of the contradictory roles he plays. 
This deliberately playful narrator does not share Geffrey or Tristram’s anxieties about 
writing. Thackeray situates him in the context of carnivalesque allusions, however: explicit 
references to the symbolism of wise folly that appears more rarely elsewhere in the British realist 
novel. The covers of the monthly numbers of Vanity Fair depict a clown on a barrel preaching to 
a crowd of fellow clowns, and the illustration at the end of Chapter IX is a miniature self-portrait 
of Thackeray with mask and fool’s sceptre. The narrator also reminds us of his heritage 
occasionally, addressing the narratees as “my friend in motley” or “brother wearers of motley” 
(769, 227). Most importantly, however, Thackeray frames the novel with the image of the puppet 
show, which he develops in a section entitled “Before the Curtain.” Here the “Manager of the 
Performance” appears on stage in a literalized Vanity Fair to introduce a puppet show that stands 
in for the story of the novel. The narration is extradiegetic and heterodiegetic, but focalized 
through the Manager, who looks out over the fair: “not a moral place certainly; nor a merry one, 
though very noisy” (1). The narrator of the novel is not the same as the Manager, but the roles 
are analogous, and the unstable metaphor of the Fair captures the complexity of the narrator’s 
position. 
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First of all, Vanity Fair is the story space: as the narrator uses the term in the novel, it is 
the fictional world of sin and folly in which Becky Sharp, Amelia Sedley, and the other 
characters live their circumscribed lives. But in the prologue, Vanity Fair is also the discourse 
space, the space of the Manager of the Performance, who stands on a stage between the audience 
and the puppet show.
5
 Furthermore, the Fair extends beyond the Manager’s stage. The audience, 
too, is in Vanity Fair, which is therefore also an analogue of the real world. The capaciousness of 
the Fair, realized metaphorically in the prologue, is what bridges the novel’s insistently arbitrary 
story and its sweeping social satire: the world of Becky Sharp corresponds ostensibly to our 
world—the human folly under examination is ours as well. But aligning our world and Becky’s 
under the name “Vanity Fair” requires a sleight of hand, which does not suffer when we know 
the trick. In order to accomplish this deft manipulation of theoretical space, the narrator must 
stand where the Manager does, before the curtain but part of Vanity Fair, a fool like the ones on 
the stage and the ones off of it, mediating between the Fair in which his audience finds itself and 
that in which the puppets act. This position is tenuous. Just as Geffrey is not quite the master of 
his dream, the narrator is not quite the master of Vanity Fair: he knows the story, most of the 
time, but he is also subject to his own metaphor of the Fair and its imposition of a universal 
foolishness. 
There are limits to the Fair, finally, which are likewise limits to the narrator’s discourse. 
In the novel the narrator frequently talks about Vanity Fair as if it were synonymous with the 
world, one world—that of the real readers as well as the characters. But it is more accurate to say 
that Vanity Fair is what lies within the horizon of the narrator’s vision. Like Harry Shaw’s “loose 
                                                     
5
 Seymour Chatman’s terms “discourse space” and “story space” apply a spatial metaphor to the narrative discourse 
and the story: the discourse space is where the narrator is imagined to exist during the time of the narration, while 
the story space is where the action of the story is imagined to exist. See Chatman, p.96. In this study “the diegesis” 
will most often be used instead of “story space” to designate the imagined world of the fiction without implying the 
narrator’s necessary existence in a separate, contrasting space. 
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narrator,” the wise-foolish narrator can imitate or perform the kind of human, situated, value-
inflected vision that a character in story space might have, even while narrating what a human 
character could never know.
6
 Thackeray’s narrator indicates the limit of his vision—or, in this 
case his hearing—when he declines to narrate the thoughts of Amelia, who is pining for her 
husband George: “Have we a right to repeat or overhear her prayers? These, brother, are secrets, 
and out of the domain of Vanity Fair, in which our story lies” (321). Tapeworm, remember, 
“knew everything—and a lot more besides.” The idea behind this joke, that there’s everything 
and then there’s everything, is fundamental to the design of Vanity Fair. The vision of a realist 
narrator, his or her peculiar take on the world, can have the appearance of totality, of accounting 
for a whole reality by capturing it in the diegesis. But Thackeray uses his wise-foolish narrator 
openly to expose this totality as a performance even as he performs it, to make the novel more 
like a dream vision of human folly than an attempt to judge the human condition. The Fair may 
extend beyond the Manager’s stage, but the Manager knows that his audience comes to the Fair 
from somewhere else, whence we return when the play is played out. 
In the other realist novels that will be examined, the narrator does not explicitly adopt the 
accoutrements of the wise fool, but the narrative discourse does similarly present the diegesis as 
if it were the narrator’s version of some independent reality. In other words, what is represented 
in nineteenth-century British realism is a narrator’s attempt to represent a reality; reality itself is 
not the primary object of representation. The Middlemarch of Middlemarch is a different kind of 
Vanity Fair, another interpretation of human life by a significantly different interpreter. Wise 
folly provides the mechanisms by which the narrator’s vision can be established as idiosyncratic 
and limited, however synoptic and universal it sometimes appears to aspire to be. This study 
                                                     
6
 Loose narrators are those who, though considered to be in discourse space, seem to enter story space, to simulate 
entering it, or otherwise to threaten the border between the spaces as classical narratology draws it. See Shaw, 
“Loose Narrators: Display, Engagement, and a Search for a Place in History in Realist Fiction.” 
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begins, therefore, by concentrating on specific issues of narrative discourse, and moves outwards 
progressively towards character and plot, intertextuality, and ideology, though at every point the 
narrative discourse of realist novels will be of central importance. 
The second chapter, “Narrative Authority and George Meredith’s Gnomes,” revises the 
authoritative status of realist narration. Focusing on aphorisms, epigrams, and maxims in novels 
including Diana of the Crossways, The Egoist, and The Ordeal of Richard Feverel, this chapter 
argues that such gnomic utterances belong to a discourse of wise folly, of tongue-in-cheek claims 
to wisdom: these “gnomes” challenge the possibility of summing up truths about reality in pithy 
sentences even as they attempt to do so. More broadly, Meredith’s theories and practices of 
comedy and realism exclude the possibility of wholly authoritative speech about reality by 
subjecting individual wisdom to correction within a larger, comic social consciousness. 
The third chapter, “George Eliot’s Pharmacy,” builds on the first chapter’s analysis of 
narrative authority to explain how characters resist the ethical frameworks imposed on them by 
narrative discourse. I use the term “pharmakos,” to which Jacques Derrida and Northrop Frye 
have given related meanings, to describe the ambiguous and subversive status of the scapegoat 
figures that are subjugated by the hierarchies of Eliot’s novels. From the margins of their novels 
characters such as Hans Meyrick in Daniel Deronda and Bob Jakin in The Mill on the Floss 
launch critiques of the values at the centre, namely of the doctrine of sympathy. Turning to 
Eliot’s late work Impressions of Theophrastus Such, a collection of essays attributed to an 
unsuccessful scholar who parodies Eliot’s usual learned narration, the chapter argues that there is 
a slippage between insiders and outsiders in Eliot’s work, between narrators and marginal 
characters, just as there is a slippage between the pharmakeus and the pharmakos, the druggist or 
sorcerer and the victim of a healing sacrifice. 
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The fourth chapter, “Learning We Are Fools,” taking into account the first two chapters’ 
arguments about authority and ethics in novels, examines the pedagogical role of literature and 
intertexts. In a novel that thematizes the literary education of its hero, such as Scott’s Waverley 
or Meredith’s The Ordeal of Richard Feverel, literary quotations become part of the network of 
discourses that influence the hero. Partly through fool characters such as Davie Gellatley and 
Adrian Harley these novels consider the possibility that reading can delude instead of educating. 
These novels thus examine their own pedagogical effects. Yet they offer no easy alternative to 
Quixote’s path, since they depict education as an intertextual process, fraught with corruption, 
distortion, and misreading, through which one borrows forms of thought from texts. 
The argument culminates in the fifth chapter, “If: Aesthetics and Ideology Revisited,” 
which examines the relationship between aesthetics and ideology in Rudyard Kipling’s fiction, 
especially his novel Kim. As critics have recognized, Kim practices an ethnography that 
contributes to the British imperial project by creating mastering knowledge about colonized 
peoples. Through narrative, discursive, and characterological strategies, however, Kim also 
launches a sophisticated critique of knowledge, one that distinguishes between ways of knowing, 
such as ethnology and proverbs, and that also imagines all forms of knowing to be limited. Kim 
himself illustrates an alternative means of engaging with the phenomenal world, an aesthetic 
apprehension that is receptive to particularity, but does not foreclose action. Similarly, this 
chapter and the dissertation as a whole treat realist novels as a source not merely for ideological 
commitments about reality or sheer play, but for complex forms of understanding through which 
readers may choose what commitments to make.
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Chapter Two 
Narrative Authority and George Meredith’s Gnomes 
 
Platitude, n. The fundamental element and special glory of popular literature. A 
thought that snores in words that smoke. The wisdom of a million fools in 
the diction of a dullard. A fossil sentiment in artificial rock. A moral 
without the fable. All that is mortal of a departed truth. A demi-tasse of 
milk-and-morality. The Pope’s-nose of a featherless peacock. A jelly-fish 
withering on the shore of the sea of thought. The cackle surviving the egg. 
A desiccated epigram. (Bierce, “Platitude”) 
 
1. Realist Narration and the Burden of Authority 
I suggested in Chapter One that wise folly in the British realist novel is most importantly 
a function of the narrator. Realist narrators mediate between the space of the characters and the 
space of the reader, simultaneously implying a world that the reader may come to know, and 
defining the limits of the reader’s access to that world. If the realist novel performs wise folly, if 
it renders the terms of ethical and hierarchical distinctions ambiguous even as it inscribes them, 
then the narrator is, wittingly or not, a central player in this performance. It may seem capricious 
to liken the typical realist narrator, variously called third-person omniscient or extradiegetic and 
heterodiegetic, to the wise fools of a carnival tradition. These narrators are more sovereign than 
clown. Their acute intelligences imitate their authors’, and their narrative discourse appears to 
define the ethical hierarchies of novels and arbitrate between characters’ discourses. This chapter 
will argue that ascribing such final authority to the realist narrator is not a necessary reading 
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practice, and that the narrator’s seeming authority is best considered a performance that displaces 
authority onto the reader. 
This argument will take its examples from George Meredith’s novels, especially Diana of 
the Crossways, The Egoist, and The Ordeal of Richard Feverel. Though Meredith’s work is too 
experimental in form to be simply representative of Victorian realism, the same pronounced self-
consciousness that makes Meredith appear exceptional and even proto-modernist makes his 
novels an excellent site for investigating the means and ends of realism. Meredith uses the 
resources of other literary forms, especially comedy, to craft a realism that has little to do with 
naturalism, the representation of gritty life, or “the dirty drab,” and more to do with 
“philosophy,” an exercise of intellection that, in wise-foolish spirit, Meredith both valorizes and 
satirizes (Diana 15). Meredith’s self-critical narrators are our best source of explicit insight into 
his realism and his chief tool for creating it. This realism, it will become clear, is more 
compatible with modernist and post-modern sensibilities than Victorian realism is ordinarily 
taken to be. Though it is tempting to ascribe this compatibility to Meredith’s own modernism, 
Chapter Three will trace the continuities in the other direction, extending the argument of this 
chapter to George Eliot’s more clearly typical realism. 
Meredith’s ambiguous periodicity is also useful because it helps us to examine how 
differences between Victorian and modernist practices have informed literary criticism of realist 
narration. Modernist novelists, especially Henry James, tended to reject the intrusive and 
judgmental narrator, preferring to use narration as a means to represent the consciousness of 
individual characters in finer detail. Wayne Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction responds to this shift 
by defending and normalizing judgmental narration: according to Booth’s early theory of 
narrative rhetoric, all narration is judgmental, inflected with the values of an implied author who 
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seeks to persuade the reader of certain ethical truths. Though Booth treats this goal as inevitable, 
acceptable, and even desirable, his theory only makes clearer why nineteenth-century intrusive 
narration would have seemed offensive to modernist taste. If these narrators carry out their 
implied authors’ rhetorical missions more baldly and insistently than the narrators of modernist 
novels do, then Roland Barthes is right to associate the nineteenth-century novel with the 
“classic text,” the “readerly” text, the text that constrains the plurality of its meaning and the 
creativity of its reader more than the “modern text,” which aspires to the pluralistic ideal of the 
“writerly.” The assertive authorial narrator of the typical realist novel appears to provide the 
speech “origin” that for Barthes is definitively classic: “In modern texts, the voices are so treated 
that any reference is impossible: the discourse, or better, the language, speaks: nothing more. By 
contrast, in the classic text the majority of the utterances are assigned an origin, we can identify 
their parentage, who is speaking: either a consciousness (of a character, of the author) or a 
culture (the anonymous is still an origin, a voice: the voice we find, for example, in the gnomic 
code)” (S/Z 41). Who speaks? In the realist novel, the narrator does, and if as Booth’s theory 
suggests the narrator speaks for the implied author, then the British realist novel is the epitome of 
the readerly, which robs readers of our own writerly activity in reading. To be sure, Barthes does 
not identify the realist novel with the readerly text, and his purpose in S/Z is largely to find what 
is writerly in Balzac’s “classic” Sarrasine. The readerly and the writerly are ideals—a text is 
never one or the other. Nevertheless an association, less nuanced than Barthes’s, of realism with 
the readerly has become the ground on which debates about narrative authority take place, and 
the ground itself is rarely questioned. From their different positions Booth and Barthes both 
suggest that realism, in opposition to modernism, aspires to a special narrative authority that is in 
one view salutary and in another repulsive. 
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The narrative of a modernism attempting to escape, through its practices and theories of 
narration, from the domineering authority of nineteenth-century realism underlies current 
approaches to the novel. Thus can Amanda Anderson refer in passing to “omniscient realism” as 
a “literary form,” combining a term for a kind of narrator with a term for a kind of fiction to 
suggest that realist fiction as a whole aspired to the omniscience that has traditionally been 
attributed to the form’s most typical narrator (48). As Jonathan Culler has argued, the term 
“omniscient” conflates and names, inaccurately, several distinct properties of narrators. Yet 
Culler writes, “the examples where the best case could be made for the notion [of omniscience] 
are those nineteenth-century novels from George Eliot to Anthony Trollope with extradiegetic-
heterodiegetic narrators who present themselves as histors: spokespersons of authority who 
judiciously sift and present information, know the innermost secrets of characters, reveal what 
they would keep hidden, and offer sage reflections on the foibles of humankind” (31). These 
histors are the exemplary narrators of realism. Culler notes that they are not, finally, omniscient: 
“Unraveling and exploring are not the operations of the omniscient. They are the province of the 
historian, who can investigate and capaciously survey. Such narrators engage in reflection, and 
link such wisdom as they offer to the process of judicious rumination, while an omniscient God 
should not need to reflect at all: he simply knows” (31). Yet the judicious sifting and sage 
reflecting of these narrators appear, in some way, to depend on the possession of authority, and 
Culler’s phrase “spokespersons of authority” recalls Booth’s identification of the narrator’s 
rhetoric with the author’s. 
Perhaps the most extensive account of the realist narrator’s authority appears in Susan 
Lanser’s Fictions of Authority. This book examines the precarious position of female narrative 
voice with respect to the norm of the public male voice and studies the dialogic strategies by 
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which different forms of female voice work in and around this norm in order both to resist the 
devices of masculine authority and to question the conventional gendering of authority as 
masculine. Lanser’s treatment of the narrative norm, however, depends on the assumptions about 
realist narration and authority I have been outlining and would like to challenge. She claims, 
“One project of the realist novel . . . is to accommodate the contradictions between knowing and 
judging, or representation and ideology, through an unprecedented authorization of the 
heterodiegetic voice, which must stand against the realist novel’s necessary production of 
‘speaking persons’ whose discourses threaten to destabilize any ideological hegemony” (85). In 
this view the realist novel is, by default, at pains to master and monologize the dialogue of its 
speaking persons by setting above them an absolutely authoritative, conventionally male narrator 
as arbiter: this narrator warrants on the one hand that his representation of reality is accurate, and 
on the other that his ethical evaluations of this reality are correct. Lanser’s narrator of “classic 
realism” thus claims a moral and rhetorical responsibility towards the reader that recalls Booth’s 
Rhetoric of Fiction as well as Barthes’s “classic text” (85). The realist narrator is, Lanser writes, 
“the single, extradiegetic and public voice, sole mediator of the fictional world, who occupies a 
‘higher’ discursive plane than the characters, entering into a compact with public narratees who, 
if they read rightly, are privileged to share the narrator’s enlightened place” (85). This 
enlightenment Lanser views as almost divine, implying omniscience without the name: “It is 
only a slight exaggeration to suggest that upon this narrator rested the demands and powers of 
divinity itself, trusted at once to know all and to judge aright” (85). 
How does Lanser reach this model of the almost-divine narrator? Partly by induction, but 
because I am arguing that realist novels look quite different under a different set of assumptions, 
I would like to note two other (over)determining influences. Lanser’s discussion of the realist 
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narrator repeats a familiar narrative, reinscribing the opposition between realism and modernism 
that underlies the work of Booth and Barthes. In this history, modernism succeeded realism and 
“challenged both of the narrative imperatives—knowing and judging—that I have associated 
with classic realism: in a world in which ‘nothing was just one thing,’ in which consciousness 
was understood to implicate unconsciousness, and in which traditional foundations of fact had 
been severely undermined, the project of realism was drastically compromised. The realist 
narrator could no longer pretend to infallibility” (104). Then came postmodernism: “while 
modernism understood narrative authority as conditional, postmodernism finds it a sham. 
Meaning is now not merely contingent but indeterminate, and the notion of a narrator as a textual 
‘higher’ authority—or of any textual figure as privileged knower—becomes not merely hollow 
but absurd” (126). From surety to doubt to a carnivalesque openness: these are the broad lines of 
the history of English literature over the past two centuries, but they obscure the particularities of 
realist narration, which accommodates ambiguities of epistemology and ethics to a greater 
degree than this narrative suggests. 
Current narratological terminology also buttresses the traditional view of realist narrators. 
The term “extradiegetic” designates a narrator who is not a character in another narrator’s story, 
while “heterodiegetic” designates a narrator who is not a character in his or her own story. The 
reliability of the extradiegetic heterodiegetic narrator is difficult for the reader to assess. 
Homodiegetic narrators can expose their unreliability through their self-representation, as 
Thackeray’s Barry Lyndon does. Intradiegetic narrators such as Marlow in Heart of Darkness 
can be measured against the narration of their framing narrators. The extradiegetic heterodiegetic 
narrator, however, is “sole mediator of the fictional world” in that he or she is outside all framing 
discourse (85). The sheer difficulty of judging whether such a narrator’s perspective is reliable 
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does not in itself endow that perspective with authority, but the spatial metaphor of being outside 
or beyond (extra) is powerful, and can encourage us to imagine a quasi-divine narrative position. 
Gérard Genette, who coined these narratological terms, writes, “Gil Blas is an extradiegetic 
narrator because, albeit fictitious, he is included (as narrator) in no diegesis but is on an exactly 
equal footing with the extradiegetic (real) public” (84). Speaking strictly of what Genette calls 
“level,” the position of an entity with respect to the nested narrative frames of a text, the realist 
narrator and the public are on “exactly” the same level—neither is embedded in any of the text’s 
narratives. “Equal footing” is not necessarily an ethical description. But it sounds like one. 
Moreover, realist narrators can destabilize the concept of diegesis, as we have seen 
Thackeray do. They forge, in the senses both of fashioning and of falsifying, an analogy between 
the world of the narrative and the world of the reader. The realist narrator appears to seek a 
vantage external to the reader’s own reality, making the reader intradiegetic, demoting the reader 
to a lower level. From this imaginative manoeuvre, perhaps, comes the sense that this narrator is 
a “textual ‘higher’ authority,” that he or she speaks from an “enlightened place” to narratees that 
can only reach such a place by submitting to the medium of the narrator’s authority (Ermarth 
126, 85). I will argue in the following sections and chapters that when the realist narrator 
“pretend[s] to infallibility,” he or she is best read as pretending, hamming it up with a greater or 
lesser degree of levity, and that it is important to the narrator’s operation that we catch a wink or 
two (104). When Anthony Trollope “suddenly winks at us and reminds us that he is telling us an 
arbitrary thing,” he does not destroy his realism, as Henry James believed—he creates it (James, 
The Critical Muse 117). 
The crux of the realist narrator’s ostensible authority is what Lanser calls “judg[ing] 
aright” and Culler calls “sage reflections on the foibles of humankind” (Lanser 85; Culler 31). 
 
 
31 
 
Knowing all, as Culler has shown, is not really a property of any kind of narrator. The narrator’s 
knowledge of the basic events and facts of the story is just the “constitutive convention of 
fiction,” a performative power to make the story so, and the narrator’s knowledge of characters’ 
thoughts is a special, limited power, more like telepathy than omniscience (27, 29). A narrator 
who possesses such powers can occasionally lose them. At one point in Adam Bede George 
Eliot’s narrator, who is usually telepathic, suddenly doesn’t know what is going on in Arthur 
Donnithorne’s mind: “Possibly there was some such unrecognized agent secretly busy in 
Arthur’s mind at this moment—possibly it was the fear lest he might hereafter find the fact of 
having made a confession to the Rector a serious annoyance, in case he should not be able quite 
to carry out his good resolutions? I dare not assert that it was not so. The human soul is a very 
complex thing” (157). One purpose of such lapses is precisely to remind us that the narrator does 
not know all, and that some things, such as the workings of even an imaginary mind, are difficult 
to know. Once we are reminded that the narrator is limited, albeit with special access to 
information, we are better able to recognize as Culler does that such “sage reflections” as “The 
human soul is a very complex thing,” are not simply matters of empirical or theoretical 
knowledge, but also of judgment. Culler calls the result of this judgment “wisdom,” and under 
the conventions of wise folly wisdom implies the possibility of profound error. As Mr. Irwine 
says in the same chapter of Adam Bede, “if we wise people make eminent fools of ourselves on 
any particular occasion, we must endure the legitimate conclusion that we carry a few grains of 
folly to our ounce of wisdom” (156). 
Turning to George Meredith’s narrators, we will consider how their ounces imply their 
grains, how Meredith constructs narrators with a claim to adulterated wisdom that decentres their 
authority. Meredith’s narrators, like George Eliot’s, have sophisticated philosophies, ethics, and 
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social and literary theories, which they present wholesale, piecemeal, explicitly, implicitly, along 
with sweeping, often humorous and incisive generalizations about characters, reality, and human 
life. The claims the narrators make are large and clearly necessitate the authors’ reflection on 
serious matters. Yet, while we might find these philosophies or generalizations compelling, 
interesting, far-sighted, beautiful, even right, we might also find them wrong, ugly, backwards, 
for many personal and historical reasons. Judging a narrator’s judgment is part of the intellectual, 
emotional, and ethical experience of reading, which is an experience that can in turn become part 
of wider intellectual, emotional, and ethical exchange. My goal in this project is not primarily to 
make such judgments, to argue whether the wisdom of any narrator is indeed wise—for us, for 
the Victorians, for an age, or for all time. My aim is to help enrich our experiences of reading by 
accounting for contingencies in realist narrators’ perspectives and the textual processes by which 
realist narration can, if we let it, stimulate rather than overwrite our own readerly judgment. 
Meredith’s narrators are wise fools, masks that operate much like Erasmus’s Folly. They do not 
merely channel the authority of an originary Author: on the contrary, they render such ultimate 
authority irretrievable and the most breathtaking displays of wisdom potentially foolish. 
 
2. The Problem of Disagreeing 
 Realist narrators frequently overreach the basic class of narrative-statement that, as Culler 
notes, we conventionally accept unless given reason not to, statements which tell us that so-and-
so did thus and such. Because realist novels performatively align the world of their narrative with 
the world of their narratees, readers are often faced with judgments that attempt to bear on our 
own reality. Here is a claim from Diana of the Crossways: “Irishmen, as far as I have seen of 
them, are, like horses, bundles of nerves; and you must manage them, as you do with all nervous 
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creatures, with firmness, but good temper” (Meredith 41). There are reasons why a reader might 
reject this idea. In this case, dissent is relatively inconsequential because the speaker is a 
character, Thomas Redworth, and he is at least half joking. Yet other judgments may appear to 
carry more authority in a novel, such as “when Celtic brains are reflective on their emotional 
vessel they shoot direct as the arrow of logic,” which is the narrator’s claim (488). If one 
considers the narrator to be omniscient, superlatively authoritative, or even just wise, the 
proposition is more difficult to dismiss—that is, dismissing it may affect our reading of the 
whole novel. 
The narrator’s claim appears to be ethically and interpretively coercive, to imply 
mutually dependent judgments both of “Celtic brains” and of Diana’s impending marriage to 
Redworth at the end of the novel. This marriage is a crux in Diana, because it is not at all a tidy 
comic ending: Diana is a feminist, an author, an independent woman who evidently desires the 
conventionally masculine, athletic, and self-disciplined Redworth to a degree, but is averse to 
marrying him. As the subtitle of the last chapter alarmingly terms it, she is a “Barely Willing 
Woman . . . Led to Bloom with the Nuptial Sentiment.” The preceding chapter is subtitled 
“Showing a Final Struggle For Liberty and a Run Into Harness,” and when providing Diana’s 
point of view in free indirect discourse the narrator portrays her marriage as a “submission” to 
“the wedding yoke”: “She was dominated, physically and morally, submissively too” (487, 488). 
When the narration is focalized through Diana’s close friend Emma Dunstane, on the other hand, 
the marriage appears in a considerably more positive light, as “the union of the woman noble in 
the sight of God with a more manlike man [than Diana’s previous lover, Percy Dacier]” and “the 
marriage of the two noblest of human souls, one the dearest” (479, 493). In fact, it is largely 
because of Emma’s intercession on Redworth’s behalf that Diana, who has already refused 
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Redworth once, submits to his courtship and proposal: Diana “had to think of appeasing her 
Emma” (479). Diana portrays herself to Emma as “a sober person taking at last a right practical 
step, to please her two best friends” (490). She marries because she thinks it is right, not 
necessarily because she wants to. She responds, however, to the massive desire that she sees 
Redworth, one of these “best friends,” repress in a “big breath” when she kisses his arm through 
his coat-sleeve (489): “Imagination began busily building a nest for him, and enthusiasm was not 
sluggish to make a home of it” (490). Emma finds a “marked” change in Diana the next day, her 
wedding day, though the narrator does not describe the change beyond saying Diana is “a natural 
bubble of the notes”—she sings, apparently (490). The novel ends with ambiguity. When Emma, 
whose pet name for Diana is “Tony,” says she would like to “live long enough to be a 
godmother” to Diana’s future children, “There was no reply: there was an involuntary little 
twitch of Tony’s fingers” (494). This sentence is the novel’s last. The twitch might signify the 
“enthusiasm” described earlier, Diana’s awakening desire for Redworth and motherhood. It 
could, on the other hand, signify various other responses, including lingering resistance. 
Critical treatments of this ending have been fittingly various. Gillian Beer assumes that 
suitability is a necessary condition to the marriage ending: “The author must convince the reader 
that Redworth is a fitting mate for Diana” (164). Gayla McGlamery believes that Redworth is a 
fitting mate for Diana and, though she allows that “Meredith leaves the relation between the two 
ever-so-slightly indeterminate,” argues that Redworth embodies the values of free and equal 
dialogue that the novel finally endorses: “Meredith cannot change the world Diana inhabits, nor 
can he imagine a circumstance in which she might educate, defend, and provide for herself 
independently, given the world as it was in the 1840s, or even in the 1880s when he was writing. 
His answer is to create a man to offer Diana the opportunities the real world did not” (486). For 
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Gisela Argyle, Redworth is not the best substitute for an unavailable independence; rather, 
Redworth is an example of the “good” paternalism that Meredith ostensibly values: “the plot 
concludes as comedy with the heroine’s happy marriage to him [Redworth],” and “Their 
anticipated offspring, prayed for by Diana’s friend Emma, symbolizes Meredith’s utopia” (987). 
Judith Wilt, more sympathetic to Meredith, locates the desire for this ending marriage in Diana, 
suggesting that she is simply not as good at reading herself as the narrator is: “He [Meredith] 
means to say that he has read through the layers of Diana’s very modern and freedom-loving 
character with all the insight and clarity of which he is capable finally to discern that she wants a 
Nuptial Chapter, that it is in fact her chosen ending” (74). 
Despite their disagreements about its meaning and motivation, these readers all suppose 
Diana’s marriage to have the author’s moral approval. The narrator’s claim “when Celtic brains 
are reflective on their emotional vessel they shoot direct as the arrow of logic” helps to explain 
this supposition. Frequently in the last chapter of Diana the narration is focalized through Diana, 
Redworth, and Emma, who all think differently about the marriage, Redworth and Emma much 
less ambivalently than Diana. The saw about Celtic brains, however, is a typical realist intrusion 
into the dialogue: this is the narrative voice speaking on its own, the singular voice that we have 
learned to read not just as the mediator but the arbiter of the characters’ voices. At this crucial 
point Diana is reviewing her past with an eye to her future, and the narrator’s intrusion tells us 
that she sees that past, and her past self, clearly: “She was driven to the conclusion that the 
granting of any of her heart’s wild wishes in those days would have lowered her—or frozen” 
(Meredith, Diana 489). By suggesting that at this moment Diana’s brain is “shoot[ing] direct as 
the arrow of logic,” the narrator appears to agree with Diana that her “wild wishes” for Dacier 
were misguided and to approve her turn to Redworth as a return to her senses. If the narrator 
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approves, are we not meant to as well, and are we not moved to approve by the rhetoric of 
fiction? 
Other critics of Diana, by beginning with different assumptions about narration, reach 
readings of the marriage that either do not view it as an ethical problem or that construe the 
problem as intentional. Elizabeth Bradburn chooses to examine the novel’s “system of 
conceptual metaphors” rather than its “conscious propositions” (877). At the end of the novel, 
she argues, “The material and social body has successfully smothered Diana’s progressive 
intellectual ideals in the sleep of domesticity” (893). Bradburn locates meaning in the network of 
metaphors through which the novel models mind and the body: she is, therefore, not interested in 
the narrator’s (or Meredith’s) opinion of Diana’s smothering, and her reading does not struggle 
against a textual coercion to see the marriage as a happy ending. Neil Roberts, decentring 
narrative authority through Bakhtinian theory, writes, “There is no reason . . . to suppose that we 
are to interpret the phrase ‘loss of self in the man’ as a final achievement of true femininity, or as 
anything but a highly problematic condition of Diana’s sexual fulfilment” (224). Instead of 
assuming the narrator’s judgments to be authorized, Roberts reveals a “hidden polemic” that he 
assumes to be intended: in other words, what has authorial approval for Roberts is not Diana’s 
marriage but the provocation that it offers to a reader encouraged elsewhere in the novel to 
consider the value of Diana’s independence (224). (McGlamery’s approach is ostensibly also 
Bakhtinian, but she curiously monologizes the dialogue of the novel by arguing that it makes an 
appreciation for dialogue into a desirable character trait. If Meredith offers Redworth as Diana’s 
“proper mate” because Redworth values free dialogue, then the novel does not, itself, value 
dialogue very much [485].) Such alternative methods of reading differentiate between the 
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intentions of a realist narrator and the design of the text as the readers construe it. This difference 
can turn the ethical problems raised by a text into meaningful parts of the text’s form. 
When the narrator is considered to be the ultimate authority of a novel, on the other hand, 
our rejection of the narrator’s claims often entails a larger rejection of the novel’s structure of 
values, and sometimes even its coherence as an artistic form, since values are part of the artistic 
form of a realist novel. Beer, reading another crux in Diana, moves from faulting the narrator’s 
judgment to faulting the novel. At one point in the heart of the narrative, Diana betrays her 
sometime lover Dacier. Diana is trying to write her own novel, but is suffering from writer’s 
block and can only produce a “heavy bit of moralized manufacture” for the first sentence, when 
really “Her present mood was a craving for excitement; for incident, wild action, the primitive 
machinery of our species; any amount of theatrical heroics, pathos, and clown-gabble” 
(Meredith, Diana 360). She cries, “It has come to this—I have no head” (360). The block is 
doubly troubling to her because she writes professionally and is living outside her means: she 
thinks not only of her book, but also of her “bank-book” (360). Dacier, a member of parliament, 
interrupts her with his entrance, and shares with her a political secret known only to him and the 
prime minister.
1
 He then kindles, takes her hands, and, it is implied, kisses her. Diana, still 
married at this point to her estranged first husband, turns Dacier away and sells his secret to a 
newspaper editor. Her motives, as far as they are visible to us, are complex and overdetermined: 
they involve anxiety about authorship, authority, money, public perception, her vexed erotic 
relationship with Dacier, and perhaps even that “craving for excitement; incident, wild action” 
that interferes with her writing. 
                                                     
1
 Meredith is vague about historical landmarks in Diana of the Crossways, and the conversation between Diana and 
Dacier does not explicitly reveal what the secret is. To the extent, however, that Diana is loosely based on the story 
of Caroline Norton, the secret is Robert Peel’s intent to repeal the Corn Laws in 1845. When the Times published 
Peel’s intent ahead of his announcement of it, rumour had it that Norton was responsible because of her connection 
to Sidney Herbert. For the links between Diana and Norton’s life, see Argyle. 
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Beer’s objection to the betrayal centres on what she terms its “artistic problem,” namely 
the “artistic problem of the relationship of author to heroine” (163). Beer believes that Meredith 
has become too attached to Diana: he displays a “lack of affection for Dacier and [a] 
possessiveness towards his heroine”; “He is obliged to blacken Dacier in order to excuse Diana”; 
he “feels [a] pressure to protect his heroine from criticism” (159, 163, 165). It is as if Meredith 
himself has fallen in love with Diana. Although Beer’s argument also pertains to plot and 
characterization, especially Meredith’s decisions to interrupt Diana’s elopement with Dacier and 
to reduce Dacier to a caricature after Diana betrays him, Beer objects most forcefully to the 
narrative commentary. On the plus side “Meredith shows much that is original and daring about 
emotional stress and suggests new attitudes to the concept of ‘congruity’ of character in fiction” 
(159, author’s emphasis). But “Meredith cannot bear to allow any loss of sympathy for her 
[Diana]. This involves him in turgid and otiose explanations of what has been presented through 
image and action” (159, author’s emphasis). Beer’s opposition between showing and explaining 
recalls the modernist preference for showing over telling, which ignores, as Booth and Tristram 
Shandy have both reminded us, that all narration is telling. Though there is a lot of the intrusive 
kind of telling in Diana and in Meredith generally, Beer rejects what she is being told, considers 
it inaccurate, and this inaccuracy becomes for her an artistic flaw in the novel. She writes, “The 
artistic problem arises not because Diana’s actions are ‘incongruous’ but because the novelist’s 
commentary exculpates her even while Diana feels herself to blame” (160, author’s emphasis). 
The narrator does tell us what to think about Diana’s betrayal of Dacier in commentary 
like the following: “When we are losing balance on a precipice we do not think much of the 
thing we have clutched for support. Our balance is restored and we have not fallen; that is the 
comfortable reflection: we stand as others do, and we will for the future be warned to avoid the 
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dizzy stations which cry for resources beyond a common equilibrium, and where a slip 
precipitates us to ruin” (Meredith, Diana 382). One might feel with Beer that such commentary 
is special pleading disguised as generalization. If we accept the narrator’s proposition about “us,” 
humans in general, then it follows that we must see Diana’s actions in a certain way: she was 
desperate, she wasn’t thinking of the consequences, the chance was too good to pass up, anyone 
would have done the same, she won’t do it again. Apologies like these are entailed by what the 
narrator claims as a universal truth, but they are not adequate to Diana’s complex motives, darkly 
intimated in dialogue and focalized narration (“shown,” that is, not “explained”). Besides—the 
thing Diana clutches for support, the selling of her lover’s secret, has everything to do with her 
“precipice,” the brink of financial ruin, sexual transgression, and submission to a man. It is no 
wonder that Beer considers the narration to be apologetic. Her ability, as a keen reader, to reject 
this apology is of the utmost importance. Of course we ought to be able to reject a narrator’s 
judgments, and especially the values and ideologies implied by them. The model of the realist 
narrator as vehicle of authority, however, masks the role of the reader’s dissent in the realist 
novel as a form. The success of Diana of the Crossways as a novel does not depend on the 
reader’s belief that the narrator is right about Diana, and if we conceive of narrative commentary 
differently, it becomes possible to see the role that error plays in Meredith’s narration. 
 
3. Meredith’s Gnomes 
 The narrator’s comment about what we think of when balancing on precipices, like the 
generalization about Celtic minds, is a gnomic utterance, a short assertion of a speaker’s wisdom. 
I will call these utterances “gnomes” to avoid promoting any particular kind of gnome, such as 
the aphorism, the epigram, or the maxim, to a general category term. With “gnome” I allude to 
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Barthes’s “gnomic codes”: a subset of the “cultural” or “reference” codes, which invoke 
knowledge or wisdom from the larger cultural text of which the single text is a part. For Barthes, 
these reference codes are at the core of what is wrong with the readerly: “The referential codes 
have a kind of emetic virtue, they bring on nausea by [. . .] boredom, conformism, and disgust 
with [the] repetition that establishes them”; “If we collect all such knowledge, all such 
vulgarisms, we create a monster, and this monster is ideology” (S/Z 139, 97).2 Barthes’s problem 
with these codes is a version of what I termed the problem of disagreeing: 
Like didactic language and political language, which also never question the 
repetition of their utterances (their stereotypic essence), the cultural proverb 
vexes, provokes an intolerant reading; the Balzacian text is clotted with it: 
because of its cultural codes, it stales, rots, excludes itself from writing (which is 
always a contemporary task): it is the quintessence, the residual condensate of 
what cannot be rewritten. (98) 
In conceiving the reader as a writer engaged in an act that is “always . . . contemporary,” Barthes 
recognizes that the reader is always later than the text, must always to some extent rewrite the 
text now. The difference that permits disagreement is inherent in reading. Because cultural codes 
are, for Barthes, repetition without critical difference, they resist the reader’s critical difference, 
are an unpleasant “condensate,” a sediment, like sand in one’s dinner. They make the reader 
angry and they make the text “stale,” unpalatable to the contemporary reader, which is every 
reader. 
                                                     
2
 I have emended Richard Miller’s translation of Barthes, which reads: “The referential codes have a kind of emetic 
virtue, they bring on nausea by the boredom, conformism, and disgust with repetition that establishes them.” The 
reference codes are established simply by repetition, not by disgust with repetition; and disgust with repetition, 
along with conformity and boredom, contribute to the reader’s nausea. See Barthes, Éditions du Seuil, 1970: “Les 
codes de référence ont une sorte de vertu vomitive, ils écoeurent, par l’ennui, le conformisme, le dégôut de la 
répétition qui les fonde” (145). 
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Barthes feeds his own “intolerant reading” of cultural codes in Sarrasine, however, by a 
kind of rewriting that is not a necessary part of reading. He uses a “transformational” stylistics, 
on analogy with transformational grammar, to translate narrative utterances into the form of 
gnomes in order to expose underlying cultural codes: “it is because an utterance can be 
transformed into a proverb, a maxim, a postulate, that the supporting cultural code is 
discoverable” (100). Balzac’s sentence “gentleness was always the most powerful of weapons 
where this passionate soul was concerned, and the master had no greater control over his 
student than when he inspired his gratitude through paternal kindness” becomes “A soft answer 
turneth away wrath” (99, author’s italics). Transformational stylistics makes cultural codes a 
hidden dimension of the text that the critic “discover[s]” by expressing the judgments implicit in 
narration in the form of gnomes. For Barthes, the codes exposed this way are apparently no 
different from the ones actually expressed in gnomic form. Gnomes, then, are no more than 
undisguised cultural codes that need not be translated by the critic-translator. But disregarding 
the particulars of narration, the specific forms of a narrator’s speech, elides the potential for 
difference in these particulars. There can be no critical difference in the repetition of cultural 
codes if our method of reading assimilates all the repetitions. An implied cultural stereotype 
cannot simply be translated into a gnome without significant loss of meaning, specifically 
whatever it means in a given context to imply a stereotype instead of expressing it directly as a 
gnome. I will treat gnomes, then, not as mere vessels for cultural condensate, but as forms that 
are significant in themselves: speech genres, in Bakhtin’s terminology. This approach will allow 
us to consider how gnomes are deployed in Meredith’s work not merely to invoke accepted 
truths but to call into question the wisdom and authority of their speakers, including the narrators 
themselves. 
 
 
42 
 
Meredith is a gnomic writer. His narration and the speech of his characters are peppered 
with gnomes. He even invents sources for them, secondary texts like “The Pilgrim’s Scrip,” “The 
Book of Egoism,” or sundry records of Diana Warwick’s witticisms, including her own novels. 
Meredith deploys his gnomes self-consciously: his narrators and characters are critics of them as 
well as authors. His novels exemplify gnomic style and examine the potentials and pitfalls of the 
gnome as a genre of speech. Writing of “the novel’s incorporation of every possible kind of 
maxim and aphorism,” Bakhtin suggests that these forms of speech “may oscillate between the 
purely objective (the ‘word on display’) and the directly intentional, that is, the fully 
conceptualized philosophical dicta of the author himself (unconditional discourse spoken with no 
qualifications or distancing)” (The Dialogic Imagination 322). Meredith’s gnomes occupy a 
middle ground closer to the first of these poles. When Meredith’s gnomes happen to be 
concerned explicitly with wisdom and folly, they tend to perform a conventional inversion of 
these terms. Sir Austin Feverel, the “Aphorist” of The Ordeal of Richard Feverel, writes: “Life is 
a tedious process of learning we are Fools” (Meredith 9).3 Diana claims the following about 
“Romance” in Diana of the Crossways: “The young who avoid that region escape the title of 
Fool at the cost of a celestial crown” (12).4 And Professor Crooklyn defines “a rough truth” in 
The Egoist by saying, “It is a rough truth, ma’am, that the world is composed of fools, and that 
the exceptions are knaves” (304). Sir Austin and Crooklyn’s gnomes imply that folly is a general 
condition, and all three suggest that embracing this condition is better than the alternative. These 
statements are not principles that the novels set out to prove, but they accomplish at least two 
things. First, they posit the basic tenets of wise folly, entertaining the idea that humanity and 
                                                     
3
 This aphorism does not appear in the second or third editions of the novel. I quote the first edition, which better 
illustrates Meredith’s use of the conventional language of wise folly and his interest in the form of the aphorism. For 
more on Meredith’s revisions of The Ordeal of Richard Feverel, see Chapter Four of this dissertation. 
4
 All italics are Meredith’s unless otherwise indicated. 
 
 
43 
 
folly are inextricably linked, and that, therefore, wisdom and folly are antithetical but unstable 
categories, liable to switch places in a hierarchy of value. Second, these gnomes signal the 
alliance between the discourse of wise folly and the gnome as a speech genre. 
Gnomes being expressions of wisdom, they often draw on a set of conventional terms and 
associations pertaining to “philosophy” in a broad sense, especially ethics. Gnomes, in other 
words, tend to allude to the history and language of their own genre. Thus does Crooklyn make 
his claim about the moral condition of humanity through the verbal pairing of the fool and the 
knave, traditional at least since the Renaissance and deliberately archaic in the mouth of a 
Victorian pedant. Such allusions are a clue to the conventionality of the wisdom the gnomes 
express. Sir Austin’s aphorism recalls the paradox of Touchstone’s “The fool doth think he is 
wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool,” which Touchstone himself identifies as a 
“saying,” and which recasts Socrates’s ironic claim to the wisdom of knowing he is not wise 
(Shakespeare, As You Like It 5.1.30-31). Crooklyn’s cynical pronouncement and Diana’s defense 
of the folly of romance are hardly new ideas, either. These gnomes remind us that it is 
conventional to express moral truths in pithy sentences using terms like “wisdom,” “folly,” and 
“knavery,” ethical categories whose exact content is changeable and must be worked out in use, 
though certain configurations of the terms tend to recur. 
It is also conventional for authors and characters to play with the positions of these 
categories in an ethical hierarchy: this play is wise folly. Confronting Kent in the stocks, the Fool 
appears to tease him for sticking by Lear, suggesting that Kent is foolish to remain loyal to a man 
whose power is waning: “Let go thy hold when a great wheel runs down a hill lest it break thy 
neck with following it; but the great one that goes upward, let him draw thee after” (King Lear 
2.2.261-63). Yet the Fool immediately retracts his own advice: “When a wise man gives thee 
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better counsel give me mine again; I would have none but knaves follow it, since a fool gives it” 
(2.2.264-66). The metaphor of the wheel now has the status of an antignome, delivered by a fool 
for the benefit of knaves. The Fool implies that he is actually praising Kent for his service to 
Lear, and indeed, dropping into rhyme, he expresses his intention to do the same:  
  But I will tarry, the fool will stay, 
     And let the wise man fly: 
  The knave turns fool that runs away, 
     The fool no knave perdy. (2.2.271-74) 
The ethical terms by this point have completely slipped their moorings: it’s wise to run away, but 
it’s knavish to run away, and isn’t it foolish to choose to be a knave? It’s foolish to stay, but at 
least one doesn’t succumb to the knavish wisdom of running. Through the Fool’s verbal trickery 
“folly” and “wisdom” become simultaneously valued and devalued categories, with the Fool 
choosing his favourite kind of each. After all, everyone’s a fool, but some fools are wiser than 
others, usually the ones that understand that every course of action is a choice among follies—
thus runs the logic of wise folly.
5
 “Where learned you this, fool?” asks Kent (2.2.275). The Folio 
Fool replies, “Not i’the stocks, fool” (2.2.276). The Fool’s taunting, in the end, is that of a 
professional toying with an unaccomplished amateur: he and the disguised Kent are both playing 
the fool, but the Fool’s not the one in the stocks. Meredith’s allusions to the language of wise 
folly in Sir Austen, Crooklyn, and Diana’s gnomes invoke not only the history of gnomic 
utterance in English, but also its often vexed relationship to moral truth. This relationship has 
                                                     
5
 Cf. Enid Welsford’s reading of this scene in The Fool, p. 255. She writes, “This whole passage proved so puzzling 
to Dr Johnson—whose mind was not attuned to the nuances and complex ironies of fool-literature—that he wished 
to straighten out the reasoning by emendation, and in particular to alter the last lines of the song into: 
‘The fool turns knave who runs away; 
The knave no fool perdy’” (255). 
Johnson’s version is a much less complex argument for running away: the knave may be a knave, but he isn’t a fool. 
The unemended version plays on a less stable distinction between the knave and the fool, in which knavery can be 
another route to folly.  
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been explored through a tradition of thought and artistic practice to which both Shakespeare and 
Meredith belong. Having examined the generic context, associations, and possibilities of 
Meredith’s gnomes, we turn now to his specific treatment of them in his fiction. 
“Gnome,” of course, is my word. Meredith uses a variety of terms. The narrator of Diana 
offers the following general reflections on wit while considering the particular case of Diana’s: 
When a nation has acknowledged that it is as yet but in the fisticuff stage of the 
art of condensing our purest sense to golden sentences, a readier appreciation will 
be extended to the gift: which is to strike not the dazzled eyes, the unanticipating 
nose, the ribs, the sides, and stun us, twirl us, hoodwink, mystify, tickle and 
twitch, by dexterities of lingual sparring and shuffling, but to strike roots in the 
mind, the Hesperides of good things. (Meredith 2) 
Diana’s “golden sentences,” unlike Sir Austin’s aphorisms, Captain Kirby’s maxims, or Mrs. 
Mountstuart Jenkinson’s epigrams, are never assigned a specific subgenre. The naming of a 
gnome in Meredith’s novels characterizes not only the specific linguistic features of the utterance 
but also its dialogic context, including the kind of speaker that speaks it. Sir Austin is a 
“scientific humanist,” stung by his wife’s infidelity into misogyny and monomania, who fills his 
“Pilgrim’s Scrip” with general reflections on human nature, especially woman’s nature and its 
dangerous effects on man. Captain Kirby, from The Amazing Marriage, is a hyper-masculine 
swashbuckler, who wooed his wife away from her weak husband and whose “Maxims for men” 
contains rules for action, specifically for acting like Captain Kirby. Mrs. Mountstuart Jenkinson 
is the voice of society in The Egoist whose epigrams sum up other characters pointedly but 
enigmatically. Diana, in contrast to these characters, is elusive, situated at the “crossways” of 
various accounts of her, none of which is entirely accurate. Her gnomes are most like the 
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aphorisms of Sir Austin, but since the aphorism in Meredith suggests a speaker like Sir Austin, 
male but emasculated, taking refuge in philosophy, it makes sense that the narrator does not call 
Diana an aphorist. 
Nevertheless, the “art of condensing our purest sense to golden sentences” describes most 
gnomes in Meredith accurately. First, the gnome contains “our purest sense”; it claims that form 
of knowledge, different from either empirical fact or tautological truth, which I have been 
classifying as wisdom. The “our” is significant because it marks this “purest sense” as collective: 
the narrator’s wording suggests not only good sense but common sense, the wisdom of 
consensus. The “Book of Egoism,” the imaginary record of human nature to which Meredith 
refers throughout The Egoist is, he tells us, “a book full of the world’s wisdom” (3). That 
wisdom often takes the form of gnomes that the narrator quotes from the Book. In fact, gnomes 
in Meredith are so often quoted, so often the words of someone else, even an imaginary human 
collective, that one might say the form of the gnome is constitutively quotational. Gary Saul 
Morson, accordingly, classes aphorisms, maxims, and witticisms in the genre category of 
“quotations.” Gnomes travel through text in what Bakhtin calls “intonational quotation marks”: 
they are spoken by speakers, but suggest a different original speaker, one who remains 
theoretical and unidentifiable (The Dialogic Imagination 44). 
Under this view of the gnome, its speaker speaks for many and speaks words that have 
already been spoken. The wisdom of the realist narrator, expressed in gnomic form, could be 
freighted not with an individual authority but a social one, which recalls J. Hillis Miller’s 
conception of the narrator as a collective consciousness or Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth’s conception 
of the narrator as “Nobody,” an indicator of potential consensus (Miller, The Form of Victorian 
Fiction 53-90; Ermarth 65-93). Not merely a channel for the cultural codes, the narrator may be 
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the repository of them. Yet in Meredith the gnome, “our purest sense,” is also an “art” that takes 
the form of “golden sentences.” “Golden” here suggests beauty, specifically a wrought beauty: 
gnomes as gilt work. One of the expectations built into this speech genre is that it will be 
evaluated aesthetically. As Jonathan Loesberg has argued in A Return to Aesthetics, to apprehend 
an object aesthetically is to treat it as if it were designed, whether or not we’re willing to commit 
to the real existence of the design or even the designer. Gnomes seem like quotations of 
collective wisdom, but they are also intentional forms that must be treated as authored in order to 
be read and assessed. And they are also in fact authored, on one level by Meredith’s characters 
and narrators, on another by Meredith, who kept notebooks of them to use in his novels, Sir 
Austin being loosely based on himself.
6
 Meredith emphasizes, especially in Diana of the 
Crossways, the work involved in authoring gnomes. The narrator of Diana, an exacting critic of 
golden sentences, makes it an implicit criterion of a good gnome that it maintain a right balance 
between the appearance of collective wisdom (“our purest sense”) and a singular beauty. A 
gnome in Meredith must not be idiosyncratic, but it must not be a cliché. 
Thus, the narrator judges one of Diana’s aphorisms to be simply a comment on her 
position as an object of scandal: “Her saying that ‘A woman in the pillory restores the original 
bark of brotherhood to mankind,’ is no more than a cry of personal anguish” (Diana 12). This 
one is “no more than . . . personal” because it seems too rooted in Diana’s own predicament. On 
the other hand, the narrator judges another to be unoriginal: “It is there [in being creatures of 
habit] we see ourselves crutched between love grown old and indifference ageing to love” (10). 
The narrator hears in this gnome “an echo of maxims and aphorisms overchannel, 
notwithstanding a feminine thrill in the irony of ‘ageing to love’” (10). It is too continental, not 
to mention too feminine. Perhaps, then, one might speak collective wisdom in an original way by 
                                                     
6
 See Beer, 19-20, for Meredith’s use of his notebook aphorisms in The Ordeal of Richard Feverel. 
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splitting up form and content, expressing an old idea in a novel phrase? Apparently not: the next 
aphorism, “Men may have rounded Seraglio Point: they have not yet doubled Cape Turk,” is 
“fresher . . . though we find it to be but the clever literary clothing of a common accusation” 
(10). What oft was thought but ne’er so well express’d apparently does not suffice. 
There may be no satisfying this narrator, and fortunately we are not concerned here with 
deciding what makes a good gnome. The narrator’s criticism of Diana’s phrases is important 
because, first, it suggests the dual quality of the gnomic writer’s voice, the tendency towards 
individual craft on the one hand and a collective consciousness on the other. Second, the 
narrator’s criticism suggests that it may be impossible perfectly to reconcile the two halves of 
this voice. The narrator communicates this impossibility partly by being fallible himself in 
particular ways, which is difficult to recognize if he is taken to represent a collective rather than 
a singular perspective. There are strong signs that he is male, and his position with respect to 
Diana colours his treatment of her. He carefully avoids taking a side in the first paragraph of the 
novel, which describes a gnomic war of the sexes in which “a general fling at the [female] sex” 
will be returned in time by “a strange assault of wanton missiles”: here he refers to both men and 
women as “them” (1). But his androgyny seems more likely to be a pose, that of a male 
philosopher attempting but failing to be impartial in his survey of human nature. His complaint 
about a “feminine thrill in the irony of ‘ageing to love’” leaves little doubt that he, at the very 
least, does not identify with the feminine. The aphorism about women in the pillory features 
woman as scapegoat; the one about Cape Turk suggests, via some Orientalism, that men have not 
yet discovered how to treat women as equals. These are feminist aphorisms, and in singling them 
out for critique, the narrator appears not to be motivated by purely aesthetic criteria. The 
masculine authorial persona treats Diana’s rival authorship with condescension. 
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The biased narrator alleges, however, that Diana herself is skeptical of her feminist 
sentences: “Generally in her character of the feminine combatant there is a turn of phrase, like a 
dimple near the lips, showing her knowledge that she was uttering but a tart measure of the truth. 
She had always too much lambent humour to be the dupe of the passion wherewith, as she says, 
‘we lash ourselves into the persuasive speech distinguishing us from the animals’” (14). On the 
one hand, the narrator gets to undermine Diana’s feminist gnomes here; on the other hand, he 
does quote Diana expressing doubt about gnomes—in a gnome. Diana’s witty characterization of 
“persuasive speech” gives humans a wise-foolish status, at both an advantage and a disadvantage 
to the animals. As if in illustration of the gnome’s sense, Diana deploys the paradox of wise 
folly, making a claim that undermines the grounds of its own wisdom: if persuasive speech is the 
result of being duped by one’s passions, than what is the status of Diana’s own persuasive speech 
when she says that this is so? The solution to this paradox is a wise-foolish mask, an attitude of 
“lambent humour” towards one’s own assertions, including assertions of wise folly. 
What the narrator says about Diana, however, applies equally to him, is the most accurate 
way to characterize the self-conscious tone in which he delivers even his sexist judgments. The 
narrator, too, is full of “lambent humour” and knows he utters “but a tart measure of the truth.” 
Only thus can he spend an entire chapter scrupulously analyzing references to Diana and 
quotations from her, musing on the topics of philosophy, realism, and fiction, only to close 
(playfully, self-deprecatingly, obnoxiously) with “Wherewith let us to our story, the froth being 
out of the bottle” (20). This self-deprecation suggests neither the authority of a god-like narrator, 
speaking from his enlightened place, nor the neutral transmission of collective wisdom, but a 
wry, very human awareness of one’s own fallibility, with a determination to persist in it. The 
narrator of the Egoist begins his narrative with a similarly discursive preamble on comedy, in a 
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chapter whose title similarly disavows the value of its content: “A Chapter of Which the Last 
Page Only Is of Any Importance.” Meredith’s narrators tend to be aware of the folly of “the 
persuasive speech distinguishing us from animals.” And yet Meredith’s narrators and many of 
his characters are inveterate phrase-makers. This ambivalence is inseparable from the aspects of 
gnomic speech that we have seen. The speaker of a gnome is poised in an impossible negotiation 
between two identities, as singular author and as conduit of culturally-available wisdom, and 
may therefore turn the position into that of the wise fool, who might speak eccentric nonsense or 
might speak common sense but who always speaks provisionally, imagining that wisdom cannot 
be systematically distinguished from folly. Meredith’s narrators navigate this course. 
There is yet another reason for Meredith’s ambivalent treatment of gnomes, and it is 
another defining characteristic of gnomic speech. The making of golden sentences is, we recall, 
“The art of condensing our purest sense.” That condensation entails several things. Pith, for one: 
the art of counting and weighing words. Gnomes, after all, must be relatively short to be 
quotable. “Life is a tedious process of learning we are Fools,” however, is not an exemplar of 
classical economy. The “art of condensing” is more than just mastery of syntax and diction. It is 
also a process of induction, of flying from particulars to the general. What makes this process an 
art is largely that it is not a science: the induction is wilfully inadequate, an imaginative reach. 
Induction, of course, is always an inadequate route to general truth, but in gnomic speech, unlike 
scientific practice, the path taken remains obscure and unsystematic. Insofar as the gnomic 
speaker expresses common wisdom, that wisdom has no origin, is, as Barthes terms it, a cultural 
“condensate.” Insofar as the gnomic speaker authors the utterance, what we admire is his or her 
daring leap towards truth. Our very awareness of this leap is what allows us to credit the speaker 
with a special wisdom, based on wit, keen intuition, genius, experience, or, in Culler’s words, 
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“judicious rumination” (31). A gnome, in other words, is neither self-evident nor a mere 
summary of available data. It is the product of a mind engaged either in processing and 
compressing shared experience into a single statement or shaping personal insight into a 
statement that looks like it expresses shared experience. Because we are given the result of the 
reasoning, not the recipe for it, the narrator has the character of an authority. But, also for this 
reason, gnomes are especially susceptible to the listener or reader’s disagreement, and this 
possibility of dissent is a characteristic of the gnome as a genre of speech, a result of its 
compression and its self-contradictory form.
7
 
Gnomic compression can also be semantic supersaturation, an excess of potential 
meaning. Gnomes often have the character of mysteries or puzzles that yield up their 
significance only under interpretation, and even then do not, perhaps, yield fully. This last form 
of compression is hyperbolically visible in an epigram from The Egoist. A provisional 
distinction: compared to the aphorism and the maxim, the epigram accentuates stylistic brilliance 
over philosophical profundity or moral engagement, is more clearly a bon mot uttered to dazzle. 
Mrs. Mountstuart’s epigrams are not ambitious in their compression of general truths into 
particular images: she does not attempt to convey wisdom about human nature or the world, 
merely about individual character, which she captures in striking images. The more aphoristic 
narrator is somewhat disdainful of her epigrammatic wit: she is “a lady certain to say the 
remembered, if not the right thing” (Meredith, The Egoist 10). There is, once again, a tension of 
gender in the narrator’s treatment of Mrs. Mountstuart in The Egoist, just as there is in the 
                                                     
7
 Philip E. Lewis, studying the form of the maxim in La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes, describes an instability similar 
to the one I am identifying in Meredith’s gnomes: “insofar as the ‘absolute’ truth of the maxim lies within a domain 
which remains unspecified, the truth of the maxim is itself insecure. In other words, reading the maxim involves a 
kind of confrontation between the absolute and the relative in which each threatens the other, in which each version 
of the truth appears in its problematical aspect. However convincing, however telling, the maxim’s truth still 
becomes the reader’s problem. The phenomenon in question is designated by Barthes as part of the paradox of the 
maxim: its generality achieves the most intimate questioning that literature can incite in its reader” (21). 
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narrator’s treatment of Diana in Diana of the Crossways. (Such tensions are more fully 
dramatized and explored in The Amazing Marriage, where the typical masculine Meredithian 
narrator wrests control of the narrative and its imaginary source documents from Dame Gossip, a 
feminized alternate narrator with an entirely different style.) Still, The Egoist’s narrator’s 
judgment of Mrs. Mountstuart doesn’t prevent him from spending several pages on a close 
reading of one of her epigrams. 
 The set piece is Meredith at his contrapuntal best. Mrs. Mountstuart remarks of Sir 
Willoughby, “You see he has a leg” (11). The epigram circulates around the party gathered for 
Sir Willoughby’s coming of age: “In seeming to say infinitely less than others, as Miss Isabel 
Patterne pointed out to Lady Busshe, Mrs. Mountstuart comprised all that the others had said, by 
showing the needlessness of allusions to the saliently evident” (11). This appearance of having 
the last word, however, is only an appearance, an illusion of closure, which in fact spurs the 
other characters to exegeses. The narrator evaluates their attempts to unpack the epigram (Lady 
Culmer’s is “prosaic”), and provides his own “amplifi[cation]” (11). He tries out different 
possible accentuations: “You see it: or, you see he has it. Miss Isabel and Miss Eleanor disputed 
the incidence of the emphasis, but surely, though a slight difference of meaning may be heard, 
either will do: many, with a good show of reason, throw the accent upon leg” (12). Over the 
course of several paragraphs the narration oscillates between the narrator’s explanations of the 
epigram and his synopses of various women’s explanations of the epigram—again, the narration 
suggests a man making light of women’s speech. The epigram turns out to suggest, among other 
things, gentlemanly accomplishments and an anachronistic chivalry that recalls the elegance of 
the court of Charles I without the licentiousness, the best of two worlds. It is a “poetic leg,” “a 
leg with brains in it, soul”: “He has it as Cicero had a tongue” (13). 
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The narrator concludes several pages of such interpretations with a summary of the 
epigram’s accomplishment: “For the young Sir Willoughby’s family and his thoughtful admirers, 
it is not too much to say that Mrs. Mountstuart’s little word fetched an epoch of our history to 
colour the evening of his arrival at man’s estate” (13). (The phrase “arrival at man’s estate” 
incidentally but suggestively echoes Feste’s enigmatic final song from Twelfth Night, which 
seems to tell a rogue’s progress more than a gentleman’s: “But when that I came to man’s estate / 
With hey, ho, the wind and the rain, / ’Gainst knaves and thieves men shut their gate” [5.1.383-
85].) After this statement the narrator undertakes his first direct characterization of Willoughby, 
describing his education and his accomplishments. The description is orthodox at this point, no 
longer organized by the readings of the epigram, and we are allowed almost to forget that the 
description was provoked by the epigram, until the narrative abruptly resumes: “Hearing of Mrs. 
Mountstuart’s word on him, he smiled and said: ‘It is at her service’” (14). The call and the 
response, the bon mot and the genteel acknowledgement of it, book-end our introduction to 
Willoughby’s character: the antecedent of Willoughby’s “it,” the leg, seems in retrospect as if it 
has been looming over the whole intervening section, even the portion not explicitly concerned 
with the epigram. Although the characterization of Sir Willoughby contains details we never 
could have gleaned from “he has a leg” without the assistance of the narrator and the other 
characters, this characterization is presented as if it were entirely consistent with and motivated 
by Mrs. Mountstuart’s summation of Willoughby. The section is a parody of interpretation and a 
satire of a social discourse that is specifically represented as feminine, but with typical wise-
foolish ambivalence Meredith actually uses the section as his first extended characterization of 
the Egoist. 
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Mrs. Mountstuart’s epigram exemplifies how gnomes, though they appear to close 
dialogue, require an ongoing interpretation that in fact catalyzes dialogue. Gnomes convey their 
compression partly by implying a rich, perhaps limitless potential for elaboration. As a result, 
even though the gnome as an utterance has clear boundaries, either actual or imaginary quotation 
marks, it exerts a wide influence over the surrounding narration. Sir Austin’s “Life is a tedious 
process of learning we are fools” is accompanied, “by way of comment,” by a supplement: 
“When we know ourselves Fools, we are already something better” (Feverel 9). Sometimes the 
supplementary comment maintains the gnomic tone but belongs to another speaker. Here is 
Diana’s narrator: “But she would have us away with sentimentalism. Sentimental people, in her 
phrase, ‘fiddle harmonics on the strings of sensualism,’ to the delight of a world gaping for 
marvels of musical execution rather than for music. For our world is all but a sensational world 
at present, in maternal travail of a soberer, a braver, a brighter-eyed. Her reflections are thus to 
be interpreted, it seems to me” (12). The narrator moves from a direct quotation of a gnome to a 
commentary that he labels an “interpret[ation]” but that is gnomic in its own right. Double-
voiced, this second gnome is presented sympathetically with Diana’s, but has the distinct stamp 
of the narrator’s progressive philosophy as it is expounded later in the chapter. The narrator is 
agreeing with Diana, but translating her view of the world into his own discourse. Even when a 
gnome and the surrounding narration are both in the narrator’s voice, the gnome informs the 
narration: the narrative becomes evidence for the gnome, or the gnome becomes an explanation 
of the narrative. Just as characters have zones in which we sense the language and perspective of 
the characters even when they are not speaking directly, gnomes, too, have zones.
8
 
                                                     
8
 The concept of the character zone is Bakhtin’s: “a character zone is the field of action for a character’s voice, 
encroaching in one way or another upon the author’s voice” (The Dialogic Imagination 316). 
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Just as character zones make us aware of different perspectives, gnomic zones make us 
aware of the various general frameworks and systems of beliefs through which humans attempt 
to account for particular phenomena. Meredith’s gnomic style is the management of these zones, 
the periodic movement of his narration between gnomic compression and narrative elaboration, a 
movement which is characteristic not only of Meredith’s fiction but of the British realist novel. 
This movement can generate general claims and judgments that are tendentious, unconvincing, 
or just plain wrong, but that possibility of failure is not a failure of Meredith’s wisdom; rather, it 
is integral to his art. In Meredith’s fiction the relationship of gnome to narrative is not simply 
that of general law to particular illustration. Meredith does not warrant that a gnome can 
adequately explain a narrative or that a narrative can exhaustively and accurately interpret a 
gnome. If one assumes such a guarantee one may be dissatisfied with realist narration. Perhaps 
one will turn away altogether from the gnomic style of the nineteenth century, imagining that 
modernism and postmodernism have rendered such a style defunct. Or, perhaps, one will search 
for narrators who share one’s perspective or who can convince one to share theirs—narrators 
whose wisdom actually seems to be wisdom. Chapter Three will examine such narration in 
George Eliot’s novels. Eliot’s narrators, similarly gnomic but lacking much of the “lambent 
humour” of Meredith’s, seem more earnestly committed to their philosophies, particularly the 
doctrine of sympathy, and less susceptible to being read as wise fools. In order to see how Eliot’s 
novels welcome readers’ dissent, it will be necessary to consider not only the instability within 
Eliot’s narrative authority but also how the dissenting discourses of marginal characters operate 
on the ethical hierarchies that the narrators seek to enforce. 
Meredith’s gnomic style, combined with his understanding of the gnome as a genre, 
results in self-conscious narrative judgments that are always suspect—not worthless, not simply 
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ironic, but of mixed value to our understanding of the characters’ reality and our own. By 
suggesting that these ambivalent narrative judgments are an instrument, perhaps even the 
primary instrument, of Meredith’s realism, I imply a particular model of realism. The following 
section will examine how Meredith’s theories and practices of realism reflect and inform the 
ambivalent narrative authority he creates through gnomic style. 
 
4. Realism, Comedy, and Philosophy 
 I have argued that Meredith’s use of the gnome is important to the ambivalent narrative 
authority he constructs because of the movements of gnomic style. Gnomes are not merely 
isolated remarks, but are in dialogue with the rest of the narrative discourse in which they occur. 
The gnome is also important because its relationship to the implied life of the characters mimics 
the relationship of realist fiction to an implied life outside it, to reality. For Meredith, that is, the 
realist novel as a genre shares certain defining aims with the gnome as a speech genre. The 
realist novel is the product of an individual artistic vision—life in Meredith’s representations 
looks quite different from life in Eliot’s—yet the realist novel also has a social dimension, so that 
it cannot be a merely eccentric flight of fancy, but must imply, albeit illusorily, a reality shared 
between the characters and the narrator, and extended to the reader. The realist novel is a 
condensed representation of this reality, condensed, like the gnome, through abstraction and the 
mediations of consciousness and language. 
Meredith suggests such a view of realism only indirectly. His narrators are literary 
theorists, but their literary-theoretical statements are part of the gnomic style, and cannot be 
taken at face value. The prefatory remarks in novels such as Diana and The Egoist are not 
exactly congruent with each other or with Meredith’s criticism elsewhere. Yet it is possible to 
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identify certain relationships between Meredith’s key terms that clarify what, for him, constitutes 
the aims of a desirable realism. Meredith himself usually uses the terms “realistic” and “realist” 
disparagingly: he treats what he calls realism as an unhealthy fad. In The Egoist the “realistic 
method” is “a conscientious transcription of all the visible, and a repetition of all the audible,” 
which “is mainly accountable for our present branfulness, and that prolongation of the vasty and 
the noisy, out of which, as from an undrained fen, steams the malady of sameness, our modern 
malady” (4). At least, so says an anonymous “humourist,” whom the narrator of the Egoist 
interprets and paraphrases. The problem with realism appears to be a lack of artistic mediation—
there are no principles of selection or form, and the result is a constipation that recalls the 
boredom-induced nausea in S/Z, though it is provoked by a sludge of particulars instead of a 
condensate of trite generalizations. 
More specifically, the kind of mediation that realism lacks appears to be decorum, a 
delicate reluctance to represent what is gritty, vulgar, immoral, lower-class, or grossly material. 
Thus can the narrator of The Egoist declare, “Comedy is a game played to throw reflections upon 
social life, and it deals with human nature in the drawing-room of civilized men and women, 
where we have no dust of the struggling outer world, no mire, no violent crashes, to make the 
correctness of the representation convincing” (3). The implicit other of comedy is realism, 
which, the narrator suggests, passes off the vulgar as “correctness of . . . representation.” In 
Diana, such realism is denoted by the epithet “dirty drab.” In Celt and Saxon, the narrator 
associates this kind of realism with “Mr. [John] Bull,” the personification of England: “Bull’s 
notion” of realism is “the realism of the butcher’s shop and the pendent legs of mutton and 
blocks of beef painted raw and glaring in their streaks” (218). Curiously, the mutton and beef are 
“painted raw,” which troubles the metaphor of the butcher’s shop. Are we to imagine a butcher’s 
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shop in which a red, fleshy texture is painted onto cuts of meat that otherwise would look 
different? Or is the idea that, in some representation of the butcher’s shop, the meat is painted in 
all its rawness? Of course, Meredith’s narrator is not really complaining about raw meat: these 
legs and blocks are men and women, and the indecency of realism is in representing them 
unadorned and flayed, whether or not they are in fact. If humans are vulgar, then the error is in 
showing them to be so. Meredith writes in the “Essay on Comedy,” “it is unwholesome for men 
and women to see themselves as they are, if they are no better than they should be; and they will 
not, when they have improved in manners, care much to see themselves as they once were. That 
comes of realism in the comic art; and it is not public caprice, but the consequence of a bettering 
state. The same of an immoral may be said . . . of realistic exhibitions of a vulgar society” (84). 
The deeper problem, however, appears to arise if people are better than realism would have them 
be—if the rawness is painted on. In Diana Emma Dunstane contemplates a “realistic picture” of 
Thomas Redworth, transformed into the hero of Diana’s novel The Cantatrice, and the realism 
appears to be entirely an effect of distortion: 
She [Emma] could not so easily forgive the realistic picture of the man: an 
exaggeration, she thought, of small foibles, that even if they existed, should not 
have been stressed. The turn for ‘calculating’ was shown up ridiculously; Mr. 
Cuthbert Dering was calculating in his impassioned moods as well as in his cold. 
His head was a long division of ciphers. He had statistics for spectacles, and 
beheld the world through them, and the mistress he worshipped. (271) 
Realism, then, can actually consist not just in recording details excessively or failing to be 
decorous, but deliberately presenting a cynical vision of life when cynicism is unwarranted. 
Realism can be caricature in a certain mood. 
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Meredith’s fiction does seem to admit the possibility of a better vision of life. This vision 
is not that of sentimentalism, which Diana’s narrator dubs the “rose-pink,” or the “sham decent,” 
and which “is rebuked by hideous revelations of the filthy foul; for nature will force her way, and 
if you try to stifle her by drowning, she comes up, not the fairest part of her uppermost!” (16). 
Here, exasperatingly, Meredith suggests that sentimentalism is false for trying to hide what he 
condemns realism for exposing.
9
 The Diana narrator seems to imagine an impossible middle 
ground in his criticism of literary representation, just as he does when contemplating Diana’s 
gnomes. Yet this middle ground is clearly described: “Philosophy is the foe of both [rose-pink 
and dirty drab], and their silly cancelling contest, perpetually renewed in a shuffle of extremes, 
as it always is where a phantasm falseness reigns, will [when philosophy is attained] no longer 
baffle the contemplation of natural flesh, smother no longer the soul issuing out of our incessant 
strife” (15). The via media is philosophy, an ambiguous word in Meredith, but one that is linked 
both to intellectual exercise and to literary realism: “a single flight of brains will reach and 
embrace her [Philosophy]; give you the savour of Truth, the right use of the senses, Reality’s 
infinite sweetness; for these things are in philosophy; and the fiction which is the summary of 
actual Life, the within and without of us, is, prose or verse, plodding or soaring, philosophy’s 
elect handmaiden” (17). In Celt and Saxon, in opposition to “the realism of the butcher’s shop,” 
the narrator names a “realism of the active brain and heart conjoined” (218). There is such a 
thing in Meredith as a good realism, and it is the realism of philosophy. 
                                                     
9
 Diana and Sir Austin participate gnomically in the rebuking of sentimentalism. Diana’s narrator: “she would have 
us away with sentimentalism. Sentimental people, in her phrase, ‘fiddle harmonics on the strings of sensualism,’ to 
the delight of a world gaping for marvels of musical execution rather than for music” (Meredith, Diana 12). Sir 
Austin’s: “‘Sentimentalists,’ says the PILGRIM’S SCRIP, ‘are they who seek to enjoy Reality, without incurring the 
Immense Debtorship for a thing done” (Feverel 226). See Wilt, Chapter Four, for further analysis of Meredith’s 
treatment of sentimentalism. 
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The narrator of Diana attributes the flaws of English fiction, both sentimental and raw-
realistic, to lack of philosophy, and he looks forward to a utopian moment when philosophy will 
be universally embraced. “Philosophy” needs some glossing, since Meredith uses it in special 
senses that he never defines. Wilt identifies three “activities of mind” that Meredith designates 
by the word: “First, philosophy is simply self-mastery, the treatment of fevers, the control of 
appetite. . . . Second, philosophy is simply an educated understanding, a widely broadened 
appreciation of complexity, mystery, and diversity. . . . Thirdly and pre-eminently for Meredith, 
philosophy is the active integrator of powers inside and outside the person, the integrator of 
temperament with circumstance, the agent of man’s wholeness, oneness, with nature” (83). 
Philosophy in Meredith can also be a power to endure, which looks like an extension of Wilt’s 
first definition, but actually has more to do with the third. To have philosophy in Meredith is to 
find a sustainable middle ground from which folly, vice, ugliness, and materiality can be 
perceived, measured, and reconciled with their opposites: “Philosophy bids us to see that we are 
not so pretty as rose-pink, not so repulsive as dirty drab; and that instead of everlastingly shifting 
those barren aspects, the sight of ourselves is wholesome, bearable, fructifying, finally a delight” 
(Meredith, Diana 15). The representation of this sight is the “realism of the active brain and heart 
conjoined.” 
Meredith’s emphasis on the role of intellect in this kind of realism recalls the definition 
of a good gnome in Diana, which “strike[s] roots in the mind, the Hesperides of good things.” 
The “flight of brains” that attains “Reality’s infinite sweetness” is much like the gnomic one, and 
we will see that it is fraught with the same problems as gnomic generalization. It will be 
necessary, however, to approach these problems by way of a third term: comedy, which like 
Meredith’s realism is a form concerned with intellect (Meredith calls it “humor of the mind”), 
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and is likewise a way to compress and record life (Essay on Comedy 141). The narrator of The 
Egoist is a proponent of comedy more than realism, and he considers comedy to be the best 
means of compressing the “Book of Egoism,” that exhaustive imaginary record of human folly. 
Comedy seems opposed to realism in some ways: “The Comic Spirit conceives a definite 
situation for a number of characters, and rejects all accessories in the exclusive pursuit of them 
and their speech. For, being a spirit, he hunts the spirit in men; vision and ardour constitute his 
merit: he has not a thought of persuading you to believe in him” (The Egoist 3). Yet comedy is 
“the key of the great Book” (5): comedy is the “particular practice of Art in letters [that] is the 
best for the perusal of the Book of our common wisdom,” and the Comic Spirit is “the spirit born 
of our united social intelligence” (4). Meredith’s comic and realist compressions of social and 
individual life are intimately related, and his fanciful comic machinery, including personified 
abstractions like the Comic Spirit, the Comic Muse, and a horde of imps, are also mechanisms of 
his realism. 
In the Essay on Comedy Meredith imagines the Comic Spirit as a celestial visage 
overlooking English society: “It has the sage’s brows, and the sunny malice of a faun lurks at the 
corners of the half-closed lips drawn in an idle wariness of half-tension” (141). The Comic 
Spirit, “humanely malign,” will launch “volleys of silvery laughter” at those who “violate the 
unwritten but perceptible laws binding them in consideration one to another” (142). Though 
Meredith treats the Comic Spirit as a god, this god is clearly not meant to have real, autonomous 
existence: the Comic Spirit is a condensation and projection of a social contract and of shared 
human experience into a fictional character on a divine plane. Meredith is responsible for 
describing and naming the character, but he means it as a way to visualize a cultural experience 
that he considers to be really shared: “to feel its [the Spirit’s] presence, and to see it, is your 
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assurance that many sane and solid minds are with you in what you are experiencing” (143). The 
Comic Spirit, like the gnome, is meant to represent the vision of others even though Meredith 
puts great effort into imagining it himself.
10
 
In contrast to comedy, Meredith’s term “humour” designates an artistic mode that is far 
less concerned with what the sane and solid minds of others are experiencing. Cervantes and 
Sterne are exemplary humourists: “The humorist of high [order] has an embrace of contrasts 
beyond the scope of the comic poet” (136); “The stroke of the great humorist is world-wide, with 
lights of tragedy in his laughter” (137); “If you laugh all round him [a ridiculous person], tumble 
him, roll him about, deal him a smack, and drop a tear on him, own his likeness to you, and 
yours to your neighbor, spare him as little as you shun, pity him as much as you expose, it is a 
spirit of Humor that is moving you” (134). The allusion in that last definition, both in content 
and style, is to Sterne. A similar language appears in the passage from Diana that describes the 
gift of gnomic utterance. A gnome should “strike not the dazzled eyes, the unanticipating nose, 
the ribs, the sides, and stun us, twirl us, hoodwink, mystify, tickle and twitch, by dexterities of 
lingual sparring and shuffling” (2). We can hear Sterne here, too. Humourists “touching upon 
history or society are given to be capricious. They are, as in the case of Sterne, given to be 
sentimental,” and for Meredith the sham of sentiment is the opponent of authentic realism and 
philosophy (Essay on Comedy 138). Comedy, on the other hand, is for Meredith fully intellectual 
and social, not sentimental and idiosyncratic as humour is apt to be: it is “an interpretation of the 
general mind, and is for that reason of necessity kept in restraint” (138). In other words, humour 
is a product of the humourist’s singular vision. Tristram Shandy and Thackeray’s narrator both 
offer humorous visions of life, the difference being that Thackeray suggests a reality outside that 
                                                     
10
 In his discussion of the realist narrator as a collective mind, Miller claims that the narrator of The Egoist “is the 
comic spirit” (The Form of Victorian Fiction 79). I am suggesting that, in Meredith’s novels, the narrators are the 
ones who imagine the comic spirit and other symbols of collective consciousness, and are not identical with them. 
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vision. Meredith, who considers Thackeray a comedian and admires him, further develops both 
the social and individual aspects of comic representation. 
Meredith’s fiction is not always comic. Yet the aim of “interpreting the general mind” is 
implicit in his gnomic utterances and in his practice of realism. The one interprets the many, 
presenting individual wisdom that has the appearance of collective wisdom, though it may not be 
in fact, and presenting individual perceptions that have the appearance of collective perception, 
though they may not be in fact. My view of realism in Meredith differs from Ermarth’s model of 
realism, in which the narrator is “Nobody,” responsible primarily for establishing the world of 
the fiction as realistic by communicating the possibility of consensus about it, and thereby its 
persistence in time and space. Although Meredith’s narrator does perform this function, implying 
a world of objects with spatial and temporal persistence, the implied realistic world is at one 
remove from the representation; the primary object of representation in a novel by Meredith is 
the narrator’s interpretation or vision of the realistic world, a vision that balances singular 
imagination with the evocation of shared experience. This remove is characteristic of nineteenth-
century British realism. The British realist novel represents narrators’ attempts to understand a 
world taken to be real, including the psychological reality of individual characters and the social 
reality of the interactions between them. Yet the results of those attempts to understand are 
inconclusive, because a narrator is only one mind, like each of the characters, not a true 
collective that is identical with the “general mind” or a god who can illuminate whatever remains 
dark to the characters. As long as Diana’s marriage to Redworth is understood to be a realistic 
event, then there is no final authority in the novel who can decide if the marriage is good or bad. 
The critique of accepted wisdom in Meredith’s novels proceeds not through direct 
statements of some alternative wisdom but through the dialogue into which Meredith’s narration 
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thrusts standards of wisdom. In Diana of the Crossways the narrator proposes philosophy as a 
corrective to romanticized ideals of femininity: 
You have to teach your imagination of the feminine image you have set up to 
bend your civilized knees to, that it must temper its fastidiousness, shun the 
grossness of the overdainty. Or, to speak in the philosophic tongue, you must turn 
on yourself, resolutely track and seize that burrower, and scrub and cleanse him; 
by which process, during the course of it, you will arrive at the conception of the 
right heroical woman for you to worship: and if you prove to be of some spiritual 
stature, you may reach to an ideal of the heroical feminine type for the worship of 
mankind, an image as yet in poetic outline only, on our upper skies. (19) 
One may well have misgivings about the value of seeking “an ideal of the heroical feminine for 
the worship of mankind,” but philosophy in Meredith is wise and foolish, always liable to 
reproduce the imbalances it seeks to correct. The self-corrective, Socratic turn—“you must turn 
on yourself”—is the crucial realist move, and it is enacted repeatedly in Meredith. In Diana of 
the Crossways, Meredith places concepts of femininity at the crossways, subjects them not to 
final correction but to a process of perpetual correction that he cannot accomplish alone. Error, 
especially the narrator’s error, is essential to this process. Wilt sees Meredith’s fiction shaped by 
a constant struggle between philosophy and perversions of it: “Two voices, one the true tone of 
philosophy and the other its flaw, its vice, its shadow of cynicism, sentimentalism, egoism, 
fatalism, struggle for control of the narrative. They struggle to control both the material of the 
plot, the story, and the material of the subplot, the reader’s allegiance” (116). Through the ironies 
of his narration, Meredith prevents this struggle ever from being decided, refuses to separate and 
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define these two voices, to banish philosophy’s shadow: this is his wise folly.11 The utopianism 
of Meredith’s narrators, who always look forward to an audience with greater philosophy, is both 
a mark of their potentially foolish eccentricity and part of Meredith’s dialogic achievement. By 
addressing a utopian future in which a full understanding of the human and the good will finally 
be attained, Meredith also addresses a present and a nearer future in which this understanding has 
yet to be achieved. He frees cultural wisdom from mere repetition, and he shares the rewriting of 
this wisdom with readers whose difference he can only prophesy.
                                                     
11
 I use the term “irony” sparingly when describing the devices of wise folly, because irony can suggest an inversion 
function through which ironically affirming something merely affirms its contrary. As Barthes points out, this 
technique is readerly—it does not open the stereotypes of the cultural code to the reader’s writing, because it merely 
adds another layer of stereotype to the code: “In fact, the cultural code occupies the same position as stupidity: how 
can stupidity be pinned down without declaring oneself intelligent?” (206). One answer: by declaring everyone 
stupid, including oneself, and taking things from there. Barthes recognizes such a manoeuvre in Flaubert’s Bouvard 
et Pécuchet. Wise folly is the art of such maneouvres, and if it is an art of irony, then it is an art of unstable irony. 
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Chapter Three 
George Eliot’s Pharmacy 
 
I is the first letter of the alphabet, the first word of the language, the first thought 
of the mind, the first object of affection. In grammar it is a pronoun of the 
first person and singular number. Its plural is said to be We, but how there 
can be more than one myself is doubtless clearer to the grammarians than 
it is to the author of this incomparable dictionary. Conception of two 
myselfs is difficult, but fine. The frank yet graceful use of “I” 
distinguishes a good writer from a bad; the latter carries it with the manner 
of a thief trying to cloak his loot. (Bierce, “I”) 
 
1. Maxims and Medicine 
 The title of this chapter refers to Derrida’s essay Plato’s Pharmacy, from which I will 
borrow three terms, “pharmakon,” “pharmakos,” and “pharmakeus”: the drug that is also a 
poison, the victim of a healing sacrifice, and the druggist or magician who may also be a 
scapegoat. These usefully multivalent words capture ambiguities in the ethics of Eliot’s novels, 
in her character-systems, and in the position of her narrators, and will structure the reading of 
Eliot’s fiction that follows.1 Though inspired in its play of antitheses by deconstructive methods, 
                                                     
1
 Alex Woloch defines his term “character-system” with reference to what he calls “character-space.” A character-
space in a narrative is “that particular and charged encounter between an individual human personality and a 
determined space and position within the narrative as a whole,” while the character-system is “the arrangement of 
multiple and differentiated character-spaces—differentiated configurations and manipulations of the human figure—
into a unified narrative structure” (14). The significance I attribute to minor characters in this chapter and in this 
dissertation more broadly is informed by Woloch’s study of minorness in The One Versus the Many, where he 
suggests that minor characters are liable to attract the reader’s interest precisely because of their minorness—
because of the tension between the position allotted them in the character system and the “implied person” to which 
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this reading will not be deconstructive in its assumptions or its aims. Concerned with the text not 
as a system of signs but a dialogic design, I track warring ethical positions instead of warring 
forces of signification. The governing binary opposition in Eliot’s ethics and in the ethical 
lexicon of her fiction is the opposition between egoism and sympathy, with egoism occupying 
the subordinate position of folly and sympathy occupying the superordinate position of wisdom. 
While a deconstructive reading of this ethical system would locate its fault lines, the sites where 
its binary oppositions break down, my object of inquiry is the encounter of this whole system 
with its constitutive other in Eliot’s fiction. Although Eliot developed a doctrine of sympathy 
that she shares with her narrators and certain of her characters, her novels do not finally assert 
this doctrine because Eliot does not present a unified, singular view of the story’s reality in 
which ethical terms have consistent values. 
 To say that Eliot does not present such a view is, in itself, merely to repeat Bakhtin’s 
insight into the dialogic form of the novel. David Lodge argues that this dialogic form increases 
the reader’s autonomy even when the narrative discourse seems designed to decrease it: “the 
authorial commentary, so far from telling the reader what to think, or putting him in a position of 
dominance in relation to the discourse of the characters, constantly forces him to think for 
himself, and constantly implicates him in the moral judgements being formulated” (53). 
Recognizing dialogue in the novel, however, is the beginning of my investigation, not its end. 
There are many ways in which novels can be dialogic, and the effects are not all identical or 
commensurate. Even extensive dialogue in a work does not necessarily prevent certain voices 
from dominating the dialogue. Cicely Havely Palser argues that Eliot’s privileged narrative voice 
in Middlemarch obscures the dialogism that would otherwise prevail: “Chip away the authorial 
                                                                                                                                                                           
their minorness limits the reader’s access (38). This tension makes possible a play like Tom Stoppard’s Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstern Are Dead. 
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assertions and there is within Middlemarch is [sic.] a novel which can be read as one reads 
Tolstoy, a narrative in which no discourse has preferred status. Middlemarch is traditionally 
applauded for its maturity, but it often makes children of its readers” (318). This chapter 
examines a kind of dialogism peculiar to Eliot and, more broadly, to the nineteenth-century 
British realist novel, explaining how realist dialogue, despite its evident asymmetry, need not 
function coercively. 
 A realist like Meredith, Eliot situates the vision of her narrators within a social field, and 
like Meredith she integrates the limits of this vision into her representation of it. These limits 
help to imply a reality independent of the narrator, which the narrator must interpret along with 
the characters, albeit with some advantages. Although Eliot’s narrators use their advantages in 
favour of the doctrine of sympathy, the realism of her novels prevents a decisive rhetorical 
victory of sympathy over egoism. Certainly, the conflict seems imbalanced: egoism is often 
vanquished in Eliot’s fiction, and is not given full articulation as an ethical position. Yet Eliot 
communicates, often indirectly, the weight of what is sacrificed in this contest. The very 
techniques that enforce asymmetry in the drama and in the representation become ammunition 
for the other side, resources for critiquing the ethical system that occupies the privileged position 
in Eliot’s fiction. To make use of these resources, I argue, is not to read against the grain of the 
fiction’s design but to apprehend a larger and more complex design in which theorizing, 
illustrating, and encouraging sympathy is only one purpose among others. Another purpose, a 
cross-grain, is the self-critical turn of wise folly, the turning on oneself, through which Eliot 
implies the necessity and even the value of egoism.
2
  
                                                     
2
 Like Harry Shaw, I seek to complicate the metaphor of reading with or against “the grain” of a work. This 
metaphor is a way to talk about the work’s implied intention, design, or form, which, the metaphor suggests, one can 
only either reject or accept. Shaw proposes an alternative, reading through the grain, that is attentive to the “network 
of possibilities opened up by the existence of the grain” (Narrating Reality 143). The method I practice in this 
 
 
69 
 
 Eliot’s narration, like Meredith’s, alternates between reflection and narration. The 
narrators explain the characters’ actions by means of general assertions and justify these 
assertions with reference to the characters’ actions. This gnomic style could invest realist 
narrators with an ultimate, self-fulfilling authority over both discourse and story; discourse and 
story, converging on a single system of ethical truths, would then constitute both the narrator’s 
vision of reality and the novel’s. As I have argued in Chapter Two, Meredith disrupts this 
convergence of story and discourse by anatomizing the art of generalization. Many of Meredith’s 
characters, including his narrators, are leery of the gnomic speech at which they excel. Eliot’s 
narrators can be similarly ambivalent. In fact, Diana Warwick’s refusal in Diana of the 
Crossways to be “the dupe of the passion wherewith, as she says, ‘we lash ourselves into the 
persuasive speech distinguishing us from the animals’” is probably indebted to the Middlemarch 
narrator’s phrase “this power of generalizing which gives men so much the superiority in mistake 
over the dumb animals” (Meredith 14; Eliot 592). Persuasion and generalization meet in gnomic 
utterances, and while both these passages make a power of speech or thought into the distinction 
between the human and the animal, what is emphasized in either case is not the mere superiority 
of the human but our “superiority in mistake.” (It takes a human to be asinine.) Eliot’s gnome, 
like Diana’s, strikes at itself, relying on the same power that it identifies as a source of error.3 
 There is more reason to take Eliot’s gnomes seriously than Meredith’s, however. That 
“lambent humour” that so pervades Meredith’s narration infuses Eliot’s subtly, but it competes 
with an earnest streak of moralism that depends on the gnomic style and that appears 
                                                                                                                                                                           
dissertation is similarly an attempt to avoid the metaphor’s constraints while recognizing that there are such things 
as more and less intentional readings. One way to do so is to conceive of the text’s grain less unilaterally: at the very 
least, the realist text has a warp and a weft. 
3
 Here, as in Chapter Two, I use the word “gnome,” the noun form of “gnomic,” in order to designate the speech 
genre that contains condensed expressions of generalized wisdom or wit, including aphorisms, epigrams, maxims, 
and proverbs. 
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incompatible with the blows Eliot occasionally levels at generalization. As Susan Lanser 
observes, “Eliot’s professed distrust of quotation and maxim stands in Archimedean tension with 
her formal practices: if Eliot is suggesting that the authority of such forms is but a fiction, she 
does so through fiction’s arguably most authoritative, ‘nonfictional’ structures— precisely 
maxims and quotations, the conventional forms for authorial wisdom, detachable from the story 
proper and able to engage ‘that tempting range of relevancies called the universe’” (82). Arguing 
that Eliot neither “deconstruct[s] authoritative discourse” nor resists it, Lanser suggests that “the 
rhetoric of Eliot’s fiction arrogates authority in a project designed precisely to construct a 
narrative hegemony” (83). Perhaps, distrusting general statements, Eliot determines to write 
correct ones. Perhaps when the narrator of The Mill on the Floss claims, “All people of broad, 
strong sense have an instinctive repugnance to the men of maxims; because such people early 
discern that the mysterious complexity of our life is not to be embraced by maxims, and that to 
lace ourselves up in formulas of that sort is to repress all the divine promptings and inspirations 
that spring from growing insight and sympathy,” this claim is not a formula against formulas but 
the personal wisdom of someone who has submitted to those divine promptings (Eliot 518). The 
narrator may have “exert[ed] patience, discrimination, impartiality,” may possess “the insight 
that comes from a hardly-earned estimate of temptation, or from a life vivid and intense enough 
to have created a wide fellow-feeling with all that is human” (518). Or the narrator may simply 
be an exception, exempt from the labours that characters must complete to attain moral 
intelligence.
4
 
                                                     
4
 Isobel Armstrong’s reading of Eliot’s gnomes in the 1970 volume Critical Essays on George Eliot epitomizes the 
view that Eliot does indeed offer a wisdom in her works that is detachable from them and that successfully applies to 
the reader’s world: “Her success depends, I think, upon her capacity to move beyond the moral universe of the 
novel, turn outwards towards the reader and to invoke a general body of moral and psychological knowledge or, 
rather, experience, which can be the corporate possession of both writer and reader; this shared experience is 
continually being brought to bear on the novel. She constantly asks for an assent, a corroboration from the reader, 
before she proceeds” (120, author’s emphasis). This assessment of Eliot represents the complement to mine: while I 
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On the other hand, if the “comprehensive and radical skepticism concerning the authority 
of language” that James Eli Adams locates in Adam Bede informs the passage about men of 
maxims in The Mill on the Floss, which similarly opposes the folly of speech to the wisdom of 
experience, then the narrator cannot so easily be exempted (239). The narrator does not bypass 
language to transmit experience to the reader, and therefore Eliot is faced with a problem that 
Adams identifies as typically realist: “The novelist always lacks an adequate vehicle for 
representing a realm located outside of language” (239, author’s emphasis). Those “dumb 
animals,” inferior in mistake, are superior in a kind of truth, closer to the ineffable that Eliot’s 
characters must encounter in order to develop wisdom and that Eliot strives to communicate: 
“‘the dumb creatures,’ as Mrs. Poyser calls them, thus assume the role of mute choric figures 
offering oblique commentary on the eminently human struggle to find an adequate language for 
feeling” (228). 
Despite such doubts about language, Eliot’s most gnomic moments may well be some of 
her most striking, memorable, and characteristic—or, at the very least, her most frequently 
discussed: the “parable” of the pier-glass and the meditation on “that roar which lies on the other 
side of silence” in Middlemarch (264, 194), or the cry of the heart in Adam Bede, “let us love 
that other beauty too, which lies in no secret of proportion, but in the secret of deep human 
sympathy” (162), or the digressive analogy of the Rhine castles and the Rhône villages in The 
Mill on the Floss, among other examples (282-83). Such intrusions express values that are 
privileged throughout Eliot’s narratives, including an awareness of the limitations of human 
perspective and, consequently, a respect for the ordinary or seemingly trivial and a belief in 
imaginative sympathy as the basis of right relations between individuals. The respect for the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
do not wish to deny the possibility of assenting, of taking Eliot’s gnomes to be wisdom, my focus is on the 
possibility and necessity of dissent. 
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ordinary is, as George Levine has thoroughly demonstrated, characteristic of the realistic 
imagination insofar as it defines itself in opposition to the conventions of romance; but attending 
to the ordinary seems much more like an ethical imperative in Eliot’s realism than it does in 
Meredith’s. In The Egoist Meredith chooses the “drawing-room of civilized men and women” 
over “the struggling outer world” (3), and in The Ordeal of Richard Feverel his recovery of the 
trivial is couched in the eccentric, prophetic language to which his narrators periodically resort: 
One [audience] will come to whom it will be given to see the elementary 
machinery at work: who, as it were, from some slight hint of the straws, will feel 
the winds of March when they do not blow. To them will nothing be trivial, 
seeing that they will have in their eyes the invisible conflict going on around us, 
whose features a nod, a smile, a laugh, of ours perpetually changes. And they will 
perceive, moreover, that in real life all hangs together: the train is laid in the 
lifting of an eyebrow, that bursts upon the field of thousands. They will see the 
links of things as they pass, and wonder not, as foolish people now do, that this 
great matter came out of that small one. (237-38) 
Be this audience if you can, the narrator dares us—but you cannot, for the time has not yet come. 
Any didactic design in this passage is complicated by its utopianism, which threatens to consign 
the present reader to the category of “foolish people,” and by the context: whether or not it is 
possible to possess this comprehensive perception of the minute causes of large effects, failed 
attempts to do so are a serious form of error in this novel. Sir Austin’s “System” for educating 
Richard, for example, appears to involve an overreading of the “elementary machinery” of male 
development, one that draws spurious links between puberty and the Fall of Man. The narrator 
allies his hypothetical audience with Austin by imagining that this audience “will participate in 
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the Baronet’s gratification at his son’s demeanour” (238). One probably does not want to 
participate in Sir Austin’s readings of Richard. 
 In Middlemarch, on the other hand, the narrator clearly considers it a failing in Dorothea 
and Casaubon that they do not understand the full importance of the seemingly trivial, in this 
case the series of unremarkable acts that gradually increase the couple’s estrangement from each 
other: “it is in these acts called trivialities that the seeds of joy are forever wasted, until men and 
women look round with haggard faces at the devastation their own waste has made, and say, the 
earth bears no harvest of sweetness—calling their denial knowledge” (Eliot 425). Generalizing 
from Dorothea and Casaubon to “men and women,” the narrator corrects on two counts what 
these men and women (mis)call things: the denial of the earth’s “harvest of sweetness” is not 
really knowledge, and “these acts called trivialities” are not really trivial. If only people paid 
attention to the minor ways they squander their own promise of joy, they wouldn’t blame the 
world for not generating any. This analysis of Dorothea’s marriage both echoes and trumps 
Dorothea’s original aspirations. Dorothea marries Casaubon in the first place hoping that the 
greatness of their shared life will make “these acts called trivialities” meaningful: she says to 
herself, “It would be my duty to study that I might help him the better in his great works. There 
would be nothing trivial about our lives. Everyday-things with us would mean the greatest 
things” (29). When the narrator corrects Dorothea for ignoring the importance of “every-day 
things,” dramatic irony results: the narrator turns out to have a much better grasp of a kind of 
understanding that Dorothea only wishes to have. Eliot seems, in general, to value and cultivate 
this understanding, using it in her fine-grained representations of social and psychological causes 
and effects. While Meredith presents ambivalently the state of finding nothing trivial—maybe 
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it’s not good to feel the winds of March when they do not blow—Eliot presents this state as a 
remedy for the waste of happiness and as the ideal basis of realist representation. 
 It may seem, then, that nothing is more foreign to Eliot’s fiction than wise folly, which 
undermines the surety of moral imperatives. The fool can play the social physician, as Jaques 
aspires to do in As You Like It: 
Invest me in my motley. Give me leave 
To speak my mind, and I will through and through 
Cleanse the foul body of th’infected world, 
If they will patiently receive my medicine. (Shakespeare, As You Like It 2.7.58-
61) 
But the “medicine” of the man in motley might be disease, as the Duke retorts: “all th’embossèd 
sores and headed evils / That thou with licence of free foot hast caught / Wouldst thou disgorge 
into the general world” (2.7.67-69). Despite the earnestness of the prescriptions, Eliot’s 
sovereign remedy, sympathy, is just such a fool’s medicine, liable to reproduce or exacerbate the 
problems it is meant to address. Eliot’s ethics of sympathy is not presented ironically; she 
commits to the development and illustration of a fully-fledged ethical system in her fiction, a 
system in which sympathy is aligned with wisdom and the good. Yet she also uses techniques of 
wise folly to convey the good that her system excludes as evil, which can only be recognized as 
good from an ethical perspective different from those of Eliot’s narrators and many of her most 
central characters. Not foreign to Eliot’s fiction but foreign in Eliot’s fiction, wise folly lingers 
on the margins in characters who ignore, defy, ridicule, or simply do not care about the moral 
aims that others in her fiction genuinely strive to achieve, and who represent in various ways the 
disease of egoism that sympathy is supposed to cure. When we attempt to determine who in 
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Eliot’s novels is outside the boundaries of right conduct, we discover that these boundaries are 
less certain than they seem, insides liable to become outsides. Apparently located at the origin 
and centre of their narratives, even the narrators are in some respects foreign bodies, working 
against their own didactic purposes—and towards the overarching purposes of Eliot’s realism. 
The following sections will examine in turn the binary opposition of egoism and sympathy; 
marginal egoist characters, especially Hans Meyrick and Bob Jakin; and the characterization of 
Eliot’s narrators. These elements of the forms of Eliot’s novels work together to construct and 
scrutinize both the inside and the outside of Eliot’s ethics of sympathy. 
 
2. Pharmakon 
 In a gnome that resembles the fundamental gnomes of wise folly, which claim for 
humanity a birthright of folly and error, the narrator of Middlemarch proclaims, “We are all of us 
born in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves” (Eliot 211). 
(Again, folly inheres in a similarity between humans and animals that is made possible by a 
difference between humans and animals: the implicit distinction is between animals, who feed 
from udders, and “we” humans, who treat the world like one.) While a Shakespearean fool would 
identify himself with the state of folly he describes, Eliot’s narrator leaves a loophole: though 
emphatically included in the subject “we are all of us,” and at least pretending therefore to have 
been “born,” the narrator may perhaps have grown out of the condition of moral stupidity, 
having thereby earned the authority to pronounce on it. In section four, we will assess the 
positions of Eliot’s narrators with respect to their own ethical systems and the characters to 
whom they apply these systems. For now, it suffices to recognize that for most characters this 
moral stupidity, the supreme folly in Eliot’s work, is a kind of naturalistic original sin, and, 
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though Eliot does not name it in this passage, its name in Middlemarch and elsewhere in her 
fiction is “egoism.” Eliot’s diagnosis of egoism and her prescription of sympathy as a remedy are 
nuanced, and the purpose of this section will be to identify these nuances before examining how 
forces outside this prescriptive system affect its function in Eliot’s fiction. 
 Eliot defines egoism in use and frequently qualifies it, drawing from the word’s common 
senses and adding specialized meanings in context, so that we would ignore an important fluidity 
in the term if we attempted to define it rigorously. Egoism in Eliot’s fiction can be, among many 
other things, “passionate” (Daniel Deronda 796, Middlemarch 423, Scenes of Clerical Life 229) 
or “fastidious” (Daniel Deronda 278), “exorbitant” (319) or “small” (The Mill on the Floss 384), 
“uneasy” (Middlemarch 211) or “untroubled” (Felix Holt 303), even “proud” and “honest” (Mill 
on the Floss 286). Egoism can be satisfied like desire (525, Middlemarch 521), irritated like a 
temper (68), wounded like pride (Daniel Deronda 50), and, because it can be wounded, risked 
(Middlemarch 478). Egoism is Sir James Chettam’s disapproval of the rival Dorothea chooses to 
marry, Gwendolen’s ignorance of Daniel’s life apart from her, Grandcourt’s assumption that 
everyone is envious of him, the attachment of various characters to their own theories or rules, 
and, perhaps most basically, the candle that shines on the pier-glass and arranges its scratches 
into concentric circles: the embodied and limited human perception that makes one the centre of 
one’s world. 
Egoism is not always and uniformly bad, or, at least, is not incompatible with good. The 
“vices and virtues alike” of the Dodson family character are “phases of a proud, honest egoism,” 
and the “[d]eeds of kindness” which are “as easy . . . as a bad habit” to Arthur Donnithorne are 
“the common issue of his weaknesses and good qualities, of his egoism and his sympathy. He 
didn’t like to witness pain, and he liked to have grateful eyes beaming on him as the giver of 
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pleasure” (The Mill on the Floss 286; Adam Bede 280). Yet in Arthur’s case egoism is on the 
side of weakness while sympathy is parallel to good. Eliot’s narrators allow that virtue and 
kindness may sometimes issue from egoism, but clearly consider the “abandonment of egoism,” 
as the narrator of The Mill on the Floss terms it, to be a greater good (305).  
The term “egoism” belongs to the narrative discourse with few exceptions: the word is 
applied once to Gwendolen in narration focalized through Grandcourt, twice to Savonarola in 
narration focalized through Romola, once to Maggie Tulliver in narration focalized through her, 
and twice to Philip Wakem by himself, once in focalized narration and once in his own direct 
speech, which is the only occasion that the word unambiguously belongs to a character’s voice 
and not the narrator’s. The term’s looseness of application is thus a property of the narrative 
rhetoric, not an effect of dialogue as in Meredith’s The Egoist. The narrator of The Egoist uses 
the word to frame his narrative in the preface, labeling Willoughby an egoist, naming the 
imaginary gnomic encyclopaedia that contains the sum of human wisdom the “Book of Egoism,” 
and designating egoism as an object of laughter, the butt of the comic imps’ ridicule. Yet in an 
important sense “egoist” is first of all Willoughby’s own word and then Clara’s. In the chapter 
descriptively entitled “In Which Sir Willoughby Chances to Supply the Title for Himself,” 
Willoughby chances to supply his title after retelling an anecdote in which a gentleman implores 
doctors to save his ailing wife so that he won’t have to undergo the hardship of remarrying 
(Meredith, The Egoist 81). Willoughby declares, “That is the perfect Egoist,” and exhorts his 
fiancée to “Beware of marrying an Egoist” (81, 82). The word comes to embody for Clara 
everything that makes Willoughby repulsive to her—it is “her medical herb, her illuminating 
lamp, the key of him”—but what she means by it is to some degree incommunicable, so that she 
cannot use the word to explain to Willoughby, her father, or anyone else why she will not marry 
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him: “What could she say? he is an Egoist? The epithet has no meaning in such a scene” (82, 
345). The Egoist arranges private meanings of “egoism” into a comic operatic ensemble, with 
Clara, Laetitia, and Vernon all confessing themselves egoists at various points in the narrative 
while the narrator, basso continuo, develops his own sense of the word in his wry gnomic 
commentary. 
In Eliot’s fiction, by contrast, the word “egoism” and its variants, even when used in 
focalized narration, invoke the narrator’s moral lexicon and diagnostic powers. (Philip seems to 
share these with his narrator.) The name of the condition is no “medical herb” in itself, but by 
presenting characters as case studies of egoism Eliot’s narrators rhetorically prepare for their 
prescription of a remedy. Readers of Eliot know well that this remedy is sympathy, which is 
central to Eliot’s ethics and artistic practice and has accordingly received much attention. The 
ethics of sympathy has an autonomous existence in Eliot’s thought, apart from its instantiation in 
her fiction, and the synthetic work of explaining the principles of and sources for this philosophy 
has been ably accomplished. My focus here will be how this philosophy and its terms are applied 
in particular fictional instances. Eliot defines sympathy, like egoism, in use, and similarly creates 
varieties of sympathy by qualifying the term. While she depicts egoism as an initial condition she 
presents sympathy as a goal, so that, as we have seen, one should eschew maxims because “to 
lace ourselves up in formulas of that sort is to repress all the divine promptings and inspirations 
that spring from growing insight and sympathy” (Eliot, The Mill on the Floss 518, emphasis 
mine). Egoism is so pervasive in Eliot’s work, however, so fundamentally human, that characters 
never fully escape it, and sympathy turns out to be a way of mitigating egoism that depends on, 
and sometimes exacerbates, egoism. Like writing, which supplements memory but in doing so 
makes memory worse, sympathy is a pharmakon, a remedy that is ambiguously also a poison. 
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Although we are told Dorothea “had early begun to emerge” from the “moral stupidity” 
of a primordial egoism, the narrator suggests she initially approaches sympathy wrongly: 
[I]t had been easier to her to imagine how she would devote herself to Mr 
Casaubon, and become wise and strong in his strength and wisdom, than to 
conceive with that distinctness which is no longer reflection but feeling—an idea 
wrought back to the directness of sense, like the solidity of objects—that he had 
an equivalent centre of self, whence the lights and shadows must always fall with 
a certain difference. (Middlemarch 211) 
The narrator’s point is similar to the one Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth makes about sympathy in 
Eliot: “This perception of difference is the key to sympathy, a much misunderstood term in 
George Eliot that does not imply giving up the self” (232). Dorothea seeks to escape egoism by 
submitting herself to Casaubon and his project, but her devotion is founded in egoism. She does 
not conceive that Casaubon’s values, aims, and desires might be different from hers, let alone 
incompatible with them. Because Casaubon’s “centre of self” is equivalent to Dorothea’s, it is 
not Dorothea’s, and Dorothea must therefore, from her own centre, imagine what Casaubon’s 
might be like. The problem of knowing others is persistent for Eliot, as several critics have 
remarked.
5
 Sympathy thus requires, in Ellen Argyros’s words, “a kind of imaginative 
transportation beyond the boundaries of the self” (1). Although Ermarth insists that true 
sympathy in Eliot does not require self-renunciation, self-renunciation is frequently part of the 
process by which Eliot’s characters, imperfect creatures, attempt to transport themselves: 
Dorothea’s early asceticism and Maggie’s conversion to The Imitation of Christ may not lead 
directly to sympathy, and may confuse egoism with desire, but such renunciations are signs that 
                                                     
5
 See, for example, J. Hillis Miller’s “George Eliot: The Roar on the Other Side of Silence” in Others, George 
Levine’s “Daniel Deronda: A New Epistemology,” and Part II of Kay Young’s Imagining Minds. 
 
 
80 
 
Dorothea and Maggie are uncomfortably aware of their investments in self, which sets them 
apart from more entrenched egoists like Celia and Tom. 
 However disapprovingly such renunciations are narrated, they are similar in function to 
the imaginative displacement that Daniel Deronda, master of sympathy, practises on the Thames 
just before he meets Mirah: “He was forgetting everything else in a half-speculative, half-
involuntary identification of himself with the objects he was looking at, thinking how far it might 
be possible habitually to shift his centre till his own personality would be no less outside him 
than the landscape” (Eliot, Daniel Deronda 189). Daniel’s “centre” recalls Casaubon’s “centre of 
self, whence the lights and shadows must always fall with a certain difference.” Daniel’s 
“personality” implies in this context, more than mere character, his existence as a person. Daniel 
tries to project this personality outside himself towards the objects with which he identifies, 
leaving nevertheless some remainder inside still designated “him.” It is syntactically ambiguous 
whether Daniel’s shifting “centre” is to be identified with his personality or the other of his 
personality, the Daniel that leaves to join the landscape or the Daniel that stays inside, and of 
course each of these must be a centre with respect to the other. This duplication of Daniel’s 
centre answers his question: it is not possible “habitually to shift his centre till his own 
personality would be no less outside him than the landscape.” Eliot’s metaphors of centres and 
circles imply a model of the unified subject under which one cannot get outside oneself, because 
the self that one left behind would become absolutely other, would no longer be oneself. Daniel’s 
peculiar thought experiment reveals the game that sympathy plays with the language and the 
boundaries of self. Sympathy may be the act of recognizing another person as a different centre 
of self, while also imaginatively identifying with that other self, but the sympathetic imagination 
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is necessarily circumscribed by egoism, by one’s centredness in the pier glass: sympathy for 
Eliot can be no more than an exploration of one’s own margins in another’s direction. 
 In the discourse of wise folly, the only possible wisdom exists in and through folly. In 
Eliot’s fiction one can only ever, like Dorothea, begin to emerge from the stupidity of egoism. 
One can make progress but not escape, approaching asymptotically the line that defines oneself 
and keeps others at a distance, however infinitesimal. Sympathy exists within these bounds: as 
the narrator of “Janet’s Repentance” says, “sympathy is but a living again through our own past 
in a new form” (Scenes of Clerical Life 258). Sympathy nevertheless has great value in Eliot’s 
novels. The small good that Dorothea does for the Lydgates and the “incalculably diffusive” 
“effect of her being on those around her,” Daniel’s friendship with the alienated Mordecai, and 
Romola’s compassion for her husband’s mistress and their children are all examples of achieved 
sympathy (Middlemarch 838). Yet many examples of sympathy in Eliot, including these, are 
potentially troubling because the gains are so modest or the sacrifices so great, even when 
sympathy is not approached through self-renunciation. Sympathy is not the cure for egoism: 
sympathy, inextricable from egoism, is a pharmakon: “This charm, this spellbinding virtue, this 
power of fascination, can be—alternately or simultaneously—beneficent or maleficent” (Derrida 
70). 
 Daniel, for instance, is both a paragon of the sympathetic imagination and the best 
example of its flaws. The problem is not that his “acts of considerateness . . . str[ike] his 
companions as moral eccentricity,” nor even that his “many-sided sympathy . . . threaten[s] to 
hinder any persistent course of action,” but that he has too much faith in his own imagining of 
others’ difference (Eliot, Daniel Deronda 178, 364). After Mirah tells Daniel that Hans Meyrick 
has likened him to the Buddha feeding himself to a tigress, there ensues an exchange about 
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beauty and truth between Daniel, Mirah, and Hans’s sisters in which Daniel eagerly becomes 
Mirah’s interpreter: 
   “Pray don’t imagine that [I am like Bouddha],” said Deronda, who had lately 
been finding such suppositions rather exasperating. “Even if it were true that I 
thought so much of others, it would not follow that I had no wants for myself. 
When Bouddha let the tigress eat him he might have been very hungry himself.” 
   “Perhaps if he was starved he would not mind so much about being eaten,” said 
Mab, shyly. 
   “Please don’t think that, Mab; it takes away the beauty of the action,” said 
Mirah. 
   “But if it were true, Mirah?” said the rational Amy, having a half-holiday from 
her teaching; “you always take what is beautiful as if it were true.” 
   “So it is,” said Mirah, gently. “If people have thought what is the most beautiful 
and the best thing, it must be true. It is always there.” 
   “Now, Mirah, what do you mean?” said Amy. 
   “I understand her,” said Deronda, coming to the rescue. “It is a truth in thought 
though it may never have been carried out in action. It lives as an idea. Is that it?” 
He turned to Mirah, who was listening with a blind look in her lovely eyes. 
   “It must be that, because you understand me, but I cannot quite explain,” said 
Mirah, rather abstractedly—still searching for some expression. (466) 
Mirah appears to be advancing an aesthetic theory in which beauty is necessarily truth, but falters 
on the ambiguous pronouns “it” and “there,” which together make her statement “It is always 
there” inscrutable. There is something potentially mock-heroic in Daniel’s rush to the “rescue,” 
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and that potential is fulfilled when his speech fails to capture what Mirah means, whatever she 
does mean. He makes a distinction between thought and action that was nowhere implied by her 
speech, and the reference to a “blind look in her lovely eyes” suggests that he has not hit the 
mark, and, perhaps, is paying more attention to her eyes than to what she has said. With “you 
understand me,” Mirah defers to Daniel’s acknowledged powers of sympathy, then tunes out the 
ensuing banter about the Buddha and tigers while she formulates a statement significantly 
different from his: “I think I can say what I mean, now. . . . When the best thing comes into our 
thoughts, it is like what my mother has been to me. She has been just as really with me as all the 
other people about me—often more really with me” (466). Daniel is not enlightened by this 
explanation, which figures the beautiful truth not as a persistent idea but as a spectre; he is only 
painfully reminded of what Mirah’s absent mother is to him. Daniel fears Mirah’s mother is the 
wife of the common pawnbroker Ezra Cohen and, “inwardly wincing under this illustration, 
which brought other possible realities about that mother vividly before him, presently turned the 
conversation” (466). The failure to communicate in this exchange illustrates how Daniel’s 
sympathy translates Mirah into his own terms, while he, preoccupied with this translation, pays 
little attention to her terms.
6
 
 Such blithe translation occurs on a larger scale when Daniel attempts to understand 
Judaism, which proves a challenge to his sympathy. Daniel displays an aversion to the ordinary 
Jewish characters that he meets, such as Ezra Cohen, whom Daniel does not find sufficiently 
romantic: “Ezra Cohen was not clad in the sublime pathos of the martyr, and his taste for money-
getting seemed to be favoured with that success which has been the most exasperating difference 
                                                     
6
 Forest Pyle identifies a similar moment in Adam Bede when Dinah, another deliberate practitioner of sympathy, 
fails in her sympathy for Hetty (156-57). Pyle is skeptical of characters’ powers of sympathy in Eliot, relegating 
sympathy to the narrative discourse rather than the story: “Since no individual character in Eliot’s novels can make 
sympathy work, and since imagination creates in these stories ‘thorny thickets of sin and sorrow,’ the effective work 
of sympathy must be assigned—‘transferred’—to the act of narration itself” (158). 
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in the greed of Jews during all the ages of their dispersion. This Jeshurun of a pawnbroker was 
not a symbol of the great Jewish tragedy” (517). The narration, focalized through Daniel, slightly 
revises but ultimately reinscribes an abhorrent stereotype, allowing greed, on the one hand, to be 
universal but calling successful greed a Jewish trait. The narrator’s position is difficult to judge 
here: “the sublime pathos of the martyr,” “Jeshurun of a pawnbroker,” and the manipulation of 
the stereotype sound arch, suggesting a distance between the narrator’s voice and Daniel’s—the 
narrator is probably articulating for Daniel his inarticulate aversion to Ezra, and doing him no 
favours in the process. Yet the archness is not necessarily satirical, and the narrator may share 
Daniel’s views: elsewhere the narrator apologizes for Daniel’s grotesque fantasies of what 
Mirah’s family might look like by saying, “Excuse him: his mind was not apt to run 
spontaneously into insulting ideas, or to practice a form of wit which identifies Moses with the 
advertisement sheet; but he was just now governed by dread, and if Mirah’s parents had been 
Christian, the chief difference would have been that his forebodings would have been fed with 
wider knowledge” (207). Here, the narrator repeats the attempt to mitigate Daniel’s conception 
of Jews by universalizing his negative preconceptions—there are many ways that a Christian 
family could be unpleasant, too. Like the apologies for Diana in Diana of the Crossways, this 
apology might strike one as unconvincing. Daniel uses a similar logic when he reminds himself 
that “there are queer-looking Christians of the same mixed morale” as the “queer-looking 
Israelites” he encounters (366). Daniel’s efforts to counteract his prejudice by thinking ill of all 
creeds equally only make it clearer that he is especially disposed to find Jewish characters 
“cheat[ing],” “grisly,” “dingy,” and “vulgar,” unworthy of his ideal of the tragic Jew, which he 
finds fulfilled exclusively in Mordecai and Mirah (366). 
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 The point here is not merely that Daniel is prejudiced but that his prejudice is implicated 
in his sympathy: his sympathy consists not in reaching out imaginatively to the Jews he meets, 
but in imagining the Judaism that he wishes to know. His romantic ideal of Judaism is so fixed 
that, when he visits a synagogue, ostensibly out of “historic sympathy” with Judaism and in 
order to understand it better, he homogenizes the service, which is in a language he does not 
understand, reducing it to his fixed idea: 
The Hebrew liturgy, like others, has its transitions of litany, lyric, proclamation, 
dry statement and blessing; but this evening all were one for Deronda: the chant 
of the Chazan’s or Reader’s grand wide-ranging voice with its passage from 
monotony to sudden cries, the outburst of sweet boys’ voices from the little quire, 
the devotional swaying of men’s bodies backwards and forwards, the very 
commonness of the building and shabbiness of the scene where a national faith, 
which had penetrated the thinking of half the world, and moulded the splendid 
forms of that world’s religion, was finding a remote, obscure echo—all were blent 
for him as one expression of a binding history, tragic and yet glorious. (367-68) 
I am offering an especially unsympathetic reading of what for Daniel is an intensely spiritual 
experience, but this reading exposes the degree to which that experience has little to do with 
Judaism specifically and, therefore, the degree to which Daniel’s sympathy appropriates its 
object. The narrator again remains at a distance from Daniel: the narrator fills in the variety and 
detail of the liturgy in order to explain exactly what Daniel is not noticing. Whether the narrator 
approves or merely describes Daniel’s experience of the service, the narrator clearly demarcates 
the difference between the experience and the service. Daniel also shows some awareness of this 
difference, but he evaluates it in his favour, imagining that the service has meant more to him 
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than to the practising Jews who understand Hebrew: “with the cessation of the devotional sounds 
and the movement of many indifferent faces and vulgar figures before him there darted into his 
mind the frigid idea that he had probably been alone in his feeling, and perhaps the only person 
in the congregation for whom the service was more than a dull routine” (368). Is “frigid” 
Daniel’s admission or the narrator’s judgment? “Frigid” because the lack of authentic religious 
feeling Daniel has attributed to the Jews is chilling to him, or because it is chilling that he has 
thought to attribute it to them? In either case, an icy core of egoism is visible here within 
Daniel’s sympathetic imagination. What he sympathizes with is his own deeply-felt imagining of 
a religious tradition to which he is still, in effect, an outsider; his imagination of the insider’s 
experience, of the Jews’ “dull routine,” is presumptuous and thin. It would not be difficult to 
extend such a judgment to Daniel’s general conduct, seeing, for example, Daniel’s position as 
Gwendolen’s confessor and advisor as similarly unearned—as Daniel’s egoism feeding off hers. 
 Like wisdom in the tradition of wise folly, sympathy in Eliot’s fiction is won out of a 
condition of egoism, is never safely antithetical to egoism, and sometimes turns out to be egoism. 
This ambiguity, the ambiguity of the pharmakon, makes available to the reader, even plausible to 
the reader, the judgment that Daniel is presumptuous. I mean to claim more, however, than that 
this judgment is available and plausible: its availability and plausibility are a working part of the 
design of Daniel Deronda, an effect of Eliot’s realism. The narrator never diagnoses Daniel 
explicitly, and though there may be a diagnosis hiding in the dialogic difference between the 
narrator’s voice and Daniel’s, when apologizing for Daniel the narrator does not appear 
committed to naming and examining his flaws. If Eliot’s narrative rhetoric were too insistent on 
the duplicity of the pharmakon, however, that rhetoric would be entirely different in character—
more prone to wry cynicism, like Meredith’s, and less capable of the ambitious moralizing that 
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is, in various proportions and to various readers of Eliot, inspiring and frustrating. It seems like 
what I am describing is a contradiction, the sort that results from attempting to conceal ideology: 
in order to advance an ethics of sympathy, Eliot needs to sweep complications under the carpet, 
from whence they spill of their own accord. These complications are not under a carpet, 
however; they are merely unarticulated by the narrator. Eliot’s fiction turns against the ethics of 
sympathy not, finally, through the voice that advocates it, but through the encounter of that voice 
with others. In order to apprehend the ethics of Eliot’s work, both its grain and its cross-grain, it 
will be necessary to question the centrality of the narrators and the marginality of certain 
characters, or, more precisely, to reinterpret the relation between centre and margin. We will 
begin at the margin, where the scapegoats live. 
 
3. Pharmakos 
 Thus far we have largely been concerned with the ethical language and judgments, 
implicit and explicit, of narrators. The explicit judgments are expressed most pointedly in 
gnomes, which illuminate the implicit judgments of the surrounding narration. Not all ethical 
judgments in fiction are attributable to narrators, however, or even to characters, because of the 
basic realist convention that a story and its diegesis exist autonomously from the narrative 
discourse, however completely the discourse mediates our understanding of the story. That is, 
even given a novel like Vanity Fair where the narrator toys with the distinction between story 
and discourse, taking responsibility for penning his puppets around the stage, we still talk about 
what Becky Sharp does and what happens to her, not what the narrator makes Becky Sharp do or 
causes to happen to her. We do, however, talk about what authors make happen in stories, and 
thus moral judgments may be communicated through character systems and plot that, as it were, 
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bypass the narrator and can be attributed directly to an implied or real author, depending on the 
kind of claim one wants to make. Although realist authors like Thackeray, Meredith, and Eliot 
insert the materials of plot and character into evaluative systems sustained by a gnomic style, 
these materials are not raw stuff, devoid of ethical significance until judged by a narrator. 
Particular characters and actions have socio-historical valences, and on a broad literary-historical 
scale, across authors, works, and time, these valences are encoded formally in typical characters 
and genres.
7
 Once an audience has identified the villain of a melodrama by conventional cues, 
little independent judgment is required in order to read his actions as evil, unless or until other 
cues indicate that the convention is being subverted. If a reader identifies a narrative as one in 
which the author doles out reward and punishment according to the deserts of characters—an 
exemplum or a parable, for instance—then reward and punishment become indices of the 
narrative’s ethical premises, which in these genres are often made explicit in gnomes. When the 
ethical import of such a story agrees with the ethical judgments of the gnomic discourse, the 
effect is strongly didactic. When the ethical implications of the story diverge from the explicit 
moral, irony can result. This irony is visible in Chaucer’s narrative poetry and detectable, but less 
pronounced, in John Gower’s Confessio Amantis. Allowing the narrative to get away from its 
moral framework in this way is a form of wise folly, and it reaches its full development in the 
realist novel. 
 Eliot’s novels, like most realist novels, incorporate and transform other conventional 
forms. Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda are both constructed around marriage plots, deriving 
from these plots their cadential structure, their modulations from suspense to closure. Such a use 
                                                     
7
 Cf. Bakhtin: “Shakespeare, like any artist, constructed his works not out of inanimate elements, not out of bricks, 
but out of forms that were already heavily laden with meaning, filled with it. We may note in passing that even 
bricks have a certain spatial form and, consequently, in the hands of the builder they express something” (Speech 
Genres 5). 
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of the marriage plot raises expectations of a comic resolution in which marriage synecdochally 
represents social integration (Frye 43-49). Marriage does not necessarily function as a reward 
earned by the characters involved, and, as Northrop Frye notes in Anatomy of Criticism, his 
ambitious taxonomy of intertextual forms, the comic ending does not require justice to be dealt: 
“The comic hero will get his triumph whether what he has done is sensible or silly, honest or 
rascally” (43). The genre of comedy competes in Eliot’s novels with others, however, including 
tragedy and the genre of the exemplum, in which the characters’ actions and the consequences of 
their actions serve didactic ends. Eliot’s narrators sometimes explicitly encourage us to view 
their narratives as exempla. The prelude and, more cautiously, the finale of Middlemarch frame 
Dorothea as a modern saint Theresa, prevented by “the conditions of an imperfect social state, in 
which great feelings will often take the aspect of error, and great faith the aspect of illusion” 
from achieving anything greater than that “incalculably diffusive” good effect on those around 
her (Eliot 838). The gnomic style also lends itself to an exemplary form in which the rhetorics of 
story and discourse reinforce each other: the plot proves the gnomes. 
 Readers construe this exemplary form when we adduce actions and consequences in a 
narrative as evidence of an authorial judgment. Stefanie Markovits, for example, cites the plot of 
Romola in an argument about Eliot’s ambivalent treatment of action in her fiction: “The book is 
still conservative, and political activity ends in disaster,” she writes, the idea being that the 
disaster eschatologically tells us something about political activity in Eliot’s view (792). With a 
similar logic, Bruce K. Martin, arguing that in Middlemarch “as in her other fiction, George 
Eliot’s narration is infused with suggestions of a morally efficient universe, stocked with 
determinable motives and actions, where deeds ultimately carry influence, consequence, 
punishment and reward,” objects to what he perceives as Eliot’s favouring of the rather 
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irresponsible and immature Fred Vincy, which “constitutes a compromise of the values central to 
the novel and, indeed, a symptom of problems within its ideological center,” and which 
“unravels both the moral and the aesthetic design of Middlemarch” (4). Martin reads Fred’s 
unearned rewards, especially marriage to the strong-willed Mary Garth, as an ideological 
symptom: Eliot gives Fred a world “where wisdom consists, above all, in acceding to the existent 
social order as a self-evident and permanent good,” and thereby retreats into bourgeois 
conventionalism instead of examining “the real struggles of class and ideology” (17). 
 In contrast to such insistence on the exemplarity of Eliot’s plots, Catherine Brown cites a 
passage from Eliot’s essay “Morality of Wilhelm Meister” in which Eliot condemns the false 
morality of poetic justice: 
Just as far from being really moral is the so-called moral denouement, in which 
rewards and punishments are distributed according to those notions of justice on 
which the novel-writer would have recommended that the world should be 
governed if he had been consulted at the creation. The emotion of satisfaction 
which a reader feels when the villain of the book dies of some hideous disease, or 
is crushed by a railway train, is no more essentially moral than the satisfaction 
which used to be felt in whipping culprits at the cart-tail. (Qtd. in Brown, 305) 
Despite this cautionary quotation, Brown nevertheless suggests that there are “notions of justice” 
in Daniel Deronda, and that “the suffering with which Gwendolen’s egotism is punished accords 
imperfectly” with this justice (306). In brief, Brown reads Gwendolen as a “scapegoat” figure, 
whose transgressions are punished more than Mrs. Glasher’s, and whose exclusion from the high 
seriousness of Daniel, Mirah, and Mordecai’s plot denies her suffering a tragic status. For 
Brown, Gwendolen “is rendered a victim in relation to Daniel’s world in that her own is 
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discontinuous with his, and she is excluded from the ethnic and aesthetic categories 
correspondent to the novel’s ideals. In addition, her downfall throws his success into relief” 
(318). Markovits concurs: “George Eliot sacrifices any potential for realistic progress when she 
scapegoats Gwendolen, leaving her behind to suffer in an outdated England while Daniel departs 
for Palestine and the future” (793). Hetty Sorrel in The Mill on the Floss, as Neil Hertz notes, 
tends to be treated as another such scapegoat: “Hetty in particular seems to many critics to have 
been especially meanly dealt with, allowed, for the space of a few pages, the most intense inner 
experience recorded in the novel, then dismissed from it not once but twice—first transported to 
the colonies, then killed off, it would seem gratuitously, in the Epilogue, while on her way home 
to England after serving out her sentence” (96). In the cases of Fred and these scapegoats what 
troubles critics is a sense that Eliot is promising and failing to deliver an intelligible ethical 
teleology in her fiction. 
 Though Eliot’s narrators do invite teleological reading to a degree, such reading is liable 
to be frustrated by her novels, because it is on the level of story and character, not on the level of 
the narrative discourse, that Eliot’s fiction is at its most dialogic. Teleological readings ignore, 
for example, the important role of the arbitrary in Eliot’s plotting. If George Eliot’s narration is, 
as Martin writes, “infused with suggestions of a morally efficient universe,” this infusion is 
titrated in a dialogic solution of available positions, one of which is that the world is governed by 
natural, not moral law. Certainly, the world of Eliot’s fiction is not on the other hand “a morally 
arbitrary universe,” but it is, in Ermarth’s words, a “material universe” with “indecipherable 
expanses,” a world in which, for example, a flash flood can wash away a central plot and make 
nonsense of many of its central ethical and erotic problems: thus the ending of The Mill on the 
Floss (Martin 11, Ermarth 225). The intentions of Eliot’s narrators, including their philosophies, 
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their teleological readings of actions and consequences, and their powerful metaphors, are 
imposed on plots that do not necessarily justify or refute those intentions, and that are amenable 
to other readings, including other generic categorizations. These competing readings are worth 
examining further for what they reveal about competing ethical systems in Eliot’s novels. 
Gwendolen may indeed be read as a scapegoat, and Fred as something like a reverse scapegoat, a 
golden ass: yet, as Eliot herself recognizes in her remarks about “whipping culprits at the cart-
tail,” the functions of the pharmakos figure in life and literature have a complicated relationship 
to morality in which the unfairness of the punishment (or, in Fred’s case, the serendipity of the 
reward) is part of the meaning of the figure. 
 “The character of the pharmakos,” Derrida writes, “has been compared to a scapegoat. 
The evil and the outside, the expulsion of the evil, its exclusion out of the body (and out) of the 
city—these are the two major senses of the character and of the ritual” (130). The ritual was the 
ancient Greek practice in which, usually during the festival of Thargelia but also during times of 
crisis, two ugly, lower-class, criminal or otherwise marginal persons were exiled from a city, and 
perhaps sacrificed, in order to ensure the good of the populace (Bremmer). The corresponding 
character has been described by Northrop Frye as typical of ironic tragedy and ironic comedy. In 
ironic tragedy the pharmakos is an isolated tragic figure, suffering a doom out of proportion with 
any of his or her actions; in ironic comedy the pharmakos is the Malvolio or Shylock figure 
whose punishment or exclusion from the comic society is cause for celebration from that 
society’s point of view, but, from the pharmakos’s perspective and potentially ours, is unjust 
(Frye 41-42, 45-47). The irony in Frye’s ironic tragedy and ironic comedy stems from the lack of 
a neat moral teleology in these literary modes: we are aware that neither the downfall of the 
tragic pharmakos nor the exclusion of the comic pharmakos are entirely merited. The difference 
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between the tragic and comic pharmakoi, between victim and gull, is therefore only a matter of 
perspective (the individual’s or the community’s). In a realist novel, in which multiple 
perspectives are faithfully represented, ironic comedy and ironic tragedy can coexist as 
competing forms through which the story may be understood.
8
 
 The pharmakos also complicates perspective, however, making it difficult to separate the 
pharmakos sharply from the society that attempts to purge him. Derrida uses the pharmakos to 
deconstruct the binary opposition between outside and inside because the pharmakos, in order to 
be made representative of an outside evil and cast outside the city, must already be inside the 
community casting him out: 
The ceremony of the pharmakos is thus played out on the boundary line between 
inside and outside, which it has as its function ceaselessly to trace and retrace. 
Intra muros/extra muros. The origin of difference and division, the pharmakos 
represents evil both introjected and projected. Beneficial insofar as he cures—and 
for that, venerated and cared for—harmful insofar as he incarnates the powers of 
evil—and for that, feared and treated with caution. Alarming and calming. Sacred 
and accursed. (133) 
Through his different mode of reading, Frye similarly arrives at a view of the pharmakos as a 
double figure that can signal the evil in the very society that designates him evil and casts him 
out: “Insisting on the theme of social revenge on an individual, however great a rascal he may 
be, tends to make him look less involved in guilt and the society more so. This is particularly true 
of characters who have been trying to amuse either the actual or the internal audience, and who 
are the comic counterparts of the tragic hero as artist” (45). The wise-foolish court jester as he 
appears in Shakespeare is a version of the pharmakos, with the ambiguity of the figure self-
                                                     
8
 See Brown on Daniel Deronda’s tragicomedy. 
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consciously incorporated into the role: the fool is kept near to the sovereign, at the symbolic 
heart of the state, but is designated an outsider to the social order of that state, exempt from the 
rules that govern speech and conduct, and thereby able to address the sovereign as no insider 
could. From this position, the fool embodies a negative ethical category, folly, but also represents 
and expresses the possibility that there is wisdom in folly, that the state’s valuation of the 
category is incorrect. It is difficult to determine whether the fool’s political function is radical or 
conservative, because, while the fool’s role allows him to introduce radical critique, it also 
contains that critique in a devalued category. As a fictional figure, however, the fool is not just 
launching satire at a social order that is free to ignore him, but also sharing his resistance with an 
audience or readers who are free to take him to heart. Using the pharmakos in a similar way, 
Eliot purges egoism from the privileged communities of her novels in the person of scapegoat 
characters, simultaneously permitting scapegoat characters to strike back in the novels’ ethical 
dialogues. Her pharmakoi, significant by virtue of the very process of narrative and moral 
selection that marginalizes them, point to flaws in the privileged moral order from which they are 
excluded.
9
 
 Daniel’s friend and would-be rival Hans Meyrick is exactly the kind of comic artist that 
Frye describes, and his function as pharmakos is a largely unexamined dimension of the ethics of 
Daniel Deronda. Hans has a singular status in the text. He is a painter, which profession places 
him, like Klesmer, at the margins of a social hierarchy based primarily on birth and wealth, and 
gives him greater freedom of expression. He is miserably star-crossed, his misfortunes a parody 
                                                     
9
 The distinction I make between the sacrifice of the pharmakos within a narrative and the resulting significance of 
the pharmakos in the work’s ethical dialogue resembles the distinction Woloch makes between a minor character’s 
minorness and the character’s importance to the reader: “Minor characters exist as a category . . . only because of 
their strange centrality to so many texts, perhaps to narrative signification itself. But this is not to say that once we 
acknowledge the significance of the minor character, he suddenly becomes major, breaking out of his subordinate 
position in the narrative discourse. This would be to elide the very source through which the minor character 
signifies—and is made significant to the reader who strangely remembers” (37). Minorness is one form that the 
sacrifice of the pharmakos can take. 
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of the teleological “Nemesis” that may or may not explain the consequences of actions in Eliot: 
“Hans was made for mishaps: his very limbs seemed more breakable than other people’s—his 
eyes more of a resort for uninvited flies and other irritating guests” (Eliot, Daniel Deronda 378). 
This singularity helps to mark Hans as an “eccentric” in Woloch’s binary categorization of minor 
characters: the eccentric “grates against his or her position and is usually, as a consequence, 
wounded, exiled, expelled, ejected, imprisoned, or killed (within the discourse, if not the story)” 
(25). Hans is the character in Daniel Deronda with the best-developed sense of humour, a foil to 
the ever-earnest Daniel. Hans is also an egoist, a parallel of Gwendolen, who loves Mirah where 
Gwendolen loves Daniel, and who like Gwendolen is conspicuously absent from the marriage at 
the end of the novel. Like Daniel and Gwendolen or Mirah and Gwendolen, Daniel and Hans 
form what Hertz calls a “structure of double surrogation,” in which each of two characters is 
associated with one half of an ethical binary: “In each case the valuing of the ‘good’ surrogate is 
matched by the abjection or exile of her (or his) ‘bad’ partner” (101, 102). 
 Hans’s exclusion is part of the cost of the ending, which in its rough outlines is 
traditionally comic. “If Hans could have been there, it would have been better,” we are told, but 
he cannot be because he was so “ridiculous” and “inconvenient,” in his sisters’ opinion, as to fall 
in love with the bride (Eliot, Daniel Deronda 809). Though Hans’s exile is self-imposed, like 
Jaques’s in As You Like It, Hans is no melancholiac. His levity, always in tension with Daniel’s 
gravity, becomes incompatible with it when they become rivals for Mirah’s affections, and the 
end of the novel enacts the “rejection of the entertainer, whether fool, clown, buffoon, or 
simpleton,” which, as Frye writes, “can be one of the most terrible ironies known to art, as the 
rejection of Falstaff shows, and certain scenes in Chaplin” (45). This irony is terrible because the 
entertainer has a special relationship to the reader—insofar as Falstaff’s cynical humour and wit 
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exist to amuse us, one’s enjoyment of Falstaff is at odds with one’s recognition that his 
amoralism and vice, the wellsprings of his humour, have no place in Hal’s state. 
 In Daniel Deronda the ability to, as Frye writes, “amuse either the actual or the internal 
audience” is a rare skill. Hans possesses this skill, and it is implicated in his exclusion. The very 
statement of his amoralism is an epigram that exemplifies his ability to amuse: “Hans had always 
said that in point of virtue he was a dilettante: which meant that he was very fond of it in other 
people, but if he meddled with it himself he cut a poor figure. Perhaps in reward of his good 
behaviour he gave his tongue the more freedom” (Eliot, Daniel Deronda 798). The first (and, as 
far as we know, the only) time that Daniel sees Mirah laugh is when she recounts the tragicomic 
mimicry that Hans has performed for her: “When Deronda went to Chelsea he was not made as 
comfortable as he ought to have been by Mrs. Meyrick’s evident release from anxiety about the 
beloved but incalculable son [Hans, who has returned undamaged from Italy]. Mirah seemed 
livelier than before, and for the first time he saw her laugh” (464). The description of lively 
Mirah seems offered almost in explanation of Daniel’s discomfort; after all, it has just been 
revealed that the “image of Mirah changing” is part of what Daniel finds so repugnant about 
Hans’s infatuation with her (464). A laughing Mirah is indeed a changed Mirah, as Mrs. Meyrick 
attests: “We hardly thought that Mirah could laugh till Hans came” (464). Mirah laughs in spite 
of her usual disposition: “‘I used never to like comic things on the stage—they were dwelt on too 
long; but all in one minute Mr Hans makes himself a blind bard, and then Rienzi addressing the 
Romans, and then an opera-dancer, and then a desponding young gentleman—I am sorry for 
them all, and yet I laugh, all in one’—here Mirah gave a little laugh that might have entered into 
a song” (464). There is little explanation in Mirah’s speech for this unaccustomed reaction 
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except for the “all in one minute,” as if Hans has by sheer speed circumvented Mirah’s distaste 
for levity and raised a laugh along with her sympathy. 
 We know something about the probable origins of this distaste in Mirah’s father, a 
performer and stage manager with a comic bent. Mirah tells Daniel, “It was his nature to take 
everything lightly; and I soon left off asking him any question about things that I cared for much, 
because he always turned them off with a joke” (216). Mirah especially loathes her father’s 
mocking mimicry of Jews, which seems to her a betrayal of their people. Such mockery threatens 
her view of the world: “For there were some things—when they were laughed at I could not bear 
it: the world seemed like a hell to me. Is this world and all the life upon it only like a farce or a 
vaudeville, where you find no great meanings? Why then are there tragedies and grand operas, 
where men do difficult things and choose to suffer? I think it is silly to speak of all things as a 
joke” (216-17). Mirah’s distrust of jokes resonates with Daniel’s, which also appears to originate 
in his youth. Daniel remembers the farmer Mr. Banks making a joke at his expense with “a 
cunning laugh”: “He features the mother, eh?” (170). “At that time little Daniel had merely 
thought that Banks made a silly face, as the common farming men often did—laughing at what 
was not laughable; and he rather resented being winked at and talked of as if he did not 
understand everything” (170). When Daniel later understands more and realizes that the joke 
bears on his uncertain parentage, it of course does not become any more laughable to him. 
 As the narrator says, “A difference of taste in jokes is a great strain on the affections” 
(163). Though Hans’s mimicry introduces Mirah to a mixed laughter that can coexist with 
sympathy, Hans’s humour has the indifference that Mirah finds so hostile to her worldview. He 
responds to the death of Grandcourt with quips like “I never knew anybody die conveniently 
before” and with jokes about Daniel marrying the newly-available Gwendolen (727). (His 
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remark “And I shall be invited to the wedding” underscores his absence from the wedding that 
does occur [727].) In response to Hans’s jesting, Mirah undergoes a dramatic “sudden 
transformation” (728). Taking on a “look of anger that might have suited Ithuriel,” she “burst[s] 
into indignant speech as creatures in intense pain bite and make their teeth meet even through 
their own flesh, by way of making their agony bearable” (728). Mirah’s manner emphasizes 
Hans’s difference from her, and her speech emphasizes Hans’s difference from Daniel: “Mr 
Deronda would not like you to speak so” (728). Hans is ashamed, but his humour remains 
irrepressible: “‘I am a fool and a brute, and I withdraw every word. I’ll go and hang myself like 
Judas—if it’s allowable to mention him.’ Even in Hans’s sorrowful moments, his improvised 
words had inevitably some drollery” (728). Both Hans and Mirah herself conclude from their 
clash that Mirah loves Daniel, and clearly one explanation of Mirah’s vehement rebuke is that 
she is jealous of Gwendolen. It is also significant, however, that a violent incompatibility of 
humour between Mirah and Hans initiates Mirah’s reflection on her love for Daniel. While 
Hans’s affection for Mirah causes Daniel to entertain unhappily the “image of Mirah changing,” 
Mirah similarly sees Gwendolen as alien to the Daniel she knows, a “woman who belonged to 
another world than her own and Ezra’s—nay, who seemed another sort of being than Deronda, 
something foreign that would be a disturbance in his life instead of a blending with it” (733). The 
marriage ending symbolically confirms the blending of Mirah and Daniel and the foreignness of 
Gwendolen and Hans to the happy couple.
10
 
 Hans and Gwendolen, pharmakoi, are alien in similar ways and for similar reasons. 
Though Hans is a minor romantic painter and Gwendolen a daughter of wealth who, once her 
                                                     
10
 See Levine: “Understanding at last the radical otherness of Deronda and the world he enters, she [Gwendolen] is 
perhaps morally redeemed but the very form of the novel confirms her marginalization by turning to the wedding of 
Daniel with Mirah and the spiritual betrothal of Daniel and Mordecai” (“Daniel Deronda: A New Epistemology” 
58). 
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family is ruined, marries into wealth again, they are both egoists and humourists, and they both 
exemplify the egoism of humour. Gwendolen “rather valued herself on her superior freedom in 
laughing where others might only see matter for seriousness,” and this superior freedom 
accompanies an inferior capacity for sympathy, such that Gwendolen can laugh at Rex’s horse-
riding accident just as Hans makes light of Grandcourt’s death (77). Humour entails an affective 
distance between the one laughing and the object of the laughter. Humour thus seems at odds 
with sympathy even when it coexists with sympathy in Mirah’s rare laugh, and it can easily be 
cruel. We have seen, however, that sympathy also entails a rift between self and other, which it 
imaginatively tries to bridge, and can sometimes effectively widen. Humour is another 
pharmakon in Daniel Deronda, a healing poison, the corrective to a tyrannical sympathy. When 
Daniel objects to Hans’s portraits of Mirah, disguising mere possessiveness as an incoherent 
concern for Mirah’s public image and presuming to voice how Mirah would feel if she “saw the 
circumstances clearly,” Hans deflates the argument with “an explosive laugh” which, “seeing 
that Daniel looked gravely offended,” he redirects towards himself and the likelihood of his own 
paintings ever being exhibited (460). As Rosemarie Bodenheimer writes, “It is one of those 
moments that shows just how clearly George Eliot understood the self-interested functions of her 
own moralizing voice” (264).11 
 From the excluded space of humour, and from whatever space he occupies while we are 
watching a newly-wed couple prepare to travel East, Hans launches a critique of Daniel that is a 
crucial part of Daniel Deronda. The artist “puts what he hates into a caricature,” Hans says, and 
though it would be overstating the case to say that Hans hates Daniel, he does put those of 
Daniel’s traits most inimical to him into a verbal caricature (461). Anticipating Daniel’s reaction 
                                                     
11
 Levine also notes that Daniel’s interest is a “driving force” in this scene, even though it is one of the novel’s 
“most solemn and truthful moments” (“Daniel Deronda: A New Epistemology” 57). Hans’s laugh, I suggest, 
exposes the interest at the expense of the solemnity. 
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to the letter he writes him, Hans includes a satirical “stage direction”: “While D. is reading, a 
profound scorn gathers in his face till at the last word he flings down the letter, grasps his coat-
collar in a statuesque attitude and so remains with a look generally tremendous, throughout the 
following soliloquy, ‘O night, O blackness, &c. &c.’” (645-46). Daniel does tend to grab his 
coat-collar, as Henry James notes in his 1876 dialogue-review entitled “Daniel Deronda, a 
Conversation.” James’s character Pulcheria objects that Daniel is not a “real figure”: “why is he 
always grasping his coat-collar, as if he wished to hang himself up? The author had an 
uncomfortable feeling that she must make him do something real, something visible and 
sensible, and she hit upon that clumsy figure” (Partial Portraits 71). Eliot removed some 
instances of coat-collar grasping in the 1878 edition of the novel, perhaps to make Hans’s 
caricature more of a caricature and Daniel’s character less of one, but the fact remains that Hans 
and thus, in a sense, Eliot, share James’s observation. Hans’s dig at Daniel makes the collar 
clutching not just an awkward reality-effect but a significant mannerism, one associated with 
Daniel’s general spoudaiotes, which Hans seeks to mock. 
 A different passage in Hans’s letter is the cue for Cynthia Chase’s reading of Daniel 
Deronda, in which the letter “functions as a deconstruction of the novel” and “proposes an 
interpretation of the novel that is substantially and radically at odds with the explanations of its 
narrator” (215). This conflict is not merely between the narrator’s judgment and Hans’s, though 
Chase notes “the contrast between Meyrick’s frivolous, self-parodic tone and the narrator’s more 
sober style” and argues that, when the narrator judges Hans harshly, this judgment “reflects the 
fundamental strategy of the narrator and indicates one of the main ostensible meanings of the 
novel: seriousness and idealism triumph over parody and the ironic spirit” (215). More 
fundamentally, for Chase, Hans’s witticism about “the present causes of past effects” “offers a 
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deconstruction of the narrator’s story and, by implication, of story in general—both of history, 
with its system of assumptions about teleological and representational structures, and of 
discourse, with its intrinsic need to constitute meaning through sequence and reference” (Eliot, 
Daniel Deronda 641; Chase 216). In short, Hans’s phrase exposes how the narrative of Daniel 
Deronda really seems to work, so that Daniel’s birth as a Jew is an effect of his alliance to 
Mordecai and Mirah in later life. That is, Hans’s joke is at the expense of the “narrative as such” 
(219). 
 Chase’s reading ultimately leads away from her earlier observations about Hans’s 
character as Romantic ironist: “it can be misleading to think of the two readings [the authorized 
one and the deconstructive one] in personified or personifying terms, since they constitute a 
single discontinuous process that moves away from personification, abandoning the notion of the 
subject for the notion of linguistic operation, reconstruing the narrative’s starting point as a text 
rather than as a subject” (225). Hans’s quip points to an aporia in the narrative where we can see 
deconstruction happen, the system of signification undoing itself and taking Hans with it. I want 
to reinstate here, pragmatically, the personifying terms that deconstruction breaks down, to 
recognize but also to suspend the deconstructive logic of Hans’s joke instead of pursuing it to an 
end in which the character Hans no longer exists as such. After all, it is typical of wise fools to 
pick at the threads of their textuality. More explicitly and self-consciously than Hans, the Fool in 
the Folio of King Lear deconstructs temporal sequence and exposes the groundlessness of the 
fiction in which he finds himself: “This prophecy Merlin shall make, for I live before his time” 
(Shakespeare 3.3.95-96). 
 It is significant that Hans writes his letter, that the utterance “present causes of past 
effects” belongs to his voice and way of thinking as they are constituted by the narrative. In the 
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person of Hans irony can be rejected and marginalized, but in the person of Hans and from the 
margins this subversive irony fights back in the novel’s dialogue against the very earnestness that 
condemns him. Hans embodies a critical faculty in the text: it may be silly to speak of all things 
as a joke, but because Hans does speak of all things as a joke he teases out and gives voice to 
nagging problems in the novel. For instance, Hans identifies the vagueness in Mordecai’s 
orations: 
 In fact, his mind seems so broad that I find my own correct opinions lying in it quite 
 commodiously, and how they are to be brought into agreement with the vast remainder is 
 his affair, not mine. I leave it to him to settle our basis, never yet having seen a basis 
 which is not a world-supporting elephant, more or less powerful and expensive to keep. 
 My means will not allow me to keep a private elephant. I go into mystery instead, as 
 cheaper and more lasting—a sort of gas which is likely to be continually supplied by the 
 decomposition of the elephants. (642) 
The objection reveals Hans’s wise-foolish conviction that “bases,” by which he evidently means 
the fundamental systems of thought that relate individuals’ “correct opinions” to each other and 
make them coherent, will inevitably collapse, and that the only tenable position is the 
oppositional non-position of an ironic mystery. This position may be of dubious intrinsic value, 
but its all-encompassing skepticism counters Mordecai’s blithe attempts to dismiss problems 
with what Dawn Coleman calls his “sermonic voice”: “Difficulties? I know there are difficulties. 
But let the spirit of sublime achievement move in the great among our people, and the work will 
begin” (535). These “difficulties” include the political challenges involved in creating a Jewish 
state amid what Mordecai lumps together as the “despotisms of the East” (535). Mordecai thus 
attempts to commit Daniel to a world-changing work that, as Edward Said has remarked from his 
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own committed position, remains largely unexamined in the novel (The Question of Palestine 
65). Mordecai’s “broad” mind is one obstacle to that examination. He is unable to descend to 
particulars: he can passionately and eloquently convey the need to act, but not how to act, and 
thus he remains at odds with his more pragmatic peers apart from Mirah and Daniel. As Coleman 
notes, even Daniel remains somewhat embarrassed about the mission he has undertaken, an 
embarrassment elicited by Hans’s own embarrassed silence when Daniel tells him his intentions 
(417). 
 More than a voice of critique, Hans’s is the voice of the comic form of Daniel Deronda, 
which is in dialogue with the exemplary form. After Mordecai consoles Mirah, who has 
encountered her dissolute father, by saying “It is because we children have inherited the good 
that we feel the evil. These things are wedded for us, as our father was wedded to our mother,” 
the narrator endorses Mordecai’s figurative use of the marriage metaphor: 
 The surroundings were of Brompton, but the voice might have come from a Rabbi 
 transmitting the sentences of an elder time to be registered in Babli—by which (to our  
 ears) affectionate-sounding diminutive is meant the voluminous Babylonian Talmud. 
 “The Omnipresent,” said a Rabbi, “is occupied in making marriages.” The levity of the 
 saying lies in the ear of him who hears it; for by marriages the speaker meant all the 
 wondrous combinations of the universe whose issue makes our good and evil. (743) 
Hans is, perhaps, the one with the light ear who, if he heard this saying, would think of wedlock 
and leave “the wondrous combinations of the universe” to the elephants; at least, he shows us 
what it would mean to be that person. In response to Hans’s letter, in which Hans humorously 
personifies his “Hope” of Mirah’s acceptance, Daniel thinks, “Already he is beginning to play at 
love: he is taking the whole affair as a comedy” (647). Love and comedy, of course, are not such 
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a novel combination. Hans does indeed take the whole affair as a comedy, in a generic sense, 
seeing his own plot moving towards marriage with Mirah and Daniel’s towards marriage with 
Gwendolen. Hans tends to treat the ostensibly real life of the diegesis as if it were a play, which 
helps to account for the metafictional implications of his utterances, such as those Chase 
explores. Hans’s cruelty in the face of Grandcourt’s death can be seen in the rawest comic terms 
as Hans celebrating the removal, convenient to him, of a blocking character, a villainous heavy 
husband who stands in the way of the comic closure that Hans finds most fitting just as 
Casaubon and his will stand in the way of Dorothea’s eventual marriage to Will. 
 In a very different kind of story than Daniel Deronda’s, Hans might have triumphed. He 
might not have been “the hinder wheel,” doomed to run behind Daniel; he might have married 
Mirah and Daniel might have married Gwendolen (645). Perhaps, after some comic confusion, 
Hans might even have married Gwendolen while Daniel married Mirah. Perhaps Daniel might 
have been the pharmakos, rejected as a cross-gartered Malvolio. Hans’s comic vision conjures 
these possibilities so that they can be rejected by the different sort of ending that does occur. The 
ending of Daniel Deronda combines the closure of Daniel and Mirah’s marriage, the death of 
Mordecai, who bequeaths the couple his Zionist mission, and the routing of egoism in the 
persons of Hans and Gwendolen, suggesting the larger, graver, more diffuse sense of “marriage” 
that the narrator advocates. 
 Unlike the traditional comic ending, however, the ending of Daniel Deronda leaves 
Daniel and Mirah socially isolated. Though Daniel has theoretically embraced his membership in 
a Jewish community, he has inherited the eccentric position of Mordecai at the margins of that 
community as it is represented in the novel. It remains to Daniel not only to fill in the details of 
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Mordecai’s notional plan, but to muster the support that Mordecai could not. Mordecai’s project 
is not in itself eccentric, as William Baker notes:  
Ideas in Daniel Deronda based mainly upon Mordecai’s proposals for the re-
establishment of a Jewish homeland, were not so fantastic as they may have 
seemed to Henry James and other Victorians. They were genuinely related to a 
movement for return amongst the diasporal Jews, to proposals and practical 
measures by the British Government to encourage Jewish settlement in Palestine, 
and to a measure of rejuvenation in the Palestine Jewish community itself. (134) 
Eliot could have situated Mordecai’s rhetoric and Daniel’s departure within existing social 
discourses and networks, but she does not. To turn my reading of the novel thus far inside out, it 
is Daniel and Mirah who are being exiled to an unspecific East, they who possess an excess of 
earnest sympathy that does not belong in the “comic and banal” society of people like Hans, 
Gwendolen, and Sir Hugo as well as Lapidoth, the Cohen family, and Mordecai’s club (Brown 
308). The rhetoric of the narrative discourse positions us with Daniel and Mirah against this 
other world, but the mechanism of this rhetoric, the scapegoating of Hans and Gwendolen, is a 
hinge on which the whole structure can turn. If Hans is a Falstaff figure, then the late nineteenth-
century England that Eliot presents in Daniel Deronda is Falstaff’s England, not Hal’s: a venal, 
fallen land of folly, egoism, and sometimes humour, where people suffer but also possess a kind 
of comic insight that seems unavailable to Daniel and Mirah. Hans voices the anti-systematic 
thesis of wise folly, that all the elephants of our thought are destined to decompose, and though 
this position can be rejected it cannot be unvoiced. Daniel must, therefore, pursue moral 
superiority in the face of these objections, and we are supplied a language, the language of the 
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pharmakos, a language foreign within the novel but not foreign to it, with which we might judge 
that he has not succeeded. 
 In The Mill on the Floss, “naughty” Bob Jakin performs a function similar to Hans’s. 
Like Hans, Bob is fundamentally different from the woman he admires (though, unlike Hans, 
Bob finds a better match in the course of the story), and this difference again has ethical 
significance (Eliot 51). The young Maggie Tulliver “felt sure that Bob was wicked, without very 
distinctly knowing why: unless it was because Bob’s mother was a dreadfully large fat woman, 
who lived at a queer round house down the river. . . . [A]ltogether, he was an irregular character, 
perhaps even slightly diabolical, judging from his intimacy with snakes and bats” (51-52). The 
narrator corrects Maggie slightly, but has faint praise for Bob: 
For a person suspected of preternatural wickedness, Bob was really not so very 
villainous-looking; there was even something agreeable in his snub-nosed face, 
with its close-curled border of red hair. But then his trousers were always rolled 
up at the knee for the convenience of wading on the slightest notice, and his 
virtue, supposing it to exist, was undeniably ‘virtue in rags’ which, on the 
authority even of bilious philosophers, who think all well-dressed merit overpaid, 
is notoriously likely to remain unrecognised (perhaps because it is seen so 
seldom). (52) 
Though the narrator also says Bob “was not utterly a sneak and a thief, as our friend Tom had 
hastily decided,” the narrator’s descriptions of Bob tend to set him apart from the protagonists 
(57). When the Tullivers are ruined and Maggie grieves that they must sell their books, we are 
told Bob looks on with the “pursuant gaze of an intelligent dumb animal” (252). The difference 
seems so fundamental that it nearly excludes Bob from the category of the human. 
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 Bob is not “dumb,” however, and his difference, minus the hyperbole of the protagonists 
or the narrator, is primarily a difference of class: while Maggie and Tom Tulliver are the children 
of a miller, Bob’s father is not in evidence, his mother “gets a good penn’orth wi’ picking 
feathers an’ things,” and Bob himself grows from a bird-scarer and aspiring “rot-ketcher” into a 
packman (253). As Paul Sawyer observes, the class distinction between Bob and the young 
Tullivers is somewhat artificially underscored by a difference in speech: Bob speaks in 
orthographically marked dialect while Tom and Maggie speak the unmarked language of the 
narrator. The standardness of Tom and Maggie’s language may be partially explicable in terms 
of literacy, though while Maggie reads avidly, and even reads the dictionary, Tom doesn’t much 
like books. It is made fairly clear that Bob can’t read when he gives Maggie a gift of books, since 
he considers the ones with pictures “bettermost” compared to the ones that are “cram-full o’ 
print” (295). The dialect marking places Bob in a sharply different category from Maggie despite 
their both being of relatively low class, and, as Sawyer writes, the linguistic marking reinforces a 
difference in morality: “In Maggie’s responses to Bob, morality takes the idiom of genteel 
speech on a level with the narrator’s. When he offers to give a good ‘leathering’ to the person 
who has wronged her, she replies, ‘O, Bob, you’re a very good friend to me. But I shouldn’t like 
to punish anyone, even if they’d done me wrong. I’ve done wrong myself too often’” (Sawyer 
67; Eliot, The Mill on the Floss 508). The word “leathering” belongs to a class lexicon and a 
moral lexicon that are uncouth from Maggie’s perspective and the narrator’s, while we are told 
Maggie’s “view of things was puzzling to Bob” (508). Maggie’s position of moral superiority as 
Bob’s “directing Madonna” is already naturalized in her superior status and speech (297). 
 Language in The Mill on the Floss works as it does in Shakespeare, as a marker not only 
of a character’s place in a social hierarchy but in multiple overlapping hierarchies, including 
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decorum, morality, class, and dramatic major- or minorness, which are not altogether congruent 
but together make up the distinction between “high” and “low.” Thus can Sir Toby Belch, the 
perpetually-drunken advocate of cakes and ale in Twelfth Night, be a prose-speaking low 
character despite also being a knight and the cousin of one of the verse-speaking nobles, the 
countess Olivia. Indeed, Sawyer compares Bob Jakin to the “Shakespearean fool,” who is 
absolutely low but is also a “semi-magical figure”: “As a trickster figure or vagrant who stands 
outside the Dodson world, Bob tweaks and outshines the Dodsons from below as the narrator 
fixes and appraises them from above; we might say then that he’s the narrator’s heterodox other, 
a voice that partially escapes the earnest narratorial regime” (67n.). 
 The narrator, who does not wear rags, can only treat Bob’s “virtue in rags” with 
condescension, but this condescension emphasizes the narrator’s lack of access to that virtue. 
Certainly the narrator cannot admire Bob’s ingenious dishonesty when he shortchanges his 
customers by measuring linen with his “big thumb” on the hither side of the yard. Yet in the 
chapter entitled “Aunt Glegg Learns the Breadth of Bob’s Thumb,” Bob’s big thumb becomes a 
metaphor for the charitable cunning with which he manipulates Mrs. Glegg simultaneously into 
buying muslin from him and lending money to Tom. Bob suggests there is an ethics to his 
cheating, though evidently a loose one: “I am a bit of a Do, you know, but it isn’t that sort o’ Do: 
it’s on’y when a feller’s a big rogue or a big flat, I like to let him in a bit, that’s all” (Eliot, The 
Mill on the Floss 254). In other words, Bob ostensibly only cheats other cheaters and those who 
are easily cheated. It is a dubious scruple, but Bob’s logic is “There’s no law again’ flea-bites. If 
I wasn’t to take a fool in now and then, he’d niver get any wiser” (254). This logic doesn’t quite 
explain the old women who buy cloth from him, who are clearly none the wiser for his fooling 
them because they do not know he has done so, but Bob’s self-description as a biting flea serves 
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as a parody of Socrates that Bob himself could not intend, both minimizing Bob’s importance 
and ascribing to him a corrective function. 
 This corrective function is demonstrable on the larger scale of the narrative, even though 
Bob’s moral code is internally inconsistent and is alien to the narrator’s. In Bob’s first 
appearance he is a victim of the juvenile Tom’s tyranny and thereby illuminates characteristics of 
Tom that remain relevant throughout the novel. The two boys discuss a hypothetical flood, 
foreshadowing the flood that ends the novel, and while Bob claims “I don’t mind the water, no 
more nor the land. I’d swim—I would,” Tom proposes to build a house-boat: “‘And I’d take you 
in, if I saw you swimming,’ he added, in the tone of a benevolent patron” (54). (The flood that 
does occur is, symbolically, an answer to Tom’s pride, since Maggie must attempt to rescue Tom 
from his home, while Bob is safe in a boat. The flood is at the same time, as I suggested above, a 
natural disaster on a planet that doesn’t care what happens at the end of humans’ stories.) Tom’s 
patronage turns less benevolent when Bob proposes a game of heads-and-tails with his own 
halfpenny. We do not know what Bob stands to win in this game, since he already owns the coin. 
We also do not know whether Bob cheats, but Tom declares that he does and tries to claim the 
prize. Tom threatens to “make” Bob give up the coin, says, “I’m master,” and when Bob refuses 
initiates a fight (55). Because Eliot portrays Bob as a victim of Tom’s bullying, which explicitly 
invokes Bob’s inferior class status, that bullying both colludes with and calls into question the 
systematic demotion of Bob in the narrative. 
 Later Bob becomes a figure of unlimited generosity, offering his mite to Tom and 
Maggie when their family is ruined, giving Maggie books to replace those that were sold, and 
helping Tom to make money in trade. This generosity is significant because it is not and cannot 
be theorized in the narrator’s language as Maggie’s, Dorothea’s, or Daniel’s sympathy can be. 
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The books themselves underline this difference. To Bob they are just books, all equally valuable 
to him simply because books are valuable to Maggie, and the heterogeneous list seems to consist 
of whatever Bob “lighted on” at the book-stall (294). To Maggie, ironically, the specific 
selection of books becomes part of the ethical crisis that leads her to, as she says to Philip, 
“giv[e] up books, . . . except a very, very few” (317). Those few are the Bible and two of the 
books Bob has given her: The Imitation of Christ and The Christian Year. Reading Thomas à 
Kempis, Maggie embraces his brand of renunciation and turns against her brother’s schoolbooks, 
“the old books, Virgil, Euclid, and Aldrich—that wrinkled fruit of the tree of knowledge” 
through which she had pursued her “vain ambition to share the thoughts of the wise” (305). It is 
a violent shift: “In her first ardour, she flung away the books with a sort of triumph that she had 
risen above the need of them, and if they had been her own, she would have burned them, 
believing that she would never repent” (305). The narrator judges that she “threw some 
exaggeration and wilfulness, some pride and impetuosity even into her self-renunciation,” and 
offers some gnomic correction: “That is the path we all like when we set out on our 
abandonment of egoism—the path of martyrdom and endurance, where the palm-branches grow, 
rather than the steep highway of tolerance, just allowance, and self-blame, where there are no 
leafy honours to be gathered and worn” (305). Are these the only options? Bob’s casual gift, free 
both of martyrdom and self-blame, is an argument that the endless road towards the 
“abandonment of egoism” need not be pursued along the two stringent paths that the narrator 
describes—or, perhaps, that virtue need not be formulated in terms of egoism at all.12 Maggie’s 
                                                     
12
 Bob, whom we have seen compared to an “intelligent dumb animal,” thus recalls the dogs Adams discusses in 
Adam Bede, who help Eliot convey a “reality beyond words” (239). These dogs may be understood as pharmakoi by 
virtue of their categorical exclusion from the human and human language: indeed, my usage of the term “scapegoat” 
in this chapter encodes the slippage between sacrificed humans and sacrificed animals. Yet, while Bob’s illiteracy 
and dialect make him less eloquent than the narrator from the narrator’s point of view, he has a discourse of his own 
and is eloquent in his own way; he points, therefore, not beyond words but specifically beyond the narrator’s words.  
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ascetic rejection of all but the most pious books is a rejection of the spirit behind Bob’s gift, by 
which he attempts merely to please her. Hans’s humour, similarly, though it is egoistic, making 
no attempts to reach beyond his eccentric vision of the world, is generous in a way the narrator 
never articulates: Hans offers the gift of laughter; his audience may accept if they choose.  
 There are blind spots in the narrator’s ethical vision, but through Bob’s marginal position 
these blind spots can partially be represented through a kind of peripheral vision. When Bob 
half-heartedly offers to “leave off that trick wi’ my big thumb,” which Maggie disapproves of, 
and laments “what ’ud be the use o’ havin’ a big thumb? It might as well ha’ been narrer,” 
Maggie “laughed in spite of herself, at which her worshipper’s blue eyes twinkled too” (297). 
Again, the pharmakos elicits laughter, and the phrase “in spite of herself” signals the logic of this 
laughter, which is provoked from Bob’s outside position but draws Maggie briefly outside her 
own convictions and the circumscriptions of the narrator’s ethical discourse. The pharmakoi 
provide us with views from outside the moral systems authorized by Eliot’s narrators. The 
exclusion of these figures helps the narrators to construct the systems but also helps Eliot, the 
intention behind a larger aesthetic and ethical design, to trace the weaknesses and limits of these 
systems. By aligning themselves with certain characters against the pharmakoi, Eliot’s narrators, 
in spite of themselves, represent their own positionality: they, too, are egoists, holding their 
candles before the pier-glass, shaping their accounts of each novel’s imagined reality around 
their own values. The pharmakoi raise the possibility of shifting even these most central candles, 
resulting in radically different understandings of the human life Eliot depicts. The concluding 
section of this chapter will examine what the pharmarkoi reveal about the position of Eliot’s 
narrators. 
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4. Pharmakeus 
 The metaphor of the pier glass, the image I have taken to be most emblematic of egoism 
in Eliot’s work, conflicts with another optical metaphor in Middlemarch. Casaubon’s egoism is 
figured not merely as a distortion of vision but as a blindness: “Will not a tiny speck very close 
to our vision blot out the glory of the world, and leave only a margin by which we see the blot? I 
know no speck so troublesome as self” (Eliot, Middlemarch 419). Hertz judges this second 
metaphor to be the most characteristic of Eliot: “egotism in her writings is almost always 
rendered as narcissism, the self doubled and figured as both the eye and the blot” (20). Hertz 
prefers the term “egotism” or “narcissism”; I have been using “egoism.” Eliot uses both 
“egoism” and “egotism,” but uses “egotism” far less often. The two occurrences of the word in 
Daniel Deronda refer to Hans’s “egotism in friendship,” his tendency to confide in Daniel 
without thinking that Daniel might want to confide in him (Eliot 181). At any rate, egoism in 
Eliot encompasses the self-absorption of egotism, and associating each metaphor with a different 
term does not erase the tension between the metaphors. In one case, self causes vision to be 
selective, orders phenomena to create the illusion of the egoist’s centrality; in the other, self is 
the object of vision and obstructs vision altogether except for a mere margin. 
 As J. Hillis Miller has observed, the totalizing metaphors of the narrator in Middlemarch 
are incommensurable with each other: 
This incoherent, heterogeneous, “unreadable,” or nonsynthesizable quality of the 
text of Middlemarch jeopardizes the narrator’s effort of totalization. It suggests 
that one gets a different kind of totality depending on what metaphorical model is 
used. The presence of several incompatible models brings into the open the 
arbitrary and partial character of each and so ruins the claim of the narrator to 
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have a total, unified, and impartial vision. What is true for the characters of 
Middlemarch, that “we all of us, grave or light, get our thoughts entangled in 
metaphors, and act fatally on the strength of them” (chap. 10), must also be true 
for the narrator. The web of interpretative figures cast by the narrator over the 
characters of the story becomes a net in which the narrator himself is entangled 
and trapped, his sovereign vision blinded. (144) 
Miller’s reading locates the deconstruction of metaphorical language within the intention of the 
work, attributing to Eliot herself a “recognition of the deconstructive powers of figurative 
language” (144). Miller’s reading, which is not itself strictly deconstructive, lends itself to the 
reconsideration of the realist narrator that I am undertaking in this dissertation: I am pressing 
Miller’s argument further, suggesting that the sovereignty and impartiality of the realist 
narrator’s vision are illusory to begin with. Realist authors need not have had deconstructive 
insight into the operation of language in order to design narrators with ambivalent narrative 
authority, since they already had the tradition of wise folly to draw from, a tradition which 
includes the Socratic irony that, under Derrida’s deft reading, yields the pharmakon. Eliot’s 
clashing metaphors, like Meredith’s uncertain gnomes, are a method of thrusting the narrator’s 
vision into the field of representation. If one entertains the possibility that the narrator, too, might 
be subject to the condition of egoism, then the two metaphors of egoism explain, in two different 
ways, the narrator’s position in the fiction. On the one hand, the narrator is a mediating device: if 
the fiction’s posited reality is the pier-glass, the narrator is the candle that shapes what we see 
into a narrative design. On the other hand, the narrator is all the narrator allows us to see; it is the 
speck close to our vision that blots out the world. To explain a metaphor of vision by means of 
Bakhtin’s metaphors of sound, which tend to be somewhat synaesthetic anyway, the narrator is 
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all we hear: the novel is the narrator’s utterance—even the direct discourse of characters is 
conveyed as quotations within the narrator’s discourse. Here I join in Hertz’s play with the 
images “blot” and “margin,” which he suggests cannot fully be separated from ink and paper 
even though Eliot uses them to describe an obstructed field of vision (21). The blot of the 
narrative discourse is the blot that we read between the margins of Eliot’s page.  
 The two optical metaphors indicate the complex double function of the narrator, which 
Eliot uses both to tell a story from an ethically committed perspective while developing the 
ethics of that perspective, and to convey the possibility and importance of different perspectives, 
in all their fullness, without representing them fully. This duality in the narrator’s function helps 
to explain the contradictions between narration and direct character discourse that Havely notes: 
conversations between Eliot’s characters sometimes disprove what the narrator has told us about 
the characters. Although I am suggesting that direct character discourse is not “apparently 
narrator-free,” but is quoted by the narrator, this discourse is the least affected by the narrator’s 
egoism (Havely 304). For this reason the utterances of pharmakoi, including Hans’s letter, are 
especially important to the narrator’s second function, to the oblique tracing of the narrator’s 
margin. It is fitting that Hans is a painter and a mimic because the representations of the world 
conveyed through his discourse compete with those of Eliot’s narrator. Although Hans’s Welsh 
surname signals his Britishness, and he stands in for the kind of middling British existence from 
which Daniel departs, his Germanic first name connects him to other continental, cosmopolitan 
artist figures in Eliot’s work, including the musician Herr Klesmer in Daniel Deronda and the 
painter Adolf Naumann in Middlemarch. Because such artists occupy a different social sphere 
and hold substantially different values than many of Eliot’s characters, they can perform to 
varying degrees the function of the pharmakos. Naumann’s knowing description of Dorothea and 
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humorous twitting of Ladislaw, as Havely observes, paint a prurient image of Dorothea as the 
object of Ladislaw’s desire, an image that the narrative discourse holds at bay by insisting that 
Ladislaw is innocent of designs on his uncle’s wife. 
 Of course, at the end of the novel Ladislaw and Dorothea marry despite these insistences, 
“For the resolution towards which the fiction always presses, though the author obscures this, is 
Dorothea’s sexual fulfillment, not the resolution of her social commitment” (316-17). I would 
say the narrator obscures this comic dimension of the novel, since Eliot did after all write 
Naumann. Naumann, like Hans, voices the comic form of the narrative in which he finds 
himself. The narrator may depict Dorothea’s marriage to Ladislaw as a failure to achieve her 
moral potential, but underlying this evaluation is the conventional comic resolution of their plot. 
Fred Vincy creates discomfort because his subplot mirrors Dorothea and Ladislaw’s, minus the 
suggestion of high moral potential: it is disjunctive that Fred can bumble his way into gainful 
employment and a marriage that seems a happy fulfillment of his and Mary’s desires (a 
happiness that, the narrator suggests, endures even at the time the story is being told), while 
Dorothea’s marriage to Ladislaw is shrouded in her family’s disapproval, the narrator’s irony, 
and her own sense of what might have been: “‘It is quite true that I might be a wiser person, 
Celia,’ said Dorothea, ‘and that I might have done something better, if I had been better. But this 
is what I am going to do. I have promised to marry Mr. Ladislaw; and I am going to marry him’” 
(Eliot, Middlemarch 821). Fred and Mary themselves turn out to be, ambiguously and 
collectively, writer figures: Fred writes a farming manual, and Mary writes a children’s book 
based on stories from Plutarch. (The Middlemarchers are convinced that each really has authored 
the other’s book.) Mary and Fred are pharmakoi only in that they are largely irrelevant to 
Dorothea’s plot, which receives particular emphasis and which intersects with Lydgate and 
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Rosamond’s plot. Mary and Fred do belong to the space of humour, however, especially Fred, 
whose laughter in the dairy at the elder and younger Cranch, family vultures awaiting 
Featherstone’s death, makes the space of humour literal: “But no sooner did he [Fred] face the 
four eyes than he had to rush through the nearest door, which happened to lead to the dairy, and 
there under the high roof and among the pans he gave way to laughter which made a hollow 
resonance perfectly audible in the kitchen” (306). While the narrator concludes the novel by 
urging the importance of small heroisms like Dorothea’s, “But we insignificant people with our 
daily words and acts are preparing the lives of many Dorotheas, some of which may present a far 
sadder sacrifice than that of the Dorothea whose story we know,” one may hear Fred, quite 
contentedly insignificant, laughing in the dairy (837). 
 A class of characters in Eliot—artists, writers, humourists, pharmakoi—represent the 
possibility of writing their reality differently than Eliot’s narrators do. Even Bob, who is illiterate 
and speaks dialect, is a con artist with an energetic verbal and moral inventiveness quite distinct 
from the narrator’s. Casaubon, too, represents the possibility of writing differently, but Casaubon 
is atypical in his lack of humour, in which he far exceeds Eliot’s narrators. Casaubon’s erudition 
and his aspirations to a synthetic understanding of mythology suggest a character that is more 
similar to Eliot’s narrators than any of the other artist figures are, but Casaubon gets wrong what 
Eliot’s narrators try to get right. Casaubon’s research is incomplete; he is unable to translate the 
research into the synoptic work he imagines, managing only minor monographs; and he does not 
practise sympathy, possessing instead merely “that proud narrow sensitiveness which has not 
mass enough to spare for transformation into sympathy, and quivers thread-like in small currents 
of self-preoccupation or at best of an egoistic scrupulosity” (279). Hertz has noted that the 
“recognition and exorcism of Casaubon” are rooted in a similarity between his task and the 
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novelist’s (41). To reject Casaubon is not just to reject narcissism, but to reject the narcissism of 
research and writing (32). 
 Treated as other to the narrator and rejected, the humourist, artist, or pedant is akin to the 
narrator. The narrator of Adam Bede opens the first chapter: “With a single drop of ink for a 
mirror, the Egyptian sorcerer undertakes to reveal to any chance comer far-reaching visions of 
the past. This is what I undertake to do for you, reader. With this drop of ink at the end of my 
pen, I will show you the roomy workshop of Mr. Jonathan Burge, carpenter and builder in the 
village of Hayslope, as it appeared on the eighteenth of June, in the year of our Lord 1799” (Eliot 
5).
13
 The narrator’s mirror of ink combines the contradictory metaphors of egoism: the pier-glass 
and the blot. This image of the narrator as a sorcerer who both reflects and writes reality recalls 
Derrida’s term “pharmakeus.” The pharmakeus is magician and druggist: “The illusionist, the 
technician of sleight-of-hand, the painter, the writer” (Derrida 140). The pharmakeus is the 
narrator, the source of the narrative and of the ethical prescriptions that are inseparable from it. 
But the pharmakeus is semantically linked to the pharmakos; the pharmakos, too, is “wizard, 
magician, poisoner,” “a synonym of pharmakeus . . . , but with the unique feature of having been 
overdetermined, overlaid by Greek culture with another function” (130). The pharmakos is a 
potential narrator, a pharmakeus cast out to the margins of the fiction instead of situated at the 
centre. 
 The continuities I have been tracing between figures like Hans and Naumann, Casaubon, 
and Eliot’s narrators become especially clear in Eliot’s last work, Impressions of Theophrastus 
Such. This collection of essays is a Menippean satire, not a realist novel, but the essays are 
delivered in the first person by a persona who unstably combines features of the pharmakos and 
                                                     
13
 Hertz glosses this sorcerer as Abd-El-Kadir El-Maghrabee, and compares Eliot’s invocation of this sorcerer’s 
mirror to Borges’s in “The Mirror of Ink” (98-99). 
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pharmakeus. The Menippean character of this work brings its wise folly closer to the surface, 
and while the work is generically different from everything else Eliot wrote, it makes starkly 
visible the concerns I have been tracing in Eliot’s fiction. Theophrastus Such is an extreme type 
of the comic pedant. He is dyspeptic, unproductive (his only publication being a “humorous 
romance” successful only in a Cherokee translation), and physically made for mockery, just as 
Hans is made for mishaps:  
This sort of distinction, as a writer nobody is likely to have read, can hardly 
counteract an indistinctness in my articulation, which the best-intentioned 
loudness will not remedy. Then, in some quarters my awkward feet are against 
me, the length of my upper lip, and an inveterate way I have of walking with my 
head foremost and my chin projecting. One can become only too well aware of 
such things by looking in the glass, or in that other mirror held up to nature in the 
frank opinions of street-boys, or of our Free People travelling by excursion train. 
(Eliot, Impressions 14-15) 
Theophrastus is also sexually unsuccessful, pining in secret for a woman who does not recognize 
him, which recalls the combination of sexual and authorial impotence that characterizes 
Chaucer’s self-representation in The House of Fame. Theophrastus is not a misanthrope, but he 
feels himself an outcast: “Though continually in society, and caring about the joys and sorrows 
of my neighbours, I feel myself, so far as my personal lot is concerned, uncared for and alone” 
(14). Theophrastus’s personal disadvantages make him into an anti-authority, who discredits any 
argument he advances: “I have now and then done harm to a good cause by speaking for it in 
public, and have discovered too late that my attitude on the occasion would more suitably have 
been that of negative beneficence. Is it really to the advantage of an opinion that I should be 
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known to hold it?” (15-16). Theophrastus takes up the position of a writer writing for no-one in 
particular, an audience he cannot and does not wish to imagine too clearly: “The haze is a 
necessary condition” (22). 
 As a pharmakos become the pharmakeus within his work, Theophrastus theorizes his 
own marginality. His initial reaction to his misfortune is the “the idea of compensation; trying to 
believe that I was all the wiser for my bruised vanity, that I had the higher place in the true 
spiritual scale, and even that a day might come when some visible triumph would place me in the 
French heaven of having the laughers on my side” (16). These “consolations of egoism” do not 
endure, Theophrastus being too socially-minded to believe the success of his friends and his own 
lack of success are entirely undeserved (18). Theophrastus, extending the optical imagery 
characteristic of Eliot, imagines his egoism as a disease or aberration of vision: 
In certain branches of science we can ascertain our personal equation, the measure 
of difference between our own judgments and an average standard: may there not 
be some corresponding correction of our personal partialities in moral theorising? 
If a squint or other ocular defect disturbs my vision, I can get instructed in the 
fact, be made aware that my condition is abnormal, and either through spectacles 
or diligent imagination I can learn the average appearance of things: is there no 
remedy or corrective for that inward squint which consists in a dissatisfied egoism 
or other want of mental balance? (17) 
The phrase “dissatisfied egoism” underscores that curing egoism altogether is out of the 
question: the best human vision is imperfect. The error function, spectacles, imagination—each 
of these is a pharmakon, a corrective to some kind of distortion, but of course there are no 
spectacles that correct the self, just as there is no error function for human folly. Imagination is 
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the only remedy that applies equally to sight and to egoism. As we have seen, sympathy is an 
imagining of the other that tries to correct the condition of egoism but can only supplement it. 
The spectacles of imagination can easily err: “Whether we look through the rose-coloured glass 
or the indigo, we are equally far from the hues which the healthy human eye beholds in heaven 
above and earth below” (18). Theophrastus’s description of “healthy” sight, which the condition 
of egoism makes elusive, echoes Meredith’s “philosophy,” which navigates a middle path 
between the “rose-pink” and the “dirty drab”: “Philosophy bids us to see that we are not so pretty 
as rose-pink, not so repulsive as dirty drab; and that instead of everlastingly shifting those barren 
aspects, the sight of ourselves is wholesome, bearable, fructifying, finally a delight” (Meredith, 
Diana of the Crossways 15). For Meredith, as I suggested in Chapter Two, realist representation 
emerges from philosophy of this sort and entails balancing individual insight with social 
consciousness. Theophrastus’s “philosophic estimation of the human lot in general” similarly 
requires care lest it become “a mere prose lyric expressing my own pain and consequent bad 
temper” (Eliot, Impressions 18).  
 In its broad outlines, Theophrastus’s self-prostrating first essay, “Looking Inward,” 
accomplishes the inward turn that distinguishes the attitude of wise folly from misanthropy: 
“Thus I make myself a charter to write, and keep the pleasing, inspiring illusion of being listened 
to, though I may sometimes write about myself. What I have already said on this too familiar 
theme has been meant only as a preface, to show that in noting the weaknesses of my 
acquaintances I am conscious of my fellowship with them” (23). By including himself in the 
critique, and acknowledging his fellowship with the satirical figures who populate several of the 
subsequent essays, Theophrastus appears to establish the conventional mood of wise-foolish 
critique: one expects a good-humoured ribbing about human failings, designed neither to 
 
 
121 
 
condemn nor to exonerate, but to explore what it would mean to take folly as the human 
condition and to find value in the human anyway. Indeed, many of the satirical sketches, in the 
style of the real Theophrastus of Eresos, fit this mold. “How We Encourage Research” is an echo 
of Casaubon’s plot translated across genres. Like Casaubon and Lydgate, the researcher Merman 
is also interested in fundamental theories, including “the ultimate reduction of all the so-called 
elementary substances,” and “the possible connection of certain symbolic monuments common 
to widely scattered races” (50, 51). Merman publishes, taking aim in particular at the views of 
the established scholar Grampus on the “Magicodumbras” and the “Zuzumotzis.” When 
Grampus publishes his refutation, Merman is universally ridiculed. Eventually Grampus changes 
his position and plagiarizes Merman’s ideas, which, when presented as Grampus’s, are met with 
acclaim. Merman’s career never recovers. The names in this essay are an encyclopedia of marine 
biology, marking the characters as the humorous types conventional in Menippean satire: aside 
from Grampus himself, other “Cetaceans” include Lord Narwhal, Professor Sperm N. Whale, 
Butzkopf (Bottlehead), Dugong, and M. Cachalot. This image of the intellectual sphere as an 
ocean, reminiscent of Moby-Dick, where the sea of thought is similarly perilous and humorous, 
lurks behind even the seriousness of Middlemarch, in which Casaubon’s peers include Carp, 
Pike, and Tench (281). (Grampus makes an early appearance as a Colonial Governor with whom 
Sir James wishes to employ Ladislaw [485].) 
 Despite the attitude of some of these sketches, Theophrastus is uncertain in his position 
as wise fool. Though he critiques himself, he is uncomfortable with what he finds to critique: 
“Dear blunderers, I am one of you. I wince at the fact, but I am not ignorant of it, that I too am 
laughable on unsuspected occasions; nay, in the very tempest and whirlwind of my anger, I 
include myself under my own indignation. If the human race has a bad reputation, I perceive that 
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I cannot escape being compromised” (Impressions 11). Theophrastus is also anxious about the 
egoism that wise folly accepts as inevitable and the techniques of satire through which wise folly 
expresses itself. He distinguishes between a good laughter and a bad: “That a gratified sense of 
superiority is at the root of barbarous laughter may be at least half the truth. But there is a loving 
laughter in which the only recognised superiority is that of the ideal self, the God within, holding 
the mirror and the scourge for our own pettiness as well as our neighbours’” (23-24). The 
distinction appears to depend on self-criticism, without which wise folly would be mere 
misanthropy or self-righteousness. But Theophrastus’s wise folly is unusual in its underlying 
earnestness, its insistence on the “God within” and the wielding of the scourge against oneself in 
service of that god. Wise folly as an intellectual or dialogical performance maintains a distance 
between the role and the one who plays it. Theophrastus, on the other hand, is a thoroughgoing 
ascetic, verging on a masochist. He likes the scourge, and he wants the privilege of using it on 
himself: “Though not averse to finding fault with myself, and conscious of deserving lashes, I 
like to keep the scourge in my own discriminating hand” (13). This admission rejects the 
neighbourly scourging that Theophrastus’s image of “loving laughter” entails—though 
Theophrastus will scourge his neighbours, he prefers not to be scourged by them. Theophrastus 
also prefers his own mirror, decrying “the sadly confused inference of the monotonous jester that 
he is establishing his superiority over every less facetious person, and over every topic on which 
he is ignorant or insensible, by being uneasy until he has distorted it in the small cracked mirror 
which he carries about with him as a joking apparatus” (140). This latter remark appears in 
“Debasing the Moral Currency,” an essay which troubles the satire of many of the preceding 
sketches by diagnosing rampant humour, parody, and burlesque as a social disease.  
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 Given that Theophrastus acknowledges the distortions of his egoism—his “inward 
squint”—as well as the distortions of the jester’s “small cracked mirror,” his confidence in the 
accuracy of his own mirror seems difficult to justify except as a symptom of the squint. 
Certainly, Theophrastus wants to discriminate between right and wrong objects of humour: “The 
world seems well supplied to me with what is genuinely ridiculous: wit and humour may play as 
harmlessly or beneficently round the changing facets of egoism, absurdity, and vice, as the 
sunshine over the rippling sea or the dewy meadows”; at the same time, “a greedy buffoonery 
debase[s] all historic beauty, majesty, and pathos, and the more you heap up the desecrated 
symbols the greater will be the lack of the ennobling emotions which subdue the tyranny of 
suffering, and make ambition one with social virtue” (142, 143). Yet the grounds for 
distinguishing between the “genuinely ridiculous” and that which is merely made ridiculous by 
“greedy buffoonery” are unclear, especially since egoism, as we have seen, is ubiquitous in Eliot. 
Short on examples, Theophrastus hauls out two cultural touchstones, Shakespeare and Plato, 
whose work ought to be revered but is instead burlesqued, “the finest images being degraded and 
the finest words of genius being poisoned as if with some befooling drug” (144). The example of 
Plato reveals part of the problem with Theophrastus’s rant:  
And doubtless if she [Theophrastus’s acquaintance Clarissa] were to take her boys 
to see a burlesque Socrates, with swollen legs, dying in the utterance of cockney 
puns, and were to hang up a sketch of this comic scene among their bedroom 
prints, she would think this preparation not at all to the prejudice of their emotions 
on hearing their tutor read that narrative of the Apology which has been 
consecrated by the reverent gratitude of ages” (145). 
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In arguing that parodies of Socrates will compromise the reverence of the youth, Theophrastus 
does not realize that he is siding with the opponents of Socrates, advocating the hemlock in place 
of the “befooling drug.” (Or maybe he does realize this—he has already told us that he can serve 
an argument best through “negative beneficence.”) The Apology tells how Socrates was killed for 
teaching the youth of Athens to question, and the tradition of a carnivalesque Socrates represents 
the clownishness that made his method possible. 
 Theophrastus’s essay engages in a conflict between seriousness and humour that plays 
out in Eliot’s novels. The narrators of these novels share Theophrastus’s learning, his 
earnestness, and his critical position as an outsider and observer. Describing Tryan in “Janet’s 
Repentance,” the narrator says, “any one looking at him with the bird’s-eye glance of a critic 
might perhaps say that he made the mistake of identifying Christianity with a too narrow 
doctrinal system . . . But I am not poised at that lofty height. I am on the level and in the press 
with him, as he struggles his way along the stony road, through the crowd of unloving fellow-
men” (Scenes of Clerical Life 229). This protestation only makes clearer the extent to which 
Eliot’s narrators habitually occupy the “lofty height” of analysis and can only be “on the level 
and in the press” with characters through sympathetic narration that temporarily declines the 
bird’s-eye view. In Impressions of Theophrastus Such, Eliot directly explores the limitations of 
her narrative discourse through the character of Theophrastus. In her novels, she represents these 
limitations through the narrative devices of the pharmakeus and the pharmakos. 
 The dialogue between pharmakeus and pharmakos is always asymmetrical, like the 
dialogue between sovereign and fool. Together the two figures do not represent all possible 
points of view: this pairing is not a means for Eliot to represent the imagined reality synoptically, 
and the views do not synthesize dialectically into a unified vision that can be called Eliot’s. The 
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pharmakeus allows Eliot to infuse her novels with the sweeping ethical vision that is 
indispensable to her art, while the pharmakos allows the novels to encompass more than that 
vision, so that a reader may reject the ethics of the pharmakeus while still finding the ethical 
dialogue of the novel valuable and instructive. A reader may be alarmed, for example, at the 
seriousness of characters like Daniel and Mirah, a seriousness which partakes of Theophrastus’s 
asceticism. In Romola this asceticism is embodied in the Bonfire of Vanities, “the new Carnival, 
which was a sort of sacred parody of the old,” in which the supporters of Savonarola burn objects 
they consider conducive to sin, including The Decameron (419). Romola admits she enjoys 
Boccaccio, but she defends the Bonfire to the painter Piero di Cosimo in language that resembles 
Mirah’s and Theophrastus’s: “There are some things in them [Boccaccio’s stories] I do not want 
ever to forget, . . . but you must confess, Piero, that a great many of those stories are only about 
low deceit for the lowest ends. Men do not want books to make them think lightly of vice, as if 
life were a vulgar joke. And I cannot blame Fra Girolamo for teaching that we owe our time to 
something better” (422). Piero’s objection, I think, is sound: “‘Yes, yes, it’s very well to say so 
now you’ve read them,’ said Piero, bitterly, turning on his heel and walking away from her” 
(422). The narrator, pharmakeus, does not entirely share Romola’s feelings, but also does not 
share Piero’s anger and, on balance, thinks the good Savonarola inspires is worth the cost: 
“Sorrow and joy have each their peculiar narrowness; and a religious enthusiasm like 
Savonarola’s which ultimately blesses mankind by giving the soul a strong propulsion towards 
sympathy with pain, indignation against wrong, and the subjugation of sensual desire, must 
always incur the reproach of a great negation” (422). By walking away, Piero, pharmakos, a 
minor character and a sensual painter aligned with the vanity on the bonfire, exits to the margins 
of the fiction, and it falls to the narrator to rationalize the loss.
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Chapter Four 
Learning We Are Fools 
 
Education, n. That which discloses to the wise and disguises from the foolish their 
lack of understanding. (Bierce, “Education”) 
Quotation, n. The act of repeating erroneously the words of another. The words 
erroneously repeated. 
 Intent on making his quotation truer, 
 He sought the page infallible of Brewer, 
 Then made a solemn vow that he would be 
 Condemned eternally. Ah, me, ah, me! 
      Stumpo Gaker. (“Quotation”) 
 
1. “Under Which King, Bezonian?” 
The progression from Chapter Two to Chapter Three of this study constitutes an 
expanding scope, locating wise folly first in the attitude of George Meredith’s narrators and then 
in the relationship between George Eliot’s narrators and the characters they narrate. This chapter 
will extend that movement outwards from the narrative discourse, continuing to consider 
narrators and characters while examining the spaces where realist novels intersect with other 
texts. The practices of wise folly rely on intertextuality. We have seen that the aphorism or, more 
generally, the gnome, is a quotational speech genre, designed to simulate the words of another 
even when spoken by its author: thus can the gnome claim to present social wisdom in a 
condensed utterance. Aware of the trickery involved in this claim, Meredith’s narrators craft 
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gnomes artfully while troubling their own pretensions to wisdom. In George Eliot’s novels, I 
have argued, minor characters whose values and ways of seeing and speaking are rejected, the 
pharmakoi, make available other ethical and generic interpretations of Eliot’s stories by 
representing the possibility of judging the imagined reality differently. 
Julia Kristeva’s term “intertextuality” is rooted in her reading of Bakhtin, and Bakhtin’s 
dialogic conception of language helps to explain why intertextuality is necessary to wise folly 
and realism. The realist novel is characterized by a particular kind of dialogism, which operates, 
counterintuitively but not contradictorily, through the overt mediation of the intrusive realist 
narrator. British realism aims to present wisdom about the novel’s imagined reality and to 
analogize that reality to the reader’s, while deploying the techniques of wise folly to make the 
narrator’s wisdom contingent, to situate that wisdom among various follies that, seen from 
different points of view, could actually constitute wisdom. Different discourses, such as the 
discourses of minor characters, are one means of evoking these points of view; as Bakhtin 
explains, discourses imply perspectives. Recognizing that wise folly operates intertextually in the 
realist novel, this chapter will examine one way in which intertextuality is represented and 
thematized in novels by Walter Scott and George Meredith, especially Waverley and The Ordeal 
of Richard Feverel: quotation, including epigraphs and incorporated verse. In addition to the 
interplay of utterances in “intonational” quotation marks that constitutes the general intertextual 
and dialogic fabric of a novel, I will be discussing in particular the written quotation marks of 
Scott and Meredith’s novels and the bearing of what lies between them on what lies outside them 
(Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination 44). Quotation and education are linked in the novel, where 
a character’s repertoire of literary, biblical, or folk quotations are an index of the character’s 
education and a means of characterization. In a novel that thematizes the literary education of its 
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hero, such as Waverley or The Ordeal of Richard Feverel, quotations indicate the networks of 
discourses that influence the hero’s, among which—and through which—he learns to fashion his 
own. Quotation is also a way for these novels to examine their own pedagogical effects: Edward 
Waverley and Richard Feverel are analogous to their readers as readers, and by representing the 
young heroes’ encounters with “miscellaneous snatches and fragments” of text, Scott and 
Meredith imagine the role of reading in education, including its value and its dangers (Scott 58). 
Quotation, I will argue, is dialogically desultory, and turns out to be implicated in the folly of 
desultory literary education in Scott and Meredith. Employing the logic of wise folly, these 
novels treat wisdom not as an alternative to this folly, but as an uncertain goal that can only be 
approached by wading deeper into folly, by creating tissues of disconnected quotations. 
In a dialogic view of discourse in the novel, explicit quotation of discourses other than 
the narrator’s occupies one extreme of a spectrum, with the discourse of the narrator at the other 
end and the various shades of hybridized or double-voiced discourse in between. Because the 
middle range involves the narrator’s implicit quotation of others, quotation marks and other 
typographical markers of quotation, such as indentation, indicate not merely the act of quoting, 
which is nearly ubiquitous, but specifically a high “degree of otherness and purity in another’s 
word,” measured “as per the intention of the speaker himself, how he himself determines this 
degree of otherness” (Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination 339). At every point on this spectrum, 
the narrator is the primary fictional speaker. As I claimed in the previous chapter, even the direct 
discourse of characters is mediated by the narrator’s discourse, which quotes the characters’. 
Bakhtin’s qualification “as per the intention of the speaker himself” implies that quotation marks 
communicate to the reader the narrator’s judgment about the quotation: the narrator uses 
quotation marks to contain otherness of speech and designate it as other. That otherness might 
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have been incorporated to a greater degree and less obtrusively into the narrator’s speech through 
indirect quotational methods, such as free indirect discourse, but has not been. In her study of 
practices of quoting, social scientist Ruth Finnegan also claims that quotation expresses the 
quoter’s sense of the status of the quoted speech: 
Anyone who repeats the words of others, whether as writer, speaker, or 
broadcaster, cannot avoid letting their own voice come through and may even 
make a point of doing so. It becomes a matter of reconstruction and 
recontextualization rather than of precise repetition, where the new user of the 
words, whether overtly or implicitly, is communicating a particular attitude to the 
words or to their original speaker in this new enactment, manipulating the 
audience’s interpretation. (104) 
Quotation marks help to make the speaker’s attitude overt. Quotation marks are also the 
narrator’s guarantee of minimal mediation, though the otherness and purity of the quoted 
discourse are not absolute, and certain kinds of interference are conventionally acceptable. When 
Eliot renders dialect in orthographically marked language and Rudyard Kipling renders non-
English speech in English with a smattering of untranslated words, these mediations are designed 
to render intelligible to the reader both the otherness and the meaning of the quoted speech. 
Misquotation of real sources is also possible, and quite common when authors quote from 
memory, as Scott often does. Sometimes, as Finnegan notes, authors will enclose indirect 
discourse or forms of summary in quotation marks as if it they were direct discourse; Austen 
does this, the most extreme example being the chatter about strawberries in Emma (Finnegan 
106). Such exceptions all display recognizable cues, however. One does not suspect without such 
evidence that a nineteenth-century realist narrator is tampering with the language in direct 
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quotations, unlike the content of free indirect discourse, in which the degree of the narrator’s 
interference is often impossible to determine and can be assessed only through the reader’s 
acquired sense of the voices involved. 
In avowing the otherness of discourses in direct quotation, the narrator confers on them 
an exceptional status that resembles the status of the pharmakos figure I examined in Chapter 
Three: direct quotations are incorporated into the text but kept apart and designated alien. 
Although common in the novel, direct dialogue between characters imports dramatic norms and 
interrupts narrative norms, which are better served by indirect and free indirect discourse. Direct 
quotations are also a means of introducing lyric or fragments of other prose genres into narrative. 
Quotation marks indicate intertextual seams. Thus, as we have seen, direct quotations of the 
distinctive speech of pharmakoi such as Hans Meyrick, Bob Jakin, or Adolph Naumann, 
especially the extended quotation of Hans’s discourse in his letter to Daniel, are crucial to Eliot’s 
representation of these figures of ethical otherness whose views engage in an asymmetrical 
conflict with the views of Eliot’s narrators. Perhaps because the space of a quotation is that of a 
licensed and potentially subversive otherness, of discourse simultaneously appropriated and 
disavowed, quotations are a conventional instrument of wise fool characters, including court 
jesters. (The fool is a type of pharmakos—the pharmakos is not always a fool.) The fool is 
allowed at court by the authority of the sovereign, who exempts the fool from ordinary rules of 
speech and decorum, allowing the fool to speak relatively freely, but only under the 
understanding that what the fool says is, by definition, foolish. If the fool also functions as 
advisor, this function is enabled by the logic of wise folly, which, provisionally entertained by 
the fool and his listeners, permits the fool’s advice to be recognized as wisdom while still 
designated folly or nonsense. The fool’s role is not inherently either conservative or radical, but 
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has the potential to be both, either restricting or enabling subversive speech depending on the 
context and the audience. Quotation shares this ambivalent potential. 
In drama, the fool can be an intertextual portal, a conduit of aphorism and poetry—of 
“nonsense, or poetry, or the dash between the two,” as Meredith’s narrator says of Sir Austin’s 
monomaniacal oracles (Feverel 112). The fool quotes sources and sometimes fabricates them in 
order to play with authority. Typographical markers of quotation do not have the importance in 
drama that they do in narrative, since they cannot be heard: fools signal quotation explicitly by 
tagging their quotations verbally or shifting the form of their speech into song or rhyme. The 
fool’s quotations have several functions. They contribute to the posture of wise folly by 
fragmenting the fool’s speech and diffusing its authorship. Lear’s Fool uses song and rhyme 
extensively to create a texture of seemingly nonsensical speech, fragments of which the audience 
must interpret, reconcile with each other, and apply with some ingenuity to the context in which 
they are uttered, if they desire to extract a coherent critique of Lear. Touchstone does not quote 
frequently, but when he utters his version of the premise of wise folly, he quotes it: “I do now 
remember a saying: ‘The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool’” 
(Shakespeare, As You Like It 5.1.29-31). This “saying” displaces the origins of the logic of wise 
folly into an unspecified past, rendering Touchstone the performer and not the author of his role. 
The fool’s quotations can also parody the practice of quoting authorities. One reason to mark a 
discourse using explicit quotation is to preserve the authority of another’s speech. When Feste 
utters an epigram advocating wise folly, he attributes it to a spurious authority: “For what says 
Quinapalus? ‘Better a witty fool than a foolish wit’” (Twelfth Night 1.5.32-33). As the director 
Terry Hands noticed, “Quinapalus” is suggestive of qui n’a pas lu (who has not read) (1.5.32n.). 
Neither Feste nor anyone else has read Quinapalus, of course, because he does not exist, but 
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perhaps Feste is also insinuating that invoking authorities through detachable gnomic quotations 
does not necessitate reading the authorities. More drastically, when Lear’s Fool attributes his 
prophecy to Merlin, Shakespeare makes a joke at the expense of the drama itself: the Fool 
references the period in which he is supposed to live by attributing his speech to a later source 
that playwright, players, and audience can know but he himself cannot. Realist novelists draw on 
these dramatic uses of quotation, with the difference that quotation in the novel always 
represents an intrusion into the narrative discourse. Though fool characters may continue to be 
vehicles of quotation in the realist novel, and there are characters in Scott and Meredith who 
perform this function, quotation is in itself a mechanism of wise folly in the novel. 
Quotation is necessarily a messy process. Not only does a direct quotation become 
ambiguously part of and distinct from the narrator’s utterance, attenuating the narrative discourse, 
a quotation also interrupts some other utterance, the utterance of the quoted source. For Bakhtin, 
the utterance, the unit of speech communication, is also the unit of intention and meaning. Every 
utterance has a “speech plan” or “speech will,” which the listener or reader gauges continually 
while hearing or reading the utterance: “In each utterance—from the single-word, everyday 
rejoinder to large, complex works of science or literature—we embrace, understand, and sense 
the speaker’s speech plan or speech will, which determines the entire utterance, its length and 
boundaries. We imagine to ourselves what the speaker wishes to say. And we also use this 
speech plan, this speech will (as we understand it), to measure the finalization of the utterance” 
(Bakhtin, Speech Genres 77).
1
 The utterance is only fully finalized when there is a change of 
speaker, when it is someone else’s turn to respond. This response may be another utterance or an 
action. In conversation, for example, the question “How are you?” is finalized as an utterance 
when the speaker pauses and the responder, understanding what is asked, becomes the next 
                                                     
1
 Italics are Bakhtin’s unless otherwise indicated. 
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speaker and begins to say how he or she is. If a pedestrian reads the sign, “Do not walk on the 
grass,” on the other hand, his or her response will probably not be a communication to the sign’s 
author but an action, walking or not walking on the grass. (Viewed dialogically, walking on the 
grass after having read and understood the sign means something different than walking on the 
grass without having read the sign.) The listener or reader’s response, finally, need not be 
communicative at all: it may be intellectual or emotional, what Bakhtin calls “active responsive 
understanding” (71). If one reads that the unexamined life is not worth living, one’s response 
may simply be silently to agree or disagree. All of these examples are of successfully finalized 
utterances, which are the only utterances that Bakhtin considers in his discussion of speech plans. 
Because the listener’s judgment of the speaker’s speech plan is ongoing, however, the listener 
may prematurely finalize the utterance by interrupting it. “I’m fine, thank you” is not an 
appropriate response to “How are you” if the speaker was going to finish, “getting to the theatre?” 
This exchange would be a relatively simple case of misunderstanding. 
When utterances are larger and more complex, interruption becomes qualitatively 
different and inescapable. A novel-length realist narrative is a long and complex utterance. 
Applying the concept of the speech plan to the novel yields something very much like an implied 
author or a similar fiction that permits the reader to apprehend the meaning of a work as a whole. 
Bakhtin recognizes that this kind of finalization, like that of a scientific work, is less final than 
that of a simple conversational utterance: 
Here one can speak only of a certain minimum of finalization making it possible 
to occupy a responsive position. We do not objectively exhaust the subject, but, 
by becoming the theme of the utterance (i.e., of a scientific work) the subject 
achieves a relative finalization under certain conditions, when the problem is 
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posed in a particular way, on the basis of particular material, with particular aims 
set by the author, that is, already within the boundaries of a specific authorial 
intent. (77) 
The phrase “specific authorial intent” looks like a reference to explicitly stated intent, especially 
paired with the phrase “particular aims set by the author,” but Bakhtin is taking the example of a 
scientific study, in which it is conventional to state one’s aims as clearly and accurately as 
possible. Seeing the intention behind a “problem [being] posed in a particular way” requires a 
greater degree of interpretation and reminds us that the speech plan of an utterance is ultimately 
the construction of its listener. In my own acts of finalization, of reading novels as intentional 
wholes, I have been using the term “design,” which I owe to Jonathan Loesberg’s version of 
Kantian aesthetics. Loesberg describes how a reader may hypothesize intention for the purposes 
of understanding a work without positing the real intention of the artist, and Bakhtin’s concept of 
the speech plan suggests why such a hypothesis is important to communication, even artistic 
communication. 
 Bakhtin’s greatest insight into the novel, however, is that it is formally dialogic and 
resists finalization even more than other creative works do. Even though the novel is a single 
utterance, it contains other utterances that interact with each other, so that the reader’s responsive 
understanding of the novel depends on sorting through the dialogue between the discourses 
organized within it. In other words, the reader can only develop a sense of the novel as whole 
utterance by hypothesizing the roles that various interacting speech plans play within the 
overarching speech plan of the novel. Because novels are long, moreover, readers’ provisional 
responses throughout the act of reading become more important than a single, final response: 
although one surely understands a novel much better after finishing it, it would be incredible to 
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claim that the reader only truly responds to the novel, takes his or her turn in the dialogue, after 
the last page is read. The reader puts the book down, picks it up, forgets, remembers. Barthes 
proposes tmesis, “source and figure of pleasure,” the insertion of words into the middle of a 
semantic unit (“abso-bloody-lutely!”), as a figure of readerly reading: 
Yet the most classical narrative (a novel by Zola or Balzac or Dickens or Tolstoy) 
bears within it a sort of diluted tmesis: we do not read everything with the same 
intensity of reading; a rhythm is established, casual, unconcerned with the 
integrity of the text; our very avidity for knowledge impels us to skim or to skip 
certain passages (anticipated as “boring”) in order to get more quickly to the 
warmer parts of the anecdote (which are always its articulations: whatever 
furthers the solution of the riddle, the revelation of fate): we boldly skip (no one is 
watching) descriptions, explanations, analyses, conversations. (The Pleasure of 
the Text, 11) 
Although in this project I am making a case for the pleasures and value of a more sustained 
engagement with the forms of realist novels, Barthes does identify a plausible consequence of 
the duration and leisureliness of nineteenth-century novel reading. Bakhtin’s framework, in 
contrast, seems to leave little room for the unfinished work, unfinished either by the reader or the 
author. The ending of Tristram Shandy can easily be incorporated into the novel’s design—it is a 
novel about writing one’s life, and the ending of the novel is simply the ending of Tristram’s 
(and Sterne’s) ability to continue writing it; but not every unfinished work is so appropriately 
unfinished. 
Direct quotations unfinish the work being quoted. They reduce the total utterance of a 
work to a fragment that is presented as an utterance in its own right. The speech plan of the 
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utterance in quotation marks bears an uncertain relationship to the speech plans or designs of the 
work from which it originated and the work into which it has been introduced. Like the speech of 
the fool, which is simultaneously sense and nonsense, direct quotation makes especially difficult 
the reader’s task of measuring the utterance against its context to decide which meanings are 
pertinent and which are not. This problem is a version of the problem raised by any kind of 
allusion or trope—where is the bottom of the rabbit hole?—but is further complicated by the 
distance between the new speaker and the old one that the act of explicit quotation enforces. C. 
M. Jackson-Houlston organizes Scott’s allusions to folk songs into four categories of propriety: 
“simple display,” “allusion which seems to imply audience recognition of common material,” 
“the ingenious selection of unlikely quotation for its local verbal propriety,” and “selection for 
significant intertextual propriety” (33). The first two of these categories distinguish whether 
Scott is alluding for the sake of alluding or seems to expect his reader to catch the allusion; the 
second two distinguish the degree and kind of propriety. These categories are equally applicable 
to Scott’s direct quotations of various sources, including folk songs, and the third category—
pertinently impertinent quotation—is especially relevant to this discussion of the follies of 
quotation. 
In some cases the impropriety of a direct quotation can be recovered as part of the 
meaning of the quotation, and therefore part of the design of the quoting text. The title page of 
each volume of the first edition of Waverley displays the following epigraph: 
Under which King, Bezonian? speak, or die! 
 Henry IV. Part II. 
The explicit attribution of the epigraph and its location at the centre of the title page, set between 
horizontal lines, perform the work of quotation marks. Above the epigraph, on four lines, are the 
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words “WAVERLEY; OR, ’TIS SIXTY YEARS SINCE. IN THREE VOLUMES.” Below the 
epigraph are the volume number and the publication information. Shakespeare’s words are the 
only ones on the title page that appear neither in italics nor the upper case. Typographically 
resembling the text of inset quotations within the novel more than the varied type of the title 
page, the epigraph remains a fragment from the body of one work even while it helps to frame 
the other. This epigraph is significant because, as paratext, it shapes the reader’s expectations of 
the novel’s design—its speech plan is linked directly to the overarching speech plan of Waverley. 
The title also performs this function: as Scott’s author-historian-narrator explains in the 
introductory chapter, the choice of “Waverley; or, ’Tis Sixty Years Since” (as opposed to 
“Waverley, a Tale of Other Days,” “Waverley, a Romance from the German,” “Sentimental 
Tale,” or “A Tale of the Times”) is meant to signal “neither a romance of chivalry, nor a tale of 
modern manners,” but, instead, the realist historical novel that Waverley turns out to be (Scott 4). 
Similarly, the epigraph provides important information about the speech plan of the work to 
which it has been attached. The superficial pertinence of the quotation is clear enough. The 
subject of Waverley being the Jacobite uprising of 1745, the historical moment the fiction 
presents hinges on the ambiguity of the word “King,” a stable ambiguity that allows the word to 
name either of two different men, depending on who is listening: “When the dinner was removed, 
the Baron announced the health of the king, politely leaving to the consciences of his guests to 
drink to the sovereign de facto or de jure, as their politics inclined” (48). Because the epigraph 
consists of a question and an imperative, one is encouraged to imagine a dramatic situation in 
which someone is forced to declare an allegiance. The question seems to be addressed, 
specifically, to Edward Waverley, though for him the sovereign ambiguity represents less of a 
choice and more of a slippage: from the house of his Whig father to the house of his Tory uncle, 
 
 
138 
 
from the English army to the Jacobite one, Waverley moves between different cultures and picks 
up the politics of his companions, as one might pick up the language when travelling in another 
country. The command “speak or die!” demands a decisive response, an end to the slippage. 
Even when Waverley impulsively swears fealty to Charles Stuart, however, it is not clear that he 
has an answer to the sovereignty question, and part of the irony of the threat is that Waverley’s 
fluid loyalties are eventually absolved of consequences.  
Who utters the threat, though? The speaker asks “which King,” recognizing two separate 
kings at once, which the Baron does not quite do when he allows his guests to choose his 
meaning. Surely the speaker can be neither Hanoverian nor Jacobite, for whom the choice is 
either between King and Pretender or King and usurper, never between King and King. “Under 
which King?” can only belong to an outsider. Scott’s historian would have the necessary distance: 
he attempts to represent the conflict even-handedly, though he is on the right side of history and 
only uses the word “king” to designate George II elsewhere in the text of Waverley. Shakespeare 
is even further removed from the conflict. But neither of these perspectives would account for 
the military charge of the epigraph, including the threat of violence and the epithet “Bezonian.” 
Indeed, “Bezonian” is so Shakespearean a word that it resists the current exercise in reading for 
superficial pertinence and summons us into the original context, where Shakespeare’s design 
shapes the meaning of his characters’ utterances. 
Here one finds Ancient Pistol, miles gloriosus. He arrives to Sir John Falstaff with news 
of Henry IV’s death, but prolongs the delivery of it. Justice Shallow intervenes, invoking his 
authority: 
SHALLOW. Give me pardon, sir. If, sir, you come with news from the court, I 
take it there’s but two ways: either to utter them, or conceal them. I am, sir, under 
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the King in some authority. 
PISTOL. Under which king, bezonian? Speak, or die. 
SHALLOW. Under King Harry. 
PISTOL.        Harry the Fourth, or Fifth? 
SHALLOW. Harry the Fourth. 
PISTOL.       A foutre for thine office!  
 Sir John, thy tender lambkin now is king. 
 Harry the Fifth’s the man. I speak the truth. (Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part 
II 5.3.108-116) 
There is some basis in this exchange for the idleness of the threat, at least as it pertains to 
Edward Waverley’s consequences. Its motivation is not military or civil conflict, but Pistol’s 
bravado. The origins of the insult “Bezonian” are military: the term designated a “raw recruit” 
and, more generally, a “Needy beggar, base fellow, knave, rascal” (“†bezonian, n.”). Pistol is 
issuing his challenge to Justice Shallow incongruously, as if the Justice were a soldier he held in 
contempt. If Pistol’s speech is pertinent to Waverley in this respect, there is a more significant 
impertinence in Scott’s quotation of it. The reason Pistol can ask “Under which King, Bezonian?” 
is that both the men in question are, from his point of view, entitled to be called “King.” While 
the play contains an abortive rebellion against Henry IV, Pistol is not referring to this conflict but 
to the death of Henry IV and the ascension of his heir, Prince Hal, as Henry V. The ambiguity in 
the word “King” is altogether of a different sort than it is in Waverley. Here we have the formula 
“The King is dead. Long live the King” played out as a comic pun. Scott fuses the question of 
the right to sovereignty, raised by Henry IV’s usurpation of Richard II, with the superficial 
pertinence of Pistol’s utterance, yielding an epigraph that marshals Shakespeare in service of 
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Waverley’s theme by misrepresenting both texts. 
Perhaps due to the wide influence of Scott as much as the wide influence of Shakespeare, 
Pistol’s words continued to wander, appearing with different inflections in unusual places. It is 
hard to imagine that, without Waverley, Lewis Carroll would have quoted Pistol’s “well-known 
words” in his preface to The Hunting of the Snark or rendered their context with such wonderful 
inaccuracy (8). Carroll quotes Pistol to explain the method of his nonsense coinages in 
“Jabberwocky”: 
Supposing that, when Pistol uttered the well-known words— 
“Under which king, Bezonian? Speak or die!” 
Justice Shallow had felt certain that it was either William or Richard, but had not 
been able to settle which, so that he could not possibly say either name before the 
other, can it be doubted that, rather than die, he would have gasped out 
“Rilchiam!” (8) 
Carroll forgets, probably wilfully, that Shallow is not in danger, that neither William nor Richard 
is on the table, and that the actual options, “Harry” and “Harry,” do not make for a very good 
portmanteau. Carroll carries the impertinence of the quotation to its extreme. There is nothing in 
Pistol’s exchange with Shallow that makes it particularly helpful as an example in this context; 
instead, the quotation becomes part of the verbal foolery of Carroll’s preface, in which he spends 
more space discussing another poem than that to which the preface is attached and protests 
ironically that, as his works evidence, he is incapable of writing nonsense. 
Seeking Bezonians in “the page infallible of Brewer,” one finds further vagaries (Bierce, 
“Quotation”). In the 1881 edition of the Dictionary of Phrase and Fable the entry “Bezonian” 
provides: 
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A beggar (French, besoin; Italian, bisogno, want). Sir Walter Scott adopted in his 
“Waverley” the motto— 
Under which king, Bezonian? speak or die. 
    Shakespeare, “2 Henry IV.,” v.3. 
By 1899 Brewer omits the reference to Waverley, alters the definition to “A new recruit; applied 
originally in derision, to young soldiers sent from Spain to Italy, who landed both ill-accoutred 
and in want of everything (Ital. besogni, from bisogno, need; French besoin),” and lists three 
examples, including Pistol’s speech, another instance from Shakespeare (Henry VI, Part II), and 
one occurrence of the form “besognios” from Scott’s The Monastery. The quotation of Pistol is 
accompanied with a peculiar gloss: “‘Under which king, Bezonian? Speak or die’ (2 Hen. IV., act 
v. 3). Choose your leader or take the consequences—Caesar or Pompey? ‘Speak or die.’” 
Brewer’s allusion to Caesar and Pompey is a better interpretation of Scott’s epigraph than of 
Pistol’s utterance. Further complicating the matter is the separate entry, “Under which King, 
Bezonian?” which offers “Which horn of the dilemma is to be taken? (See BEZONIAN).” It is 
undoubtedly this sort of thing that causes Stumpo Gaker’s poor scribbler to “ma[k]e a solemn 
vow that he would be / Condemned eternally” when he tries to use Brewer to make his 
quotations truer (Bierce, “Quotation”). Quotations of Pistol’s challenge extend into the 20th 
century. It has been the title of newspaper articles and essays, notably F. R. Leavis’s article 
“Under which King, Bezonian?” published in his journal Scrutiny in its first year, which attacks 
Marxism while refusing to align the journal “with a social, economic or political creed or 
platform” (38). Leavis restores to the quotation a sense of its original context: “The Marxist 
challenge, then, seems to us as heroic as Ancient Pistol’s and to point to as real alternatives” (45). 
As of the present writing, one may buy Pistol’s challenge on a T-shirt, coffee mug, or mouse pad 
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from an online merchant specializing in selling such objects with sundry quotations printed on 
them. 
We have followed Pistol’s reverberations some distance away from Waverley, but the 
potential for intertextual drift is part of what is at stake in the impertinence of Scott’s epigraph. 
Its impertinence is ultimately significant because of a larger concern in Scott’s novel with the use 
and abuse of quotation, including his own practice of quoting liberally and taking liberties with 
quotations. Walter Scott had an extraordinary memory, and it is possible to see his habit of 
quoting as a mere exercise of it, but the narrator’s quotations in Waverley mirror the education of 
Edward Waverley, which is represented as a flawed intertextual process. The Ordeal of Richard 
Feverel shares with Waverley a preoccupation with pedagogical methodology, the frequent 
intrusion of snatches of poetry and quotations from literature, and the presence of fool characters 
with a clear descent from Shakespeare. Adrian Harley and Davie Gellatley encourage us to read 
quotation as wise folly, simultaneously a mechanism of education and a problem with it. 
 
2. Education 
“Life is a tedious process of learning we are Fools,” reads “The Pilgrim’s Scrip” in 1859, 
adding, “When we know ourselves Fools, we are already something better” (Meredith, Feverel 
9). If the fictitious collection of Sir Austin Feverel’s aphorisms still reads thus in 1875 or 1896 
the reader does not know it, since Meredith removed the quotation when he condensed the 
opening three chapters of The Ordeal of Richard Feverel into one, toning down the satire of Sir 
Austin’s aphorisms, his female disciples, and his System for educating his son Richard. 
Meredith’s later revisions render the novel’s humour less caricatural and the initial exposition 
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much more direct.
2
 Meredith having, regrettably or not, set the quotation from “The Pilgrim’s 
Scrip” loose in 1859, I take the liberty of quoting the more intricate opening to his novel. The 
first edition uncovers slowly the motivation for Austin’s gnomic cynicism, his misogyny, and the 
convergence of these in the System, presenting first the Aphorist and his aphorisms and then the 
chapter entitled “A Glimpse Behind the Mask,” while the later editions explain Austin’s 
motivation baldly at the outset: Sir Austin’s wife left him for his former friend, Denzil Somers, a 
poet who writes under the alias “Diaper Sandoe.” The narrator suggests that the aphorisms and 
the System have a common origin in this wound. Sir Austin tends to express his rationale for the 
System in “his Aphoristic fashion” (16). I will paraphrase: the Fall of Man is recapitulated in the 
development of every young man. A boy is born free of sin, the “Apple-Disease,” which, as the 
term suggests, is introduced by woman when the boy’s sexuality awakens. Austin’s System of 
education aims to fortify Richard for this moment and eventually to marry him off to a carefully 
vetted young woman who will not corrupt him. The idea is to recreate prelapsarian Adam and 
mitigate the damage done by Eve. 
“The Pilgrim’s Scrip” invokes so frequently Austin’s theory of the corruption of man that 
Austin’s nephew Adrian Harley calls the “Scrip” the “GREAT SHADDOCK DOGMA,” alluding to a 
citrus, rather than pomaceous, candidate for the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge (11). We have 
seen in Chapter Two that the aphorism about the tedious process of learning we are fools 
resembles conventional formulations of the premise of wise folly. (The narrator notes that 
Austin’s aphorisms are not always original.) Yet Austin’s dogma does not accord well with the 
wise-foolish attitude he expresses in the “Scrip.” Wise folly, which historically draws from 
Christian folly, is comfortably postlapsarian. If life really is a tedious process of learning we are 
fools, and knowing ourselves fools makes us something better, then trying to circumvent this 
                                                     
2
 See Hergenhan for a discussion of the revisions of The Ordeal of Richard Feverel. 
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process of learning, on earth at least, is worse than futile. One is still a fool; one simply doesn’t 
know it. By this logic, Austin denies Richard the knowledge of foolishness that makes wisdom 
of a kind possible. The logic of Genesis, the mythical basis of the Shaddock Dogma, also implies 
that Austin is denying Richard such knowledge, though in Genesis this knowledge is assigned a 
negative value. The apple (or, alternatively, the shaddock) introduces to Adam and Eve both 
knowledge and sin. The Fall allows Adam and Eve to seek to understand how to be good, but 
only from a condition of evil, and their salvation ultimately lies outside their own power. 
Whether one employs the humanistic concept of wise folly or a specifically biblical doctrine of 
original sin, all humanity finds itself in the same predicament. Richard, however, is to be refused 
the apple in a world where everyone is supposed to have partaken of it. In other words, Sir 
Austin’s aphorism about learning applies only to those who have not been educated within his 
System. When we know ourselves Fools we are already something better, as if there were the 
possibility of a further betterment to come, a betterment of one’s progeny if not of oneself. 
Austin has learned his foolishness through the traditional method of becoming a cuckold, and 
consequently embraces a doctrine of wise folly that he simultaneously attempts to transcend 
through Richard.  
In the System, therefore, the knowledge of folly or sin needs to be denied because, once 
one knows these things, it is already too late to cure them. For Austin this fatal knowledge is 
linked to sexual knowledge, which echoes both the association of original sin with 
concupiscence that has been contentious in Christian theology since Augustine and the 
ambivalent association of folly with sex in Erasmus’s Praise of Folly (Erasmus 19-20). Sexuality 
is not the only vehicle of dangerous knowledge in Feverel, however. Reading and writing are 
potentially both signs and sources of corruption. Richard’s friend Ripton is caught reading “the 
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entrancing Adventures of Miss Random, a strange young lady,” and Sir Austin takes this to be a 
“great triumph to the System” in opposition to the “Wild Oats theory,” to which Ripton’s father 
subscribes (145). Richard, on the other hand, goes through a bookish phase that does not in itself 
trouble Austin much. Richard “was growing to be lord of kingdoms: where Beauty was his 
Handmaid, and History his Minister, and Time his ancient Harper, and sweet Romance his Bride: 
where he walked in a realm vaster and more gorgeous than the great Orient, peopled with the 
heroes that have been” (111). The narrator describes Richard’s condition in language that could 
belong to Austin in a sentimental phase, recognizing the awakening of adolescent desire but 
believing it to be still uncorrupt: 
For there is no princely wealth, and no loftiest heritage to equal this early one that 
is made bountifully common to so many, when the ripening blood has put a spark 
to the imagination, and the earth is seen through rosy mists of a thousand fresh-
awakened nameless and aimless desires, panting for bliss, and taking it as it 
comes; making of any sight or sound, perforce of the enchantment they carry with 
them, a key to infinite, because innocent, pleasure. The passions then are 
gambolling cubs; not the ravaging gluttons they grow to. They have their teeth 
and their talons, but they neither tear nor bite. They are in counsel and fellowship 
with the quickened heart and brain. The whole sweet system moves to music. 
(111) 
The description here is laden with partially disavowed eroticism, which accumulates in such 
phrases as “panting for bliss, and taking it as it comes” despite the disclaimers of “nameless and 
aimless desires” and “infinite, because innocent, pleasure.” The reference to Richard’s “sweet 
system” echoes the System through which Sir Austin interprets Richard’s development. It 
 
 
146 
 
becomes clear that the narrator is performing Austin’s logic, under which it is possible to 
quarantine the healthy blossoms of this stage in Richard’s development, the “Blossoming 
Season,” from the immanent threat of the Apple-Disease. Austin says, “The blood is healthy, the 
mind virtuous: neither instigates the other to evil, and both are perfecting toward the flower of 
manhood. If he reach that pure—in the untainted fulness and perfection of his natural powers, I 
am indeed a happy father!” (111). Austin’s “If” suggests the possibility that something might 
divert this process of perfection. Richard’s aimless desire may take aim, concretely, at a woman. 
There is evidence that Richard’s passionate reading is actually related to his desire for 
women: Richard retreats to his books after he loses a swimming race, and we are told he loses 
the race because he catches sight of Lady Blandish’s bonnet appearing over Sir Austin Feverel’s 
shoulder. Meredith narrates the scene with the abstraction that he sometimes uses as a sly form 
of delicacy, but it is evident that Sir Austin has invited Lady Blandish, without Richard’s 
knowledge, to observe him, and that Richard is in the nude. We are told, “It was the Bonnet had 
beaten him, not Ralph. The Bonnet, typical of the Mystery that caused his heart those violent 
palpitations, the Bonnet was his dear, detestable enemy” (110-11). This race is an event in 
Richard’s sexual development, and it is significant we are next given the erotically charged 
description of his reading, which represents, pace Sir Austin, a resting place for desire already 
awakened by a woman. Soon Austin comes to question his previous interpretation of Richard’s 
literary phase, provoked by a kind of literary activity that, unlike reading, Austin cannot consider 
to be an innocent sign of the Blossoming Season: writing poetry. Austin does not articulate his 
objection apart from saying “No Feverel has ever written Poetry,” but this is clearly not the 
problem (113). Austin commands Richard to burn his manuscript: 
A strange man had been introduced to him [Richard], who traversed and bisected 
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his skull with sagacious stiff fingers, and crushed his soul while, in an infallible 
voice, declaring him the animal he was: making him feel such an animal! Not 
only his blossoms withered, his being seemed to draw in its shoots and twigs. And 
when, coupled thereunto (the strange man having departed, his work done), his 
father, in his tenderest manner, stated that it would give him great pleasure to see 
those same precocious, utterly valueless, scribblings among the cinders, the last 
remaining mental blossoms spontaneously fell away. (113) 
Here the narrator appropriates the terminology of the System, turning it to Richard’s defense: 
Richard’s poetry, part of his blossoming, is destroyed through this violent transformation of his 
father, who perhaps sees poetry not as part of the Blossoming Season but as a prelude to the 
dangers of the impending “Magnetic Age.” It is not clear if this is precisely how Austin sees 
poetry because the Hyde-like “strange man” declaring to Richard that he is an animal is not the 
articulate Aphorist who has sublimated his pain into a System. Poetry evidently touches the 
original wound that underlies Austin’s thought: we are reminded, “his wounded heart had its 
reasons for being much disturbed” (113). Diaper Sandoe is a poet. 
Sir Austin may be motivated by personal prejudice when he condemns Richard’s 
scribbling, but Richard’s poetic tendencies do partially bear Sir Austin out in that they issue in 
romance and romantic misadventure. Richard falls in love with Lucy in a scene in which the 
narrator refers to the couple as Ferdinand and Miranda. Richard attempts to rescue Lucy’s lost 
book from a stream, but is only able to recover some paper, which turns out to be a “remnant of 
his burnt Offering! a page of the sacrificed Poems! one Blossom preserved from the deadly 
universal blight” (131). Richard quotes to himself a couplet from the solitary sonnet Lucy has 
recovered, in which he imagines asking the stars to tell him of his future love. Hesper replies: 
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“Through sunset’s amber see me shining fair, / As her blue eyes shine through her golden hair” 
(132). I have discussed the othering effect of explicit quotation in novelistic discourse. In this 
case, interpreting a quotation of one’s own words becomes a way of consolidating the self and its 
desires over time. Richard’s slightly younger self did not intend the couplet to be about Lucy, 
and his choice of “blue eyes” and “golden hair” is not surprising; it imitates an ideal of the fair 
woman he is likely to have encountered reading love sonnets. (Richard has seen Lucy before, as 
a girl of thirteen, but he does not recognize her.) The occurrence of these features in Lucy strikes 
him as significant, and he reads her back into the poem: “Here were two blue eyes, and golden 
hair; and by some strange chance, that appeared like the working of a divine finger, she had 
become the possessor of the prophecy, she that was to fulfil it!” (132). While formally 
delineating the difference between Richard’s past and present discourses, the quotation shows 
Richard in the process of merging them, casting Lucy into the role of his beloved, a role he had 
already prepared for her in the writing of his verse, while summoning into the present the 
emotion that previously moved his pen: “Richard strove to remember the hour, and the mood of 
mind, in which he had composed the notable production” (132). 
Poetry continues to shape and express Richard’s courtship of Lucy. As Neil Roberts 
observes, during the climax of the pastoral scene in the chapter “A Diversion on a Penny-
Whistle,” Richard and Lucy even begin to speak blank verse: 
“Lucy, did you never dream of meeting me?” 
“O Richard! yes; for I remembered you.” 
“Lucy! and did you pray that we might meet?” (169; Roberts 28) 
Therefore, when Richard flouts Sir Austin’s System by pursuing Lucy, his actions mirror the 
original wounding of Austin that gave rise to the System. The implication appears to be that Sir 
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Austin is right about poetry: it is a sign of corruption, of the “Apple-Disease” that is responsible 
for postlapsarian man. Richard marries Lucy against his father’s will, and continues his romantic 
career under the delusion that it is his vocation to rescue fallen women from further sin, fancying 
himself both a knight and a Titan (383). One of these women, Bella Mount, seduces Richard in a 
scene that culminates in her performance of several fragments of songs, original to Meredith. 
Stanzas of these are reproduced in the novel. They shade from elegiac to salacious, from 
Once the sweet Romance of story 
 Clad thy moving form with grace: 
Once the world and all its glory 
 Was but framework to thy face. (414) 
to 
If I had a husband, what think you I’d do? 
 I’d make it my business to keep him a lover: 
For when a young gentleman ceases to woo, 
 Some other amusement he’ll quickly discover. (414) 
Bella continues to sing a Spanish ballad, which Richard enters into imaginatively, projecting the 
ballad onto Bella much as he projected his own love poetry onto Lucy: “The lady in the ballad 
had been wronged. Lo! it was the lady before him; and soft horns blew; he smelt the languid 
night-flowers; he saw the stars crowd large and close above the arid plain; this lady leaning at 
her window desolate, pouring out her abandoned heart” (414-15). The narrator asks what affects 
Richard so strongly, “Was it the Champagne? the music? the poetry? Something of the two 
former, perhaps: but most the Enchantress playing upon him” (415). The parallel structure says 
implicitly that the Enchantress played upon him through the poetry. The chapter ends in a 
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passionate kiss and the narrator’s corruption of a quotation from Richard III, which he does not 
mark with quotation marks, perhaps because he wishes to take credit for the emendation of 
“woman” to “Hero,” a crossing of gender that reflects Bella’s cross-dressing in this scene: “Was 
ever Hero in this fashion won?” (416). 
It is clear that Richard’s romanticism is partly his downfall, here and later, when he 
insists on duelling Lord Mountfalcon to protect Lucy’s honour; that this romanticism is related to 
his reading; and that The Ordeal of Richard Feverel therefore takes on a version of the Quixotic 
subject. In this the novel echoes its precursor, Waverley, which presents its hero in a similar 
situation to Richard, with an absent mother and male guardians who are responsible for his 
education, but who fail to prevent it from going awry. Edward spends his youth shuttling 
between his Whig father and his Tory uncle, neither of whom altogether takes responsibility for 
his education. Under the care of a tutor who does not monitor him, Edward independently 
pursues an extensive but “desultory course of reading” and develops a romantic turn of mind that 
results in misadventure (15). The apparent conflict between realism and romance that is 
dramatized in Waverley, and that also appears in Feverel, has been sufficiently discussed 
elsewhere, especially in the case of Scott.
3
 Ian Duncan’s reading of romance and realism in the 
novel avoids drawing the line between them sharply. Duncan argues that the nineteenth-century 
British novel negotiates romance and anti-romance dialectically: “The old commonplace of an 
antithetical relation between romance and reality, invoked by the novel in its own apologies of 
origin, produces a new, dialectical figure of romance as the fulcrum against which—positioned 
on its edge, between inside and out—reality can be turned around (2). This view prevents the 
kind of difficulty that can emerge from seeing realism primarily in opposition to the conventions 
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 In the case of Meredith, see Gillian Beer for a discussion of education, reality, and romance in The Adventures of 
Harry Esmond. 
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of romance, as George Levine does in The Realistic Imagination, which puts realism in the 
awkward position of permanently taking the side of disillusionment and resistance to convention, 
despite its own illusions and conventions, and consequently struggling perpetually with the 
contradictions of its own form. It is clear enough, however, that romanticism has historically 
been considered part of the danger of reading, and that it is a danger with which the realist novel 
often concerns itself. As Duncan writes, “When, at a crucial stage in his adventures, we are told 
that Waverley ‘gave himself up to the romance of his situation,’ the term means something like 
‘psychological effect derived from imaginative literature.’ Scott thus helped establish romance in 
its two dominant modern senses, objective and subjective: as a traditional literary form, and as a 
state of the imagination” (56-57). This problem of quixotic romanticism is related to the problem 
of quotation that motivates the current discussion of reading and education in The Ordeal of 
Richard Feverel and Waverley, because both are problems of what readers do with the units of 
their reading.  
The narrator diagnoses Waverley’s education as “somewhat desultory,” applying this 
adjective to his studies five times in the novel (12).
4
 Not only is Waverley’s education “regulated 
alternately by the taste and opinions of his uncle and of his father,” Waverley’s reading practices, 
which revolve around his own pleasure, are evidently also to blame. Duncan focuses primarily 
on Waverley’s taste for romance, broadly construed, seeing Waverley as a female quixote, after 
the eighteenth-century conception of the passive feminine reader: “Edward Waverley is less like 
Don Quixote, who rides out to force his visions on the world, than the generic type of eighteenth-
century romance reader, the female quixote, whose imagination suspends her from intercourse 
with society” (63). Although Edward’s romantic temperament does lead him to act in certain 
                                                     
4
 In the 1829 General Preface to the Magnum edition of the Waverley Novels, Scott uses the word once more to 
reveal that Waverley’s reading was based on his own. See the 1972 Penguin edition, p.521. 
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ways, such as joining the Jacobite cause, he remains at a remove from real historical conflict: 
“Heroic death for others, sedentary life for a subject who looks on: we read the elegiac structure 
of sentimental romance. For Waverley’s absence, the ethos of romance, is just what saves him 
from the death sentence of historical engagement. The hero’s passivity entails not a failure of 
action so much as one of purposeful commitment” (84). Ina Ferris, similarly, sees Edward as a 
“type of female reader,” though she places more emphasis on the “significant social effects” of 
female reading performed by males, arguing that the “Waverley Novels opened up the novel to 
the male gender as both writing and reading, establishing novel writing as a literary activity and 
legitimating novel reading as a manly practice” (99, 101, 80). 
With the model of Edward as female quixote in mind, I would like to examine more of 
the narrator’s remarks about Edward’s reading. “His powers of apprehension were so 
uncommonly quick” that his Oxonian tutor is hard pressed to “prevent him . . . from acquiring 
his knowledge in a slight, flimsy, and inadequate manner” (Scott 13). Edward only reads what he 
enjoys, and will not “fi[x] his attention on critical distinctions of philology, upon the difference 
of idiom, the beauty of felicitous expression, or the artificial combinations of syntax” (13). He 
does not develop “habits of firm and incumbent application” or “the art of controuling, directing, 
and concentrating the powers of his own mind for earnest investigation—an art far more 
essential than even that learning which is the primary object of study” (13). Edward’s uncle does 
not hinder him, thinking “the mere tracing of the alphabetical characters with the eye . . in itself a 
useful and meritorious task,” and not caring “what ideas or doctrines they may happen to convey” 
(14). Edward “dr[ives] through the sea of books, like a vessel without a pilot or a rudder” until he 
is satisfied (14). As a result, he “store[s] in a memory of uncommon tenacity, much curious, 
though ill-arranged and miscellaneous information,” but “kn[ows] little of what adds dignity to 
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man, and qualifies him to support and adorn an elevated situation in society” (15). His “surfeit of 
idle reading” results in a “dainty, squeamish, and fastidious taste,” “unfit[ness] for serious and 
sober study,” and “habits of abstraction and love of solitude” (16). 
In presenting the case study thus, as fully as I dare without reproducing pages of 
Waverley wholesale, I quote inordinately, but this inordinate quotation is part of the point. I 
attempt to convey my understanding of Waverley’s design, of its speech plan as a long and 
complex utterance. But this understanding, insofar as it is articulable, consists of fragments of 
Scott’s discourse suspended in a medium of summary, paraphrase, and my own thoughts, an 
incomplete merging of his discourse and mine. The reader, especially the student or scholar, is 
reduced to jumping between pieces of utterances, which is why I believe new critical readings of 
old texts remain valuable—they are a way of pooling, negotiating, and continually renovating 
our active responsive understandings of long and complex utterances. I take this metaphor of 
jumping from the etymology of “desultory,” which it shares with the noun “desultor,” or “circus 
horse-leaper” (“desultor, n.”). It is difficult not to read desultorily. My series of quotations, or 
horses, reveals a constellation of concerns underlying the narrator’s judgment of what Waverley 
reads, how he reads it, and how this reading affects him. There are suggestions that Waverley 
reads books that convey dangerous ideas or doctrines, and that Waverley does not develop an 
intellectual discipline rooted in values of masculinity and good public citizenship. There is also a 
suggestion, perhaps more pertinent today because its values are entrenched in university 
education, that Waverley is not a critical reader—that, were he to “fi[x] his attention upon 
critical distinctions of philology, upon the difference of idiom, the beauty of felicitous expression, 
or the artificial combinations of syntax,” and to take care to select and frame what he reads in a 
less “ill-arranged and miscellaneous” manner, he would be better able to make use of what he 
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reads.
5
 He would, perhaps, still be a horse jumper, but he would be a better one. Instead, Edward 
has a simplistic notion of literacy as the mere ability to get to the end of a book knowing what 
the words mean: “‘I can read and understand a Latin author,’ said young Edward, with the self-
confidence and rash reasoning of fifteen, ‘and Scaliger or Bentley could not do much more’” 
(13). 
In literary criticism, reading, and education, direct quotation of texts creates thresholds 
between discourses, where critics, readers, students—these categories intersect—stake their 
claims to understand the relationship between the speech plan of a work and that of the fragment. 
Yet it is not Edward’s quotations I will principally be concerned with in the following section. 
Certainly, Edward has moments of wayward intertextuality: he casts his first love interest, Flora 
MacIvor, as Romeo’s first love Rosaline, announces to himself “I will love my Rosaline no 
more,” and begins to think of Rose as his Juliet, oblivious to the foolishness of pursuing an 
identification with Romeo that far (273). The narrator is the one with a penchant for direct 
quotation, however. At one point the narrator seems to use quotation to represent Edward’s 
habits of mind. The narrator says, “Edward loved to ‘chew the cud of sweet and bitter fancy,’ 
and, like a child amongst his toys, culled and arranged, from the splendid yet useless imagery 
and emblems with which his imagination was stored, visions as brilliant and as fading as those of 
an evening sky” (19). It appears that the narrator has chosen to quote As You Like It because it is 
what Edward would do, but the narrator has his own store of imagery and emblems. At one point 
he quotes Anna Seward—“O nymph, unrelenting and cold as thou art, / My bosom is proud as 
thine own”—and then tells us, “With the feeling expressed in these beautiful lines (which 
however were not then written,) Waverley determined upon convincing Flora that he was not to 
                                                     
5
 For another interpretation of the problem of Edward’s education, see Kenneth Sroka. Sroka suggests a distinction 
between useless knowledge and a useful knowledge that is more likely to be acquired by experience, but argues that 
there is an “interpenetration of ‘useful’ and ‘useless’ knowledge” in Waverley (146). 
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be depressed by a rejection” (222). The anachronistic quotation forcibly separates the narrator’s 
intertextual frame of reference from Waverley’s, importing feeling from a work Edward cannot 
have read and attributing it to him. The activity of culling and arranging literary fragments being 
under scrutiny in Waverley, the narrator’s indulgence of this activity is relevant to his assessment 
of Edward’s education. In both Waverley and Feverel, the problem of quotation is a general one, 
with particular application both to the intertextual formation of the hero’s own discourse and to 
the reader’s encounter with quotations inserted into the narrative discourse. Hero and reader are 
parallel, engaged in the process of forging a coherent understanding from incongruous fragments. 
In both texts, there is a character who acts as a mediator in this process, and that character is a 
Fool. 
 
3. Adrian and Davie 
In the aphorism “Life is a tedious process of learning we are Fools,” the upper-case F is 
Austin’s (Meredith, Feverel 9). Liberal capitalization, however, is a general idiosyncrasy in the 
narrator’s rendering of Austin’s discourse, Adrian Harley’s, and his own. It is a device of George 
Meredith’s pronounced style. Not merely a throwback to the eighteenth-century, Meredith’s 
liberal majuscules are a mark of the “abstract portraiture” to which Meredith tends, and in which 
Austin and Adrian also indulge (343). Meredith does not usually capitalize the word “fool,” but 
does so again when referring to one of Bella Mount’s entourage at a dinner party in Richmond: 
“Mrs. Mount was flashing her teeth and eyes with laughter at one of her Court, who appeared to 
be Fool” (374). The initial capital and the odd omission of the article, preserved in the later 
editions, indicate that “Fool” is being used as a name, as in King Lear, where the Fool is never 
given his own name. “Fool” designates a conventional dramatic category: in the metaphor of 
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Bella’s Fool at Court and in Austin’s aphorism, “Fool” does not merely signify a foolish person, 
but also suggests character type, especially the type of the wise fool. 
I have largely avoided typology in this study. The categories of pharmakeus or 
pharmakos refer to the function of a narrator or character within the narrative rhetoric of a given 
novel rather than to a type with consistent conventional content. The fool as he appears in 
Shakespeare has been a means of identifying and explaining the techniques of wise folly, and if I 
have sometimes suggested that narrators or characters play the wise fool, I have resisted 
identifying them with the role they play. In the realist novel, one does not encounter typical fools 
so much as characters wearing the mask of wise folly. It is rare to find a simple deployment of 
the type because realist characters tend not to be typical in the same way as characters in drama. 
Rameau underscores this distinction in Diderot’s Le neveu de Rameau with a novelistic reading 
of Molière: “quand je lis L’Avare, je me dis: sois avare, si tu veux; mais garde-toi de parler 
comme l’avare. Quand je lis le Tartuffe, je me dis: sois hypocrite, si tu veux; mais ne parle pas 
comme l’hypocrite. . . . Je suis moi et je reste ce que je suis; mais j’agis et je parle comme il 
convient” (111).6 Rameau distinguishes carefully between the type and the person who is 
performing it, even where the usual reading assumes no difference, and he is himself an example 
of the wise fool becoming a rounded, novelistic character who performs a flat role. As Michael 
André Bernstein argues, there is more to Rameau than his role, which he is aware of, but can’t 
seem to escape. Characters in novels who perform wise folly tend to be more like Rameau than 
like Lear’s Fool, though it is possible to see how Rameau emerges from Lear’s Fool. Yet there 
are ways of attaching the mask more securely to a character’s face, of putting the character in the 
characterological equivalent of quotation marks. Eliot does this with Hans to a degree by 
                                                     
6
 When I read L’Avare I tell myself: be miserly if you like, but take care not to talk like the miser. When I read 
Tartuffe, I tell myself: be hypocritical if you like, but don’t talk like the hypocrite. . . . I am me and I remain what I 
am; but I act and speak appropriately. 
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designating him eccentric, a creature “made for mishaps,” but these characterological quotation 
marks have merely an othering function, not also an attributing one; they are an analogue of 
“scare quotes,” which insist (as I have just done) not that the enclosed words belong to anyone in 
particular but that the speaker does not take responsibility for them (Eliot, Daniel Deronda 378). 
Meredith and Scott’s quoted characters have more distinct origins. 
The Fool in The Ordeal of Richard Feverel is Adrian Harley, the “Wise Youth.” Adrian’s 
most obvious prototype is Falstaff, though Adrian is more urbane and polished, with a crafted 
cynicism that seems related to his perpetual reading of his sole “intimates,” Gibbon and Horace: 
“the society of these fine aristocrats of literature helped him to accept humanity as it had been, 
and was; a Supreme Ironic Procession, with Laughter of Gods in the background. Why not 
Laughter of Mortals also? Adrian had his laugh in his comfortable corner. He possessed peculiar 
attributes of a Heathen God. He was a disposer of men: he was polished, luxurious, and happy—
at their cost” (34). Falstaff himself is not simply a fool character but a compound of several other 
types. Northrop Frye writes: “In Falstaff and Sir Toby Belch we can see the affinities of the 
buffoon or entertainer type both with the parasite and with the master of revels” (175). The 
parasite “does nothing but entertain the audience by talking about his appetite”; the master of 
revels or cook provides “a center for the comic mood,” and descends from the cook of Greek 
Middle Comedy, “who breaks into comedies to bustle and order about and make long speeches 
about the mysteries of cooking” (175). Falstaff is the adherent to and proponent of a festive 
philosophy of food, and especially of drink: “If I had a thousand sons, the first human principle I 
would teach them should be to forswear thin potations, and to addict themselves to sack” 
(Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part II 4.2.117-20). Adrian, too, is master of revels. When Sir Austin 
forbids drink at Richard’s birthday, “to the delight of all present, Adrian, ever provident, puts his 
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hand behind him and leads forth a flask, saying that he had anticipated this possibility” (Meredith, 
Feverel 59). Adrian is also a parasite, who “had been destined for the Church,” but has become 
merely “a fixture in the Abbey” at Raynham (35). Meredith has made Adrian even closer to his 
typical sources than Falstaff is, since Meredith displaces Falstaff’s poor digestion onto the dry-
as-dust scholar Hippias Feverel, leaving Adrian free to enjoy his appetite. As Richard says: 
“He’s very fond of eating; that’s all I know of Adrian” (184). As a cook figure Adrian delights in 
announcing Richard’s unauthorized wedding by delivering wedding cake around London, is 
extremely particular about soft-boiled eggs, and has a dalliance with Richard’s wife Lucy that 
revolves chiefly around cookery. Furthermore, the implication that there is wisdom in the antics 
of the Wise Youth, who sleeps “knowing himself wise in a mad world,” and who “has attained 
that felicitous point of wisdom from which one sees all mankind to be fools,” links his role to 
that of the wise fool—with the crucial difference that he is insufficiently self-critical, and 
therefore not successful (60, 311).
7
 
Lady Blandish responds to Sir Austin’s charge that “Falstaff is only to us [women] an 
incorrigible fat man” by desiring “to know what he illustrates” (203). Adrian, in turn, is more 
than an incorrigible fat youth. Like Hans’s fragility, the characteristics that Falstaff and Adrian 
share are peculiarly innate, which underscores their symbolic function. Falstaff claims: “My lord, 
I was born about three of the clock in the afternoon with a white head, and something a round 
belly” (Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part II 1.2.181-83). Meredith’s narrator tells us of Adrian, 
“Some people are born green: others yellow. Adrian was born yellow. He was always on the ripe 
sensible side of a question”; and: 
A singular mishap (at his birth, possibly, or before it) had unseated that organ [his 
heart], and shaken it down to his stomach, where it was a much lighter, nay, an 
                                                     
7
 See Frank Curtin, who reads Adrian as a figure of the limits of comedy. 
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inspiring, weight, and encouraged him merrily onward. Throned in that region, it 
looked on little that did not arrive to gratify it. Already that region was a trifle 
prominent in the person of the Wise Youth, and carried, as it were, the flag of his 
philosophical tenets in front of him. (33, 34) 
That Falstaff and Adrian have always had their appetites and their worldliness helps to bestow on 
them a literary function and a clear descent from type. Meredith marks Adrian from birth, “or 
before it”—a phrase that refers ambiguously to his two conceptions: one of which occurs in his 
fictitious mother’s womb, the other in his author’s head. Fools are metafictitious. As Molly tells 
Adrian, “You’re al’ays as good as a play” (173). 
Waverley’s Fool is Davie Gellatley, the Baron Bradwardine’s kept fool, who reminds 
Edward of “one of Shakspeare’s roynish clowns” (Scott 41). In the Magnum edition Scott 
provides a footnote to explain what he knows about “the ancient and established custom of 
keeping fools” (85n.). Between the reference to Shakespeare and the note, Scott implies two 
slightly discordant origins for the character: one literary, the other historical. Wilmon Brewer, 
tracking Shakespeare’s influence on Scott, resolves this discord in favour of the literary, since 
“Gellatley resembles not only Shakespearean clowns in general but the Fool of King Lear in 
particular—a character whom at about the same time Scott had praised highly in his criticism” 
(246). Similarly, John Mayer draws a distinction between the historical specificity of Davie, 
which Scott emphasizes in the note, and the character himself, whom “the reader might regard as 
more akin to a Shakespearean fool than rooted in historical reality” (921). Davie’s roots affect 
how one reads him: as a type character whose meaning is metaphorical, or a historical character 
who belongs to the network of metonymic connections through which, as Harry Shaw argues, 
historical realism creates a sense of being embedded in history. Shaw suggests that metonymic 
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and metaphorical meanings are not mutually exclusive, but that “a fictional passage highlights 
and invites us to pursue” them in varying combinations (Narrating Reality 233). Like the 
epigraph from Henry IV, Part II, Davie is poised between two designs in which he has two 
different meanings, and Scott incorporates this doubleness into his own design. Davie is not 
merely a historical artifact, but also performs the role of the wise fool, commenting indirectly on 
the discourses of the fiction in which he finds himself, including the network of intertextual 
connections to which he belongs. 
The story of Davie’s birth, like the reference to Adrian’s, makes his typical role into a 
birthright. Rose tells Waverley: “This poor creature had a brother, and Heaven, as if to 
compensate to the family Davie’s deficiencies, had given him what the hamlet thought 
uncommon talents” (59). Later, she recounts a more thorough version of the story, which begins, 
“Once upon a time there lived an old woman, called Janet Gellatley, who was suspected to be a 
witch, on the infallible grounds that she was very old, very ugly, very poor, and had two sons, 
one of whom was a poet, and the other a fool, which visitation, all the neighbourhood agreed, 
had come upon her for the sin of witchcraft” (65). Davie’s “deficiencies” come with gifts that 
help him to fulfill his role, including “a prodigious memory, stored with miscellaneous snatches 
and fragments of all tunes and songs, which he sometimes applied, with considerable address, as 
the vehicles of remonstrance, explanation, or satire” (58). The reference to Davie’s memory 
recalls Edward’s “memory of uncommon tenacity,” storing “much curious, though ill-arranged 
and miscellaneous information,” which Edward applies to understand the world around him (15). 
Davie’s primary means of communicating is quotation. He comments on the Baron 
Bradwardine’s deflection of a duel with the Laird of Balmawhapple by singing “an old ballad” 
comparing the love, wrath, and fighting habits of young and old men, with a nonsense refrain 
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about birds and “something like a satirical emphasis” (66-67). The ballad communicates 
something, probably simply that the old Baron has subdued the young Laird, but Edward cannot 
decipher it. What Davie does to Edward here is a parodically exaggerated version of what the 
narrator does to the reader repeatedly, habitually referring us to quotations of literature and folk 
song in order to enrich his narration. When the narrator cryptically conveys Cecilia Stubb’s 
affection for Jonas Culbertfield by mutilating a quotation from A Midsummer Night’s Dream, he 
is being no less playful, and scarcely more direct, than Davie (25). 
Davie’s “old ballad,” incidentally, is probably original to Scott (66n.28). The importance 
of Davie’s quotation is primarily that it has the form of quotation. Davie is a conduit of words 
designated other. Some of those words are attributed to Davie’s dead brother, the genius poet, 
who is a figure for the source as cipher: “He [Davie’s brother] was affectionate and 
compassionate to his brother, who followed him like his shadow, and we think that from him 
Davie gathered many fragments of songs and music unlike those of this country” (59). The 
brother is irrecoverable, untraceable: Davie never mentions his name, and if asked about his 
sources “either answers with wild and long fits of laughter, or else breaks into tears of 
lamentation” (59). Davie’s story is presented at the centre of a web of quotations and other forms 
of intertextuality, which helps to establish him as a figure for intertextual processes. Rose 
Bradwardine tells the story of Janet as a sequel to a song she sings about the peak St. Swithin’s 
Chair, which is also the occasion for Edward to remember a “rhyme quoted by Edgar in King 
Lear,” and for the narrator to misquote slightly a couplet about anonymity, which he leaves 
anonymous, but which is in fact from John Leyden’s Scenes of Infancy (64 and n.11-12). The 
ballad itself, or the fragment that Rose remembers, which is provided in full and is original to 
Scott, tells a Gothic story of the “Night-Hag,” and provokes the story of Janet (64n.19). Rose 
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tells this story as if she were repeating a traditional tale, beginning with the fairy-story formula 
of “Once upon a time” and employing a simple repetitive style: “very old, very ugly, very poor.” 
Although in the end the clergymen who try Janet for witchcraft look credulous and ridiculous, 
and in the Magnum edition a footnote traces the historical inspiration for the incident, Rose’s 
anecdote nevertheless asserts a romantic mood that produces “romantic legends” and a 
discussion of 
   All those idle thoughts and fantasies, 
      Devices, dreams, opinions unsound, 
   Shows, visions, soothsays, and prophecies, 
And all that feigned is, as leasings, tales, and lies. (66) 
The function of the narrator’s quotation from the Faerie Queen is ambiguous: although in this 
context it ostensibly deprecates the fancies it catalogues, the intrusion of Spenser’s words into 
Scott’s is an instance of the wise folly of quotation, Scott’s use of the very practices his novel 
questions through Davie and through Edward’s education. Davie’s story sits at the centre of this 
portion of the chapter, flanked on the one side by King Lear, John Leyden, and a Gothic ballad; 
on the other, by The Faerie Queen. As they flirt with the folly of “all that feigned is, as leasings, 
tales, and lies,” Waverley, Rose, and the narrator himself resemble Davie. Haunting each of the 
numerous instances of literary quotation in Waverley is the image of Davie, like a “shadow,” 
channelling the alien genius of his dead brother’s poetry. 
Davie’s quotations create the incongruity to which quotation is subject. The greatest 
incongruity occurs when Edward finds Davie in the ruins of Tully-Veolan. Davie is singing an 
“old Scottish song” that is really a pastiche of old ballads, including the “Lament of the Border 
Widow” and the “Lady Turned Serving-Man,” which evokes the attack on Tully-Veolan: “They 
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came upon us in the night, / And brake my bower and slew my knight” (317 and n.11-18). 
Beginning another song, Davie pretends that the inhabitants of the manor, including the Baron 
and Rose, are dead:  
But follow, follow me— 
While glow-worms light the lea, 
I’ll shew ye where the dead should be— (318) 
It is a story that suits its stage, appropriate to the ravaged estate, though completely false. The 
phrase “should be” is suggestive beyond the immediate context, pointing to the ongoing 
negotiation between kinds of narrative frameworks through both Edward’s behaviour and Scott’s 
writing. Edward is always to be found working to create heroic narratives. He joins with Prince 
Charles to help enact the narrative of the restored and rightful king, but he falters when he 
realizes that this also entails enacting the fall of those who are equally heroic, such as Colonel 
Gardiner. Waverley itself in the end is partially sympathetic to such values. Scott partakes of 
them in contriving an ending with so few losses. Not only does Waverley survive his ordeal, the 
Baron Bradwardine is exonerated for his second act of treason and is by the efforts of his friends 
restored to his estate. We have seen Ian Duncan explain the difference between the sphere of 
historical action, in which Fergus MacIvor dies for his cause, and the sphere of feminine 
romance reading, in which the stakes are never so high. Davie’s poem suggests what might have 
happened in Waverley—indeed, what “should” have happened had Scott been interested only in 
representing events that might plausibly have happened in history rather than the experience of 
historicity.
8
 The absence of the past source (Davie’s brother) and the presence and imperfection 
of the quoting instance (Davie) inform Scott’s history, including his use of folk sources. The 
                                                     
8 See Shaw, Narrating Reality: “At its most ambitious, realist fiction offers us the possibility of participating in the 
workings of a mind capable of following the unfolding of that most real of modern phenomena, the workings of 
history itself” (107). 
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differences in context made visible by impertinent quotation function like the narrator’s remarks 
about precarious rafts at a Highland burial in The Fair Maid of Perth, which, as Shaw argues, do 
more than ridicule “primitive societies and their absurdities” (The Forms of Historical Fiction 
147). By breaking away from the seriousness of the scene, the narrator emphasizes his distance 
from it: “The joke is really on us as readers and on Scott himself. He cannot and does not want to 
offer us a facile merging with the past. His fiction does not provide the chance to live in the days 
of yesteryear. We can only visit the past, catch glimpses of it, wonder about what it meant to its 
regular inhabitants. We are different from the Highlanders” (The Forms of Historical Fiction 
147-48). Through his historical fiction and The Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border, in which he 
collects and reproduces folk ballads, mediated by his fallible but “prodigious” memory of 
“uncommon tenacity,” Scott attempts to preserve and understand the past, but exhibits his 
awareness of historical and cultural remove and of the vagaries—the desultoriness—of the 
processes that make present the past, including its words, discourses, and patterns of thought. 
Edward’s education connects the formation of a historical understanding of the past to the 
formation of an adult understanding of the world. Davie is, thus, a pedagogical figure. Adrian 
Harley is more explicitly so, because he is the tutor Sir Austin chooses for Richard. As my 
earlier comparison of Adrian to Falstaff suggests, Adrian is not the best choice for the success of 
the System, but Adrian can quote the “Scrip” like the Devil quotes scripture, and often engages 
Sir Austin in debates about his own aphorisms. Like Rameau’s nephew, il parle comme il 
convient, and few see through his aura of virtue to the roles of parasite, master of revels, and fool 
that he consistently plays. Adrian’s other favourite source for quotations is Diaper Sandoe, 
Austin’s nemesis and what Gillian Beer calls “[p]oetry’s representative in the book” (21). Sir 
Austin once recognized Diaper as a poet of “Genius” (Meredith, Feverel 21). Diaper has 
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declined, however, and appears rarely in the novel, always with a high degree of abstraction. He 
has no dialogue, but we are told he speaks in blank verse, “for seldom writing metrically now, he 
took to talking it” (Meredith, Feverel 105). Diaper functions much like Davie’s brother. As a 
character he is more symbol than substance, and he is present primarily through the numerous 
quotations of him. Richard, who is initially ignorant of his mother’s infidelity, does not 
understand his father’s quarrel with Diaper, and is fond of Diaper’s poetry, a perverse fondness 
encouraged by Adrian. 
Adrian represents an alternative view of poetry to Sir Austin’s, one that takes pleasure in 
its indeterminate value. Like Davie he is the active and citational half of the symbolic poetic 
brotherhood. He is a vocal proponent of Diaper’s poetry, probably not for its own sake but as a 
tool for provoking others. In an argument with his cousin Austin Wentworth, another of Sir 
Austin’s nephews, he defends Diaper’s pessimistic portrait of the “Age of Work,” which 
dismally represents the industrial age and which prophecies: 
From this unrest, lo, early wreck’d, 
   A Future staggers crazy, 
Ophelia of the Ages, deck’d 
   With woful weed and daisy! (73) 
Adrian clearly delights in the poem as a defense of license, and he cites it to support what 
amounts to his manifesto of wise folly: “Well! all Wisdom is mournful. ’Tis therefore, coz, that 
the Wise do love the Comic Muse. Their own high food would kill them. You shall find great 
poets, rare philosophers, night after night on the broad grin before a row of yellow lights and 
mouthing masks. Why? because all’s dark at home. The Stage is the pastime of great minds” (72). 
With a “’Tis” and a Shakespearean “coz,” Adrian gives his version of Touchstone’s old “saying,” 
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and explains the wisdom of folly.  
In the chapter “The Hero Takes a Step,” Richard’s crucial decision to elope with Lucy is 
immediately preceded by two scenes of frequent quotation. In the first, Adrian “is trying 
zealously to torment a laugh, or a confession of irritation, out of his hearers,” and displays his 
“peculiarities of the professional joker” (234). He quotes poetry repeatedly: first a Middle 
English poem, which he alters to feature Hippias passing wind; then fragments of Richard’s 
poetry, which he criticizes; and, finally, a fragment of song from A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
which he adapts to suit his moral “all’s game to the poet!” (236 and n.11). Though Adrian has no 
immediate effect on Richard, and thinks Richard has “quite beat him,” later Hippias does pass 
wind, and this inadvertent quotation of Adrian plunges Richard into a laughter that is “like 
madness come upon him” (237, 239). Richard then begins playing the fool himself, translating 
an allegory of Sir Austin’s about the pursuit of the “Golden Bride” into extemporaneous verse, 
which, given Austin’s opinion of poetry, is a deliberate indignity to Austin’s words. The Golden 
Bride evidently signifies not a woman but a state of masculine energy. Observing Richard’s 
excitement, Hippias suggests that Richard has found the Golden Bride, unaware that Richard is 
contemplating securing himself a golden-haired bride presently. The irony intensifies as Richard 
transitions into a recital of Diaper’s love poetry, including the lines “But Beauty’s for the largest 
heart, / And all abysses Love can bridge!” which leaves Hippias, who knows Diaper’s love was 
Austin’s loss, “laugh[ing]; grimly, as men laugh at the emptiness of words” (242). Shortly after, 
Richard learns that his rival Tom Blaize is on his way to marry Lucy, and decides to defy the 
System and marry her himself. Adrian’s foolery, therefore, which exploits the ambivalent status 
of poetry in the text, marks the character of the entire event, including the folly of Richard’s 
impetuous defiance of his father, which is simultaneously wisdom in that it rejects the folly of 
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Sir Austin’s System. 
The Ordeal of Richard Feverel does not affirm Adrian’s values. Curtin sees the end of the 
novel as a denial of the adequacy of comedy, and of Adrian as its representative. He cites 
Adrian’s absence from Lady Blandish’s letter to Austin Wentworth, which constitutes the 
novel’s final chapter (278). This absence is especially significant given Adrian’s final 
appearance. Adrian delivers a cryptic parting prophecy to Richard, who is preparing for his duel 
with Mountfalcon, which he will survive but Lucy will not: “I can no longer witness this painful 
sight, so Good-night, Sir Famish! You may cheat yourself into the belief that you’ve made a 
meal, but depend on it your progeny—and it threatens to be numerous—will cry aloud and rue 
the day” (Meredith, Feverel 479). Then he assures Ripton that he will stop Richard’s duel: “Time 
enough tomorrow. He’s safe enough while he’s here. I’ll stop it tomorrow” (479). Not only does 
Adrian fail to stop the duel, we never learn why, because Blandish does not mention him. He 
goes to bed and vanishes, like Lear’s Fool, who goes to bed at noon and leaves the madness to 
carry on without him; or like a quotation, which summons the will of another’s utterance only to 
banish it again, leaving the reader to assess the dimensions of the rupture, and to leap across it. 
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Chapter Five 
If: Aesthetics and Ideology Revisited 
 
Ethnology, n. [1.] The science that treats of the various tribes of Man, as robbers, 
thieves, swindlers, dunces, lunatics, idiots and ethnologists. [2.] A science 
that recognizes the difference between a Chinaman and a Nigger, but is 
oblivious to the difference between a gentleman and a blackguard. (Bierce, 
“Ethnology,” numerals in original) 
 
1. Wisdom, Folly, and Ethnology 
The Devil’s Dictionary has served implicitly as a structural device for this dissertation. 
Bierce’s lexicographical anatomy of folly illuminates facets of the attitude I take as my subject: 
an ambivalent conception of the human, especially of ethics and intellection, premised on a 
constitutively human propensity for error of various kinds. The epigraph to this chapter being not 
merely illustrative, but also inflammatory, however, I think it necessary to begin the chapter by 
fronting the devil directly. Bierce’s first definition of “ethnology” articulates wise folly from a 
“comfortable corner” like Adrian Harley’s in The Ordeal of Richard Feverel: from this 
perspective all humanity is a pageant of fools and knaves, and Bierce’s clever Menippean twist 
classes the classifier, the ethnologist himself, among them (Meredith 34). The second definition 
exhibits starkly one of the risks of the wise-foolish perspective: a humorous indifference to the 
consequences of folly, an indifference similar to Hans Meyrick’s, which was discussed in 
Chapter Three. The second definition associates ethnology with derogatory racial classification, 
and implies that ethical distinctions are of greater importance than ethnic ones, but does not 
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necessarily challenge the terms it deploys, and quite possibly forgives them. Bierce’s word 
“recognizes” does not clearly distance his lexicographer from the ontological categories 
ostensibly belonging to the ethnologist, though he may mimic them parodically. The attitude of 
wise folly, by rendering definite wisdom inaccessible, can forgive too much. If ethnology itself is 
folly, like the human pursuit of knowledge in general, and if codifying knowledge about peoples 
and cultures is a dead end because the true categories of the human are robbers, thieves, 
swindlers, and so on, then there seems to be no reason to attempt to know others responsibly. 
Real knowledge lies only in the cynic’s universal derogation. Retreating to that cynicism allows 
one to evade or conceal ethical problems, just as Daniel Deronda attempts to compensate for his 
unfavourable opinion of most Jews by thinking ill of Christians proportionately. Misanthropy is 
not necessarily better than more specific prejudice, and can comfortably contain it. 
In Bierce’s two definitions the discourse of wise folly double-voices the discourse of 
ethnology, casting ethnology in a bad light. By stating baldly that ethnology is “A science that 
recognizes the difference between a Chinaman and a Nigger,” Bierce bares the kind of logic that 
Edward Said critiques in Orientalism: the ethnological discourse of Orientalism is premised on 
the inferiority of the other, and generates an archive of knowledge that perpetuates these 
premises. The ideology of wise folly, though it may find expression in satire, is not in itself 
likely to motivate engaged critique like Said’s—it is an ideology of the shrug, Adrian’s most 
characteristic gesture: “Whenever the Wise Youth encountered a mental difficulty he 
instinctively lifted his shoulders to equal altitudes, to show that he had no doubt there was a 
balance in the case,—plenty to be said on both sides, which was the same to him as a definite 
solution” (178). Yet my interest in the practices of wise folly lies not in the ideology of wise 
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folly for its own sake, but in its dialogic functions when performed through writing, especially in 
the realist novel, where this performance is at its most fully developed. 
Rudyard Kipling’s novel Kim enacts, like Bierce’s definition, an encounter between 
ideologies, including ideologies of wise folly and of hegemonic knowledge. Unlike Bierce’s 
definition, Kipling’s narrative renders all means of knowing suspect and all statements of fact 
uncertain. Though Kim does not directly question problematic knowledge claims, it declines to 
offer a stable position from which sure knowledge can be produced, and it dramatizes diverse 
positions and approaches to knowledge in an inconclusive dialogue. Mark Kinkead-Weekes 
reads Kim similarly, as “the product of a peculiar tension between different ways of seeing,” 
though he attempts to resolve this tension and attributes it to Kipling’s fleeting transcendence of 
himself and his allegiances (233). In contrast, I will emphasize the lack of resolution in Kim, the 
openness which creates a space for the reader in all one’s difference from Kipling. Reading 
Kim’s dialogue, one discovers the limits of various claims to knowledge and also to ignorance, 
claims which compete on the field of Kim’s development. Kim’s own position in the dialogue is 
dynamic; it modifies and is modified by the positions of the adults Kim encounters. 
The ways of knowing in the novel can be arranged between two poles. While for Jesse 
Oak Taylor the curator of the Lahore Museum represents an epistemology of “rule” that is based 
on European empiricism and that seeks to generate knowledge about India in order to master it, 
Teshoo Lama represents an epistemology of “liberation” in his Buddhist denial of the substance 
of the phenomenal world (54). Taylor locates Kim in an epistemological “third space” that he 
associates with aestheticism, a space “constituted through sensory perception and delight in the 
‘untranscended materiality’ of the world” (54). This tripartite framework reflects the conflict of 
the novel, in which the young Kim is torn between duty to the India Survey and loyalty to the 
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lama; between his European and native identities; between, crudely, East and West. Yet no one 
in Kim inhabits this structure straightforwardly, especially not Kim, and Taylor’s epistemologies 
of rule and of liberation, though useful as reference points, are both complicated by the narrative. 
Kim uses the resources of wise folly to undertake its critique of knowledge. These 
resources include those we have examined in previous chapters, especially ambivalent gnomic 
utterances, pharmakoi, and a young male protagonist whose education is problematized. The 
purpose of this chapter is, in part, to bring the concerns of the previous chapters to bear on the 
large question underlying this project: how readers, in the aesthetic apprehension of reading, may 
productively negotiate our own ideological distance from discourses, texts, authors, places, 
times, while also apprehending with as much granularity as possible the apparent design of 
works instead of assimilating them to our prior understanding. This question is a version of the 
ethnological one that Kipling and Said both make especially insistent: how does one learn about 
the other without overwriting the other through one’s methods of knowing? Although canonical 
British realist novels are artifacts of the hegemon, and therefore the relationship between a reader 
and such a novel is significantly different from the relationship between an imperial ethnologist 
and a colonized people, there is nevertheless a power differential in the diachronic dialogue of 
reading, in which either the voice of the reader or the voice of the text may drown out the other. 
We will return to the dialogue of reading at the end of this chapter, which also serves as a 
conclusion to the project by reasserting its argument: first, that the realist novel, by virtue of its 
form, enables the negotiation of difference, makes this negotiation part of its design, and is 
therefore capable of participating dialogically in critique instead of merely serving as an object 
for it; and, second, that my statements about the form of realist novels can only ever be 
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expressions of my own aesthetic apprehension, my own readings, shaped by my perception of 
texts and those perceptions which other readers have shared. 
For the following discussion of Kipling, the binary of wisdom and folly will need, once 
again, to be remapped. The story of Kim’s service to the imperial Survey of India concerns the 
specialized knowledge and skills that he acquires and that his fellow agents possess, and in this 
context to be a fool is usually to be ignorant or incompetent—to make poor strategic decisions, 
to lack necessary information, to fail to recognize that lack, to disseminate information tactlessly, 
to blunder. The closest one finds in Kim to a gnomic formulation of the thesis of wise folly is a 
remark made by Mahbub Ali, horse trader and agent of the Survey, as he reflects on his first 
encounter with the British: 
“When first I dealt with Sahibs, . . . I did not know how greatly they were fools, 
and this made me wroth. As thus—” and he told Kim a tale of an expression, 
misused in all innocence, that doubled Kim up with mirth. “Now I see, 
however,”—he exhaled smoke slowly—“that it is with them as with all men—in 
certain matters they are wise, and in others most foolish. Very foolish it is to use 
the wrong word to a stranger; for though the heart may be clean of offence, how is 
the stranger to know that? He is more like to search truth with a dagger.” 
(Kipling, Kim 121)
1
 
Mahbub’s recognition of the mixture of wisdom and folly in “all men” accepts the inevitability 
of folly in order to mitigate it with caution: he is not advocating that one know that one knows 
nothing, but that one know what one doesn’t know. Practising this caution involves being alert to 
cultural and linguistic differences, which are pervasive in the heterogeneous society Kipling 
depicts, and which provide occasions for folly. The narrator himself considers the fact of 
                                                     
1
 Parenthetical citations refer to the Norton edition of Kim. 
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linguistic difference when he omits the offending expression: how could the narrator render the 
expression in mannered English, as he does the rest of Kim and Mahbub’s speech, while 
preserving its error? The alternative would be to render the expression in its original language, 
with or without an explanation for the reader who does not have the requisite linguistic 
knowledge to understand both the intended and the received meanings. By omitting the 
expression, the narrator conspicuously rejects these options, and, excluding all readers from the 
joke that Mahbub and Kim share, imitates the lines that Mahbub is drawing between different 
communities of knowledge. Mahbub advises Kim, “Therefore, in one situate as thou art, it 
particularly behoves thee to remember this with both kinds of faces. Among Sahibs, never 
forgetting thou art a Sahib; among the folk of Hind, always remembering thou art—,” and trails 
off as he realizes he cannot classify Kim’s other face (121). Mahbub’s advice echoes Kipling’s 
chapter epigraph, the first and last stanza of his poem “The Two-Sided Man,” in which the 
speaker thanks “Allah Who gave me two / Separate sides to my head” (111). This imagery of 
doubleness lends itself to articulating the paradox of wise folly, but Mahbub does not quite 
employ it to that end. He implies that it is possible to cultivate different roles, each relying on 
different kinds of insider knowledge, and to choose the best role to play in a particular group.  
Similar advice is provided by Colonel Creighton, an Anglo-Indian ethnologist of the 
Survey and another of Kim’s mentors: “thou art a Sahib and the son of a Sahib. Therefore, do not 
at any time be led to contemn the black men. I have known boys newly entered into the service 
of the Government who feigned not to understand the talk or the customs of black men. Their 
pay was cut for ignorance. There is no sin so great as ignorance. Remember this” (102). I will 
bracket for the moment the import of Creighton’s word “feigned” and note that his assertion 
about the sin of ignorance makes understanding the customs of others into an ethical imperative. 
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As an ethnologist, this understanding is his speciality; as a military officer and an agent of the 
Survey, he employs his understanding in service of imperial intelligence. Creighton embodies the 
collusion between ethnological knowledge and imperial power that Said critiques and the 
“epistemology of rule” that Taylor describes (Said, Introduction 32).  
On a larger scale, Kim itself is ethnological and invites the reader to participate in its 
ethnology, to join the community of knowledge to which Kim, Mahbub, Creighton, Lurgan and 
others belong. Kipling’s Indian fictions seem to offer us the cultural reality of the subcontinent, 
with a persuasiveness of representation that Patrick Williams has termed the “Kipling effect” 
(34). Even Kim, however, generally considered Kipling’s most achieved novel, abounds with 
examples of ethnic stereotypes and stock information from the Orientalist archive, and as Said 
and others have shown, Kipling’s vision of India in Kim is tendentiously distorted. Preoccupied 
with the imperial rivalry between Britain and Russia, for instance, Kim downplays Indian 
resistance to the British.
2
 Yet when the narrator makes the dubious claim that “All hours of the 
twenty-four are alike to Orientals,” he purports to offer acquired knowledge, and additional 
weight accrues to this claim because of the novel’s concern with the acquisition of knowledge 
about categories of persons (Kipling, Kim 26). Like Meredith’s gnomic utterances about Celts, 
Kipling’s assertion extends across the analogy between diegesis and historical reality to stake a 
claim on the reader’s reality, but, unlike Meredith’s gnomes, which remain examples of the witty 
speech that he treats with irony, Kipling’s ethnography is framed and potentially authorized by 
the discipline of ethnology to which Creighton belongs.
3
 On one level Kim seeks to incorporate 
an implied white British reader into this discipline, teaching this reader about India. Said 
suggests Kim “is expressly designed as a novel to show how a white sahib can enjoy life in this 
                                                     
2
 See Edward Said in the Penguin introduction to Kim, Ann Parry, and A. Michael Matin. 
3
 In a notable essay, Noel Annan identifies Kipling’s interest in society, especially as it is composed of “in-groups,” 
as sociological, comparing him to Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Vilfredo Pareto. 
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lush complexity” (Introduction 42). There are things one must understand about the natives, it is 
intimated, lest one commit the sin of ignorance or the kind of folly Mahbub describes. 
Yet it is not simply the possession or lack of knowledge that is of ethical importance in 
this novel. Within the context of the Indian Survey in Kim, right action is a techne, a masterable 
art that entails expert knowledge but is not reducible to sheer knowledge or episteme, and it is 
this techne that occupies the position of wisdom in contrast to the folly that consists in failing to 
master the techne. This disciplinary wisdom is similar to that outlined in Kipling’s poem “If,” 
which defines didactically a series of antithetical capabilities that, exercised in measure, qualify 
the poem’s addressee to “be a Man, my son!” (32). The speaker does not command, “Trust 
yourself when all men doubt you, / But make allowance for their doubting, too.” He posits a 
condition—“If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you, / But make allowance for their 
doubting, too”—and promises a sequel: manhood and ownership of the world (3-4).4 The effect 
is to provide, not a series of maxims, but a portrait of a hypothetical man with certain powers of 
action and reserve, an expert at a certain kind of living.
5
 
At times this ethics looks like that which Socrates perversely advances in the Hippias 
Minor. Treating virtue and wisdom as technai, on analogy with mathematics and crafts, Socrates 
deconstructs Hippias’s distinction between the good man and the bad man. The expert geometer, 
the one most capable of making a true geometrical statement, is also the one most capable of 
making a false geometrical statement, because he knows what is true and what is false. The best 
geometer is also the worst geometer. The most honest man, by the same logic, is also the most 
deceitful man, the one most capable of telling the truth, and therefore of telling a lie; and the 
                                                     
4
 This complication, I think, is part of what makes the speaker of “If” a “better Polonius,” in Catherine Robson’s 
words, or at least a more nuanced one. 
5
 Cf. John Kucich’s discussion of sadomasochistic “magical groups” in Kipling: the disciplined balancing of 
antithetical powers in “If” resembles the configurations of dominance and submission that for Kucich structure the 
omnipotence of the Secret Service (160-68). 
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good man is also the bad man. Because Socrates’s target is Hippias’s easy notion that there is 
such a thing as a categorically honest man like Achilles as opposed to a categorically deceitful 
man like Odysseus, Socrates treats virtue as a matter of the power to do good, ignoring the 
question of whether the one with that power does in fact do good instead of evil, and under what 
circumstances. The argument is a deliberate attempt to drive Hippias to an aporia.
6
 Yet the logic 
of this dialogue, in all its irony, captures something about the way Kipling’s characters judge 
each other. 
When Kim recounts to Mahbub how he twice made use of his foreknowledge of the 
Second Afghan War to impress an audience, Mahbub declares, “That was foolishness. . . . News 
is not meant to be thrown about like dung-cakes, but used sparingly—like bhang” (Kim 114). 
Kim concurs, “So I think now, and moreover, it did me no sort of good. But that was very long 
ago” (115). Kim is learning the necessity, not only of knowing, but of expertise in knowing. Yet 
Kim then proceeds to enact, wilfully, exactly the kind of foolishness Mahbub will later describe 
in the same chapter, the foolishness of using the wrong word in the wrong company: 
   “They say at Nucklao that no Sahib must tell a black man that he has made a 
fault.” 
   Mahbub’s hand shot into his bosom, for to call a Pathan a “black man” (kala 
admi) is a blood-insult. Then he remembered and laughed. “Speak, Sahib. Thy 
black man hears.” (115) 
In this case Kipling provides the Hindi-Urdu term along with its translation, informing the reader 
of Kim’s exact infraction. Like the mysterious “expression, misused in all innocence” in 
Mahbub’s anecdote, “kala admi” nearly provokes violence (121). What prevents this violence is 
                                                     
6
 See R. E. Allen’s analysis of the Hippias Minor as a reductio ad absurdum of the notion of virtue as techne (Plato 
25-29). 
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Kim’s guilt, not his innocence. Kim knows that Mahbub knows that Kim knows better; he trusts 
Mahbub to “remember” that he is not an ignorant or insulting sahib, merely acting like one, and 
Mahbub’s remembering transmutes the insult into an impertinent joke. Kim goes on to say, “But 
. . . I am not a Sahib” (115). There is an ironic echo in this exchange of Creighton’s advice “do 
not at any time be led to contemn the black men,” which, because Creighton speaks it in Urdu, 
may well contain the same term that Kim uses to taunt Mahbub—the injunction against 
contempt, in a certain context, is an expression of contempt (102). Kim’s mastery of cultural 
performance looks like the sin of ignorance: he “feign[s] not to understand . . . the customs of 
black men” (102). Yet Creighton cannot possibly mean that it is wrong simply to pretend to be 
ignorant: feigning is not the problem. Shortly after delivering this advice Creighton chides Kim 
for alluding to an earlier exploit by saying, “Much is gained by forgetting, little brother” (102). 
The maximatic language of Kim’s mentors tends to coagulate into isolated gnomic puzzles 
instead of blending into a coherent system of principles, and one way to perceive the coherence 
underlying Kim’s imperial education is to recognize its similarity to the hypothetical technology 
of manhood in “If.” If Kim can know but not be blind with knowing, and know when it is better 
to forget, he will be the kind of man the agents of the Survey want him to be. If he cannot, he 
will be a fool. 
 
2. Playing the Game 
Kim’s taunting of Mahbub does not in itself exemplify the novel’s questioning of 
knowledge: the incident is premised on a fact about Pathans, which the narrator steps in to 
explain in his ethnographic voice. The ethics I have outlined is comparatively stable, deploying 
the poles of wisdom and folly with complexity, but without the vertigo that wise folly requires. 
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Yet the incident helps us to perceive a space between knowing and the performance of knowing, 
which allows the performance to come loose from questions of knowledge, to become more 
important than knowledge itself. For instance, though ethnology does function directly as a 
discourse of power in Kim, it is also a ruse that allows Creighton to play the “very foolish Sahib, 
who is a Colonel Sahib without a regiment” (100). Creighton uses knowledge to seem foolish, to 
disguise his political power as an agent of the Survey by seeming to be a mere scholar, and the 
status of the ethnological knowledge itself is accordingly ambiguous. Creighton’s ethnological 
comment to Father Victor about Kim’s “Red Bull” fetish, for example, does not simply cast Kim 
as an object of knowledge. Father Victor not being part of the secret service, Creighton must give 
Victor a plausible alternative explanation for his investment in Kim: 
   “You see, as an ethnologist, the thing’s very interesting to me. I’d like to make a 
note of it for some Government work that I’m doing. The transformation of a 
regimental badge like your Red Bull into a sort of fetish that the boy follows is 
very interesting.” 
   “But I can’t thank you enough.” 
   “There’s one thing you can do. All we Ethnological men are as jealous as 
jackdaws of one another’s discoveries. They’re of no interest to anyone but 
ourselves, of course, but you know what book-collectors are like. Well, don’t say 
a word, directly or indirectly, about the Asiatic side of the boy’s character—his 
adventures and his prophecy, and so on. I’ll worm them out of the boy later on 
and—you see?” 
   “I do. Ye’ll make a wonderful account of it. Never a word will I say to anyone 
till I see it in print.” 
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   “Thank you. That goes straight to an ethnologist’s heart.” (97) 
The joke here is that Father Victor will never see anything about Kim in print—not by 
Creighton, at least. Creighton is performing ethnology in order to secure Victor’s discretion 
without telling him anything. The pleonastic “sort of” and the repetition of “very interesting” 
suggest a pedantic mannerism, and Creighton identifies himself as an ethnologist three times. In 
a move that resembles Bierce’s, he also makes a statement about ethnologists that is similar in 
form to an ethnological statement and that relies on similar epistemological assumptions: “All 
we Ethnological men are jealous as jackdaws” claims total knowledge of a group in much the 
same way “All the hours of the twenty-four are alike to Orientals” does. Creighton inhabits the 
category of the known that he has invoked, and then invites Victor into the knowing community 
he has thereby invented: “you know what book-collectors are like.” Creighton thus authors, 
authorizes, and disseminates knowledge about himself in order to trick Victor into thinking he 
knows something. Creighton the spy creates Creighton the ethnologist by deploying the 
discourse of ethnology deceptively. 
When a text represents a character being duped, it arms the reader against similar 
mistakes. This episode renders the language of ethnology opaque, preparing us to see it as a tool 
that can be turned to ends other than its usual ones. Of course, in performing ethnology 
Creighton really does ethnology, just as Mahbub Ali really sells horses and Lurgan Sahib really 
nurses gems. In a rare foray into Creighton’s consciousness, the narrator confirms that Creighton 
is genuinely invested in ethnology for its own sake and aspires to be a Fellow of the Royal 
Society. The narrator also suggests, however, that this ambition is comically misdirected, that 
Creighton is “bombard[ing]” the wrong organization with “monographs on strange Asiatic cults 
and unknown customs”: “By all right and reason, it was the Royal Geographical that should have 
 
 
180 
 
appealed to him, but men are as chancy as children in their choice of playthings” (148). Such a 
statement does not altogether take Creighton seriously, despite Said’s reading of the character, 
and the humour at Creighton’s expense reinforces the difference between his desire for 
ethnological knowledge and his performance of ethnological discourse (Introduction 33). 
Furthermore, the narrator infantilizes Creighton through a kind of knowledge akin to the 
Colonel’s, a categorical knowledge of children and their ways from which the narrator fashions 
an aphorism that claims knowledge of men, including Creighton. Throughout the narrative, the 
narrator surveys the land that Kim traverses, describing it and sharing information about it, 
making claims to knowledge of Indian traits that draw from and contribute to the Orientalist 
archive, and in this way the narrator is analogous to Creighton. The narrator is not allied with 
Creighton in the novel’s dialogue, however, and in this instance employs a discourse similar in 
form to Creighton’s, with similar epistemological assumptions, in order to create distance from 
Creighton and his ethnology. 
The rulers’ way of knowing is not inherently an epistemology of rule. Nor is it theirs 
alone. Proverbs, for example, form a parallel discourse, one more frequently associated with 
native wisdom. Often the proverbs concern the nature of races or castes, which makes them 
nearly identical in form to ethnological statements: “Never speak to a white man till he is fed” 
(Kipling, Kim 72). Proverbs can thus consolidate power much as ethnological claims do. The 
men in the dowager’s escort exchange proverbs while addressing Kim. The first man says, “Only 
the devils and the English walk to and fro without reason,” and the second responds, “Never 
make friends with the Devil, a Monkey, or a Boy. No man knows what they will do next” (69). 
Kim is not impressed: “Kim turned a scornful back—he did not want to hear the old story how 
the Devil played with the boys and repented of it—and walked idly across country” (69). Kim is 
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“cast[ing] about for means of amusement” (68). He is playing. The men, meanwhile, are 
undertaking a mastering of children through adult knowledge that operates on similar 
assumptions and through similar mechanisms to the mastering of “the Orient” through European 
knowledge.
7
 The second man expresses the very unpredictability of Kim in order to ascribe it to 
his age and gender, to make it knowledge and therefore predictable: Kim plays because he is a 
boy. The man’s remarks about Kim resemble the Reverend Bennett’s about Teshoo Lama, 
although Bennett uses the categories of Orientalism, not of age: “My experience is that one can 
never fathom the Oriental mind” (77). This is a paradoxical claim to mastery over the “Oriental 
mind”: if Bennett knows it is unfathomable then he has, in a sense, fathomed it.8 Creighton 
himself says, “The more one knows about natives the less can one say what they will or won’t 
do” (96). On one hand, this claim functions much like Bennett’s. To know the native is to know 
that the native is unpredictable. Father Victor, however, takes the aphorism as an admission of 
ignorance, replying, “That’s consolin’—from the head of the Ethnological Survey” (96). Kipling 
does not foreclose the possibility that Creighton’s knowledge is genuinely limited; that, as it 
becomes ever more certain, it becomes ever less applicable. 
In scorning the guards’ proverbial generalizations, Kim seems to be aware of their 
function. His response, turning and walking away, is a suitably nonverbal rebuttal, a gestural 
escape from a knowing discourse. Although it does not follow that the novel’s other 
generalizations about boys are ironic, this scene stages Kim’s resistance to a discourse of 
knowledge that other characters, including the narrator, employ. The narrator tells us, “Boylike, 
                                                     
7
 See Sue Walsh, who traces this analogy in post-colonial criticism and complicates it (30-50). 
8
 Sara Suleri points out a similar paradox in her critique of “alteritism” in colonial studies: “Once the disturbing 
centrality of alterity has been established as a key area of interpretative concern, a rehearsal of its protean 
manifestations leads to a theoretical repetitiveness that finally entrenches rather than displaces the rigidity of the 
self/other binarism governing traditional discourse on colonialism” (11); “Much like the category of the exotic in the 
colonial narratives of the prior century, contemporary critical theory names the other in order that it need not be 
further known” (13). 
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if an acquaintance had a scheme, Kim was quite ready with one of his own; and, boylike, he had 
really thought for as much as twenty minutes at a time of his father’s prophecy” (17). As Kim 
eludes the categories applied to him throughout the narrative, failing continually to be fully 
explicable, he reveals that the category of “boy” is more stable and knowable than the 
individuals it encompasses. 
Proverbs are not always tools of mastery in Kim, however: they can also establish 
community. The Jat farmer Kim encounters embraces his proverbial identity. When the farmer 
wishes to repay Kim for treating his sick son, Kim recites to him the proverb of the Jat and the 
King’s elephants: “The Jat stood on his dunghill and the King’s elephants went by. ‘O driver,’ 
said he, ‘what will you sell those little donkeys for?’” (159). Instead of making a general 
ethnological claim, this proverb aims to communicate knowledge about a caste by deploying a 
type character allegorically. It implies that Jats overstate their means and understate the value of 
what they seek to purchase. The Jat responds with “a roar of laughter”: “It is the saying of my 
own country—the very talk of it. So are we Jats all” (159). Kim wins over the farmer by 
demonstrating that he knows him in the same way the Jat and his community ostensibly know 
themselves. 
Similarly when R17, alias Hurree Chunder Mookerjee, says, “I am Bengali—a fearful 
man,” Kim replies with a proverb that appears to confirm Hurree’s admission: “God made the 
Hare and the Bengali. What shame?” (187). Fearful, obese, oily, officious, hypocritical, 
malapropist, and excessively proud of his British education, Hurree instantiates a stereotype of 
the comic Bengali babu. He is citing part of this stereotype, though, whenever he refers to 
himself as fearful, which suggests that to some degree he chooses to be what he is, making use of 
the proverbial knowledge that exists about him. When Kim warns him to use English more 
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discreetly, Hurree says, “I am only Babu showing off my English to you. All we Babus talk 
English to show off,” and “fling[s] his shoulder-cloth jauntily” (154). Said, acknowledging that 
Hurree is intelligent, skilled at his work, even “lovable and admirable,” writes that “there 
remains in Kipling’s portrait of him the grimacing stereotype of the ontologically funny native, 
hopelessly trying to be like ‘us’” (Introduction 33). Precisely because Hurree is such a good 
agent, however, ontology is difficult to isolate from performance. U. C. Knoepflmacher 
discusses Hurree’s “consummate skills as a confidence man” in his encounter with the two spies 
from Russia: Hurree knows the spies expect a babu to represent the “monstrous hybridism of 
East and West,” so he gives them exactly that (Knoepflmacher 923; Kipling, Kim 199). He 
pretends to get drunk and “thickly treasonous,” “sp[eaking] in terms of sweeping indecency of a 
Government which had forced upon him a white man’s education and neglected to supply him 
with a white man’s salary” (198). After Hurree, all deference, leads the spies on a trek through 
the Himalayan foothills that ensures their cover is blown, we find him, “all Babudom laid aside, 
smoking at noon on a cot” (223). 
Still, as Walsh notes, Hurree’s character is not entirely a performance (27). He can walk 
great distances over hills and through “a storm to which nine Englishmen out of ten would have 
given full right of way,” but his girth and oily skin are repeatedly emphasized to create physical 
humour (Kipling, Kim 197). His English is clumsy even in his own narrated consciousness. His 
ostensible agnosticism and his invocations of Herbert Spencer thinly disguise his belief in the 
occult. Perhaps Kim best expresses the paradox of Hurree: “He tricked them [the spies]. He lied 
to them like a Bengali. They give him a chit (a testimonial). He makes them a mock at the risk of 
his life—I never would have gone down to them after the pistol-shots—and then he says he is a 
fearful man . . . And he is a fearful man” (234, ellipses and italics in original). Indeed, Hurree 
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first approaches the spies with “a heart beating against his tonsils” (197). The ellipsis in Kim’s 
thought suggests that he is struggling to reconcile the falsehood and the truth of Hurree’s 
repeated admissions of fearfulness: the Babu is fearful, but his fearfulness is simultaneously an 
act that he uses to disguise his real capacity for bravery. With the phrase “lied . . . like a 
Bengali,” Kim attempts to fall back on stereotype, but the stereotypes that Hurree enacts have 
now become irreconcilable. 
As Hurree shows us, knowledge claims in Kim can be used performatively while also 
happening sometimes and in some ways to be true. Walsh argues that the irony of Hurree’s 
characterization creates radically different possibilities for interpretation, “mak[ing] it difficult to 
read Hurree as simply lying” but “demand[ing] a conception of language in which words do not 
necessarily mean what they say” (26, 28). We are likely to differ from Kipling in judging what 
constitutes true knowledge, but Kim tends to encourage a critical approach to knowledge and 
claims to knowledge more than it tends to establish particular truths. The narrator will 
occasionally present blatant misinformation and expect us to recognize it as such. For instance, 
the narrator describes Hurree’s drunken spectacle as it would have appeared to the spies. There is 
no explicit sign that he is only pretending until he collapses under a tree and a brief foray into his 
thoughts reveals that he is not really unconscious. When he awakens we are told “he was racked 
with a headache—penitent, and volubly afraid that in his drunkenness he might have been 
indiscreet,” and we understand that he is “present[ing] himself” as if this were the case (Kipling, 
Kim 199). Likewise, when Mahbub Ali visits a prostitute after giving Kim an incriminating 
document, the narrator says: 
It was an utterly foolish thing to do; because they [Mahbub and the woman] fell to 
drinking perfumed brandy against the Law of the Prophet, and Mahbub grew 
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wonderfully drunk, and the gates of his mouth were loosened, and he pursued the 
Flower of Delight with the feet of intoxication till he fell flat among the cushions, 
where the Flower of Delight, aided by a smooth-faced Kashmiri pundit, searched 
him from head to foot most thoroughly. (23) 
 Only after Mahbub has awakened is it revealed that he has orchestrated the scene: “Asiatics,” 
the narrator announces, “do not wink when they have outmanoeuvred an enemy, but . . . Mahbub 
Ali . . . came very near to it” (24). Having found no document, Mahbub’s enemies conclude he is 
not the man they are looking for, which is evidently what Mahbub planned all along to 
accomplish by his “foolish” conduct. With the reference to a wink that does not occur, I suggest, 
the narrator winks at the reader. Kipling’s misleading narration encourages us to suspect direct 
statements of fact, to question our knowledge about characters, and to be prepared to revise this 
knowledge. 
We have seen that various discourses of knowledge, including proverbial and 
ethnological dicta, can emerge from an epistemology that allows sure knowledge of stable 
categories; that characters may use these discourses to assert mastery over others, but also to 
establish or disguise their own identity; and that the function of these discourses is distinct from 
their truth value. Such discourses are integral to the Great Game in Kim, the struggle between 
Britain and Russia for information about and, ultimately, imperial possession of India. As the 
metaphor of the game suggests, bodies of knowledge about races, castes, and religions become a 
firm framework, a set of rules binding the activities of each side. Kim plays the game of 
“dressing-up” with Lurgan in preparation for the greater game: “Lurgan Sahib . . . would explain 
by the half-hour together how such and such a caste talked, or walked, or coughed, or spat, or 
sneezed, and, since ‘hows’ matter little in this world, the ‘why’ of everything” (134). Such 
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detailed knowledge may, of course, be based on valid observations and explanations, but it is the 
total structure of knowledge claims and their underlying epistemology that compose the Great 
Game. 
Through the lens of the Game, Kipling presents a vision of India as a chess board and of 
its inhabitants as pieces with precisely defined attributes. Playing the game requires knowing 
these attributes, understanding the rules. Yet there are no players who are not themselves subject 
to the rules—these pieces move themselves and each other. As Don Randall argues in his 
Foucauldian reading of the Great Game, “Disciplinary power does not flow vectorally from the 
upper to the lower echelons of the social body. It is relayed through a multiplicity of subjects; it 
circulates through all social levels. In a social context such as one finds in Kim, the disciplines 
may serve, therefore, to enable transgressions of the power divide inscribed by imperialist 
intervention, may serve to unbalance the dyad of dominance and submission” (134). I am 
arguing, similarly, that though the Game is a product of the empire its rules are administered not 
from above but through the structure and epistemology of the Game. Imperial discourses of 
knowledge form this structure, as do local discourses of knowledge based on ethnic, social, and 
religious categories. Kim clearly perceives the resulting machinery after the Russian spy strikes 
the lama, thereby enraging Kim and scattering the Hillmen: “this collapse of their Great Game 
(Kim wondered to whom they would report it), this panicky bolt into the night, had come about 
through no craft of Hurree’s or contrivance of Kim’s, but simply, beautifully, and inevitably as 
the capture of Mahbub’s faquir-friends by the zealous young policeman at Umballa” (Kipling, 
Kim 207). Recall that the capture of the fake faquirs is not altogether an accident: Mahbub, 
knowing an English official would investigate the threat of a theft, simply intimates the threat of 
a theft to an English official. The beautiful inevitability is not a providence but the consequence 
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of everybody performing their social, political, and cultural roles as expected. Kim finally tires 
of this game world when he and the lama return from the Hills, wishing that “someone duly 
authorized would only take delivery” of the documents he has acquired from the Russian spies; 
then “the Great Game might play itself for aught he then cared” (225). Surely it would continue 
to do so. 
Play in Kim is hard to separate from work and education. Kim’s time in the barracks 
school is work, but appears to him to be without purpose or form: “The man explained 
something or other with white lines on a black board for at least half an hour, and Kim continued 
his interrupted nap” (86); “the schoolmaster caught him after breakfast, thrust a page of 
meaningless characters under his nose, gave them senseless [names], and whacked him without 
reason” (91). On the other hand, when the schoolmaster orders Kim to play, Kim promptly runs 
off and dictates a letter to the lama, which appears to be a far more productive activity than 
schoolwork was. Kim plays the jewel game with Lurgan to hone his memory for details, or the 
game of “dressing-up” to learn how to disguise himself. Kim’s natural mimicry suggests that 
Lurgan’s dress-up game is merely a supervised and more intensive version of an activity Kim 
has always enjoyed: he is always playing, always learning, whether or not he is working. At the 
start of the novel, Kim is already a messenger for Mahbub Ali, already a player in the Great 
Game. And he already seems to have mastered imperial knowledge of the world. His play on 
Zam-Zammah re-enacts his version of history and defines for him his Muslim and Hindu 
companions: “All Mussalmans fell off Zam-Zammah long ago!”; “The Hindus fell off Zam-
Zammah too” (6). Similarly, Kim’s seemingly innate misogyny seems to be something he has 
picked up from Mahbub. When Mahbub assigns Kim the mission of delivering a message to 
Creighton, Kim thinks, “Surely there is a woman behind this” (25). The narrator’s claim that 
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“Kim’s limitations were as curious and sudden as his expansions” seems generally to be true: we 
cannot account for the origin of many of his assumptions and beliefs (73). 
 The narrator balks attempts to construct a narrative of Kim’s intellectual development by 
twice eliding details of Kim’s education at St. Xavier’s. He writes: “The country-born and bred 
boy has his own manners and customs, which do not resemble those of any other land; and his 
teachers approach him by roads which an English master would not understand. Therefore, you 
would scarcely be interested in Kim’s experiences as a St. Xavier’s boy among two or three 
hundred precocious youths, most of whom had never seen the sea” (105). And, later: “The record 
of a boy’s education interests few save his parents, and, as you know, Kim was an orphan. It is 
written in the books of St Xavier’s in Partibus that a report of Kim’s progress was forwarded at 
the end of each term to Colonel Creighton and to Father Victor” (138-39). On both occasions the 
narrator addresses us directly, a rare device in this novel, and defines for us the limits of our 
desire to know. Since Kim’s education is so central to the novel, there would seem to be some 
teasing going on here. Furthermore, with the reference to the “books of St Xavier’s,” the 
narrator’s knowledge also appears limited; the narrator is seen to be a human collecting 
documentary evidence, and after Kim passes his surveying exam at the age of fifteen, the “record 
is silent” (139). 
What Kim seems most to gain from his formal education, aside from discretion, literacy, 
various practical skills, and a better mastery of categorical knowledge than he already had, is an 
awareness of the power that knowledge enables. Kim grasps the logic of St Xavier’s: “One must 
never forget that one is a Sahib, and that some day, when examinations are passed, one will 
command natives. Kim made a note of this, for he began to understand where examinations led” 
(107). As Kim learns the imperial epistemology, he also learns its function, which he notes, but 
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neither condemns nor approves. The lack of judgment here is both crucial and representative, 
because Kim through most of the novel does not express an opinion of the Game. In fact, his 
reasons for playing it at all are only rarely apparent. At the beginning of the novel, before Kim 
even knows what the Game is aside from a general kind of “intrigue,” “what he loved was the 
game for its own sake” (5). Later, other motives develop: after Kim taunts Mahbub with the 
phrase “kala admi,” he says, “I see my road all clear before me to a good service” (115). Kim’s 
loyalty to this service is itself motivated to a degree by “the clean pride (it can be a deadly pitfall, 
none the less) of Departmental praise—ensnaring praise from an equal of work appreciated by 
fellow-workers” (184). Kim is also clearly motivated by an affection for his superiors in the 
service and, especially, for the lama, who funds his education. Finally, he  
“play[s] for larger things [than money]—the sheer excitement and the sense of power” (43). At 
no point, however, does Kim conceive of his activity as politically purposeful. He is impressed 
by the scope of the Game and wants to play it well, but he acknowledges no investment in its 
outcome. As Said writes, “for Kim the Great Game cannot be perceived in all its complex 
patterns, although it can be fully enjoyed as a sort of extended prank. The scenes where Kim 
banters, bargains, repartees with his elders, friendly and hostile alike, are indications of Kipling’s 
seemingly inexhaustible fund of boyish enjoyment in the sheer momentary pleasure of playing a 
game, any sort of game” (Introduction 13, my italics). Said’s shift from Kim’s play to Kipling’s 
suggests the way that Kim, the other agents of the Survey, their author, and the reader who 
receives the author’s ethnography might collude in creating and perpetuating the Game’s 
structure of knowledge within both the diegesis and the historical reality to which it is 
analogized. It is part of the wise folly of Kim, however, that play is also the means of undoing the 
discursive work of the Game. 
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3. Ignorance, Indifference, Irresponsibility 
In order to place Kim’s play in a context different from that of the Game, it will be 
necessary to examine the alternatives to the Game’s structure of knowledge. Teshoo Lama 
represents one, espousing an epistemology predicated on his own ideology of ignorance. For the 
lama true ignorance—not willful disregard for knowledge or sham forgetting but the failure to 
know—is a consequence of being bound to the Wheel of Things, to phenomenal existence. The 
statement of the lama’s quest is an admission of ignorance that makes the quest possible: “I 
know nothing—nothing do I know[—]but I go to free myself from the Wheel of Things by a 
broad and open road” (Kipling, Kim 11).9 Only seemingly redundant, the antimetabole suggests 
both a lack of knowledge in the subject and a lack of substance in the object. The lama is a figure 
of blessed and unpretending limitation, and his discourse of ignorance tends to erode the 
discourses of knowledge he encounters. Barbara Black does not give him enough credit when 
she focuses on the lama’s submission to the curator of the Lahore Museum: “In the Wonder 
House, wise man meets wise man; lama confronts curator, and the lama must concede to the 
wiser man” (241). When the lama prostrates himself before the curator, he asks: “Surely thou 
must know? See, I am an old man! I ask with my head between thy feet, O Fountain of Wisdom. 
We know He drew the bow! We know the arrow fell! We know the stream gushed! Where, then, 
is the River? My dream told me to find it. So I came. I am here. But where is the River?” 
(Kipling, Kim 12). The reiteration of “know” marks this as an uncharacteristic moment of 
weakness for the lama, whose desire to find the River has caused him to forget his deliberate 
acceptance of ignorance. The lama soon realizes that the curator also does not know where the 
River is and he re-asserts their similarity: “We are both bound, thou and I, my brother” (14). 
Although the lama considers his lamasery’s books to be “dried pith,” and seems more impressed 
                                                     
9
 The Norton edition omits the hyphen. I follow the Penguin in including it. 
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by the collection in the museum, he ultimately shows these records to be no better for his 
purposes (11). The lama seeks not the knowledge of the Europeans but that “which they have not 
sought out,” that which the Curator also does not know (11). He quests beyond the compass of 
ethnological knowledge, and, eventually, beyond the circumference of the Wheel of Things. 
Furthermore, the lama denies the existence of the categories that enable the kind of 
knowledge on which the Great Game depends, including knowledge of caste. When the lama 
sees the market-gardener, an Arain, he judges the man based on his appearance (not a difficult 
judgment—the “angry” man is “brandish[ing] a bamboo pole” at Kim and the lama): “‘Such an 
one,’ said the lama, disregarding the dogs, ‘is impolite to strangers, intemperate of speech and 
uncharitable. Be warned by his demeanour, my disciple’” (39). Kim translates this sentence into 
the language with which he is familiar: “thou hast said he was low-caste and discourteous” (39). 
But the imposition of the category is Kim’s and the lama corrects him: “Low-caste I did not say, 
for how can that be which is not? Afterwards he amended his discourtesy, and I forgot the 
offense” (39). At first the lama does unequivocally discriminate between man and woman, 
refusing on principle to speak to the women on the train to Umballa, but this is a behavior he is 
quick to amend. The thrust of the lama’s faith is away from the world, social and ethnic 
categories, knowledge, and the trappings of religion. When he raises his pen case to strike the 
Russian who has torn his image of the Wheel of Things, he knows he strays grievously from his 
Way, and stops himself. 
The lama’s inconsistencies can be attributed to what he himself sees as his imperfections 
and to a set of practices that he subjects to revision. A more substantial problem with the lama’s 
quest and its epistemology of ignorance is his difficulty engaging with the phenomenal world 
that he has not yet escaped, which is suggested when he passes unseeing through the human 
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bustle of the Grand Trunk Road. The River of the Arrow that the lama seeks may be just a story, 
as the Curator implies when he responds to the lama’s account of the River by “sadly” saying 
“So it is written” (12). There is always the possibility in Kim that the lama is merely lost in a 
fantasy. Most characters consider him benignly mad, including Kim, who loves him anyway. 
This appearance of madness results from the lama’s disengagement from a world where 
knowledge is possible, where it is possible to verify whether he has achieved enlightenment and 
found his River at the end of the story or merely lost his mind and jumped into a brook. 
The lama’s ideology occupies the position of the pharmakos, the sacrificed and excluded 
other, with respect to the ideology of the imperial agents, especially if one reads the narrative 
rhetoric as finally aligning itself with the empire. The lama’s commitments are fundamentally 
anti-ontological, while the imperial epistemology is committed to a categorical ontology, even if 
that ontology seems sometimes to be an excuse for performative play. The lama therefore 
illustrates the possibility of cutting the ties between appearances and the world—more precisely, 
of becoming disinterested in the world of appearances, the Wheel of Things, or, in a term the 
lama uses once to describe the teleological unfolding of events, the “Chain of Things” (177). 
This phrase echoes the occupation for which Kim is ostensibly being groomed, that of chain-man 
in the India Survey, responsible for measuring with chains the world whose chains the lama 
seeks to escape. In the lama’s case, however, disinterest is also uninterest, and he is mostly an 
unplayful figure. One exception is the competitive streak he displays in the Himalayan foothills, 
where he proves much surer of foot than Kim; this is one of Teshoo’s lapses, of which he later 
repents. Another exception is the delight he sometimes takes in the forms of his devotion. The 
description of the lama when he begins his ritual drawing of an image of the Wheel conjoins the 
language of childhood and the language of play: “simply as a child engrossed with a new game, 
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the lama threw back his head and began the full-throated invocation of the Doctor of Divinity ere 
he opens the full doctrine” (201). Yet this play, too, is troubling within the lama’s ideological 
framework, because it is implicated in his attachment to the image he draws, an attachment that 
nearly motivates him to violence when the Russian damages the image, and thereby provokes the 
lama’s most serious crisis of conscience. 
The lama’s cultivated ignorance, however, is neither the mode of (not) knowing which 
the novel affirms nor the only alternative to the Great Game’s mode of knowing. There is a 
discourse of description in the novel’s dialogue unlike either the positive discourse of categorical 
knowledge or the negative discourse of ignorance. Taylor associates the “third space” between 
the empire’s and the lama’s epistemologies with fin-de-siècle aestheticism. The middle space I 
am identifying has less to do with the cultivated identities of aestheticism as a local historical 
phenomenon, but is aesthetic in that it is the space of the aesthetic judgment in the Kantian sense 
elucidated by Jonathan Loesberg in A Return to Aesthetics. Kim occasionally regards the world 
through a mode of strictly aesthetic apprehension, concerned with the appearance of the world as 
it is presented to him rather than with ontology, real purposes, or knowledge. One such aesthetic 
moment occurs during a dialogue between the old Rissaldar soldier and the lama about the 
Revolt of 1857. The dialogue itself is important here because some of the key discourses we 
have already seen intersect within it, so I will consider first how Kim’s aesthetic apprehension is 
framed by this dialogue. 
Seeing the soldier’s weapon, the lama asks, “why the sword?” and the soldier, “as 
abashed as a child interrupted in his game of make-believe,” replies, “Oh, that was a fancy of 
mine—an old man’s fancy. Truly the police orders are that no man must bear weapons 
throughout Hind, but . . . all the constabeels hereabout know me” (47). We have seen the narrator 
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compare both Creighton and Teshoo Lama to children, and the narrator describes the lama as 
childlike on several other occasions. The lama himself says to Kim in apology for his 
impatience, “Surely old folk are as children” (163). These intersections between the narrator’s 
discourse and the lama’s allow the narrator to suggest the lama’s point of view. To the lama, the 
soldier’s weapon is a toy and his military merit is empty: “That strength is weakness” (49). 
Ignorant of the details of the Revolt and hearing the soldier speak of “the land from Delhi south 
awash with blood,” the lama asks, “What madness was that, then?” (47). The soldier’s loyalties 
are with the British, and he agrees that the Revolt was madness, but his reasons differ from the 
lama’s. The soldier’s reasons are political, while the lama is turning the word “madness,” so 
often applied to him, against the strife of a world that to him is illusory. Just as the lama’s quest 
is madness when viewed from outside, from his perspective political strife—any political 
strife—is madness. War depends on categories that do not exist to him. 
This dialogue, with its references to children, play, and madness, encapsulates the tension 
between the lama’s epistemology and that of the soldier or the spies, who all participate in the 
Great Game for control of India. The meaning of the Great Game hinges on this dialogue, which 
brings out a suggestion of mere play in the ostensibly adult Game. Who is mad, childish, or 
playing? The lama who quests for a possibly imaginary river? Creighton and his associates who 
map India, draw lines, codify people, and generate knowledge? The aging Indian officer who 
romantically clings to the sword he used in service of the colonial power? Crucially, this 
question is not answered by the dialogue between the lama and the soldier, which does not reach 
a resolution but instead trails off, yielding to Kim’s aesthetic moment. This moment centres on 
an actual child who appears on the scene as if conjured by the soldier’s infantilization: 
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The lama’s voice faltered—the periods lengthened. Kim was busy watching a 
grey squirrel. When the little scolding bunch of fur, close pressed to the branch, 
disappeared, preacher and audience were fast asleep, the old officer’s strong-cut 
head pillowed on his arm, the lama’s thrown back against the tree-bole, where it 
showed like yellow ivory. A naked child toddled up, stared, and, moved by some 
quick impulse of reverence, made a solemn little obeisance before the lama—only 
the child was so short and fat that it toppled over sideways, and Kim laughed at 
the sprawling, chubby legs. (49-50) 
Kipling emphasizes the appearance of the bodies of his characters in this passage: the “strong-cut 
head” of the soldier, the “yellow ivory” head of the lama, the “sprawling, chubby legs” of the 
“naked child.” Significantly, Kim is not listening to the lama; he is “busy” watching first the grey 
squirrel and then the child. The “sprawling, chubby legs” and the “scolding bunch of fur” are not 
incidental synecdoche: these descriptions communicate the specificity of Kim’s attention. Kim is 
apprehending details, not categories or purposes, and his laughter at those chubby legs suggests a 
less knowing kind of play than his conquest of Zam-Zammah at the beginning of the novel or 
any of his imperial training. The material details of this scene fill the space of the lama’s silence. 
The crucial dialogue yields to the biological necessity of sleep and, on Kim’s part, the sheer 
pleasure of observing the phenomenal world. Later, just as the child and squirrel disarticulate 
into legs and fur, the classes of people on the Grand Trunk Road become patches of colour to 
Kim: “It was . . . beautiful to watch the people, little clumps of red and blue and pink and white 
and saffron, turning aside to go to their own villages, dispersing and growing small by twos and 
threes across the level plain. Kim felt these things, though he could not give tongue to his 
feelings, and so contented himself with buying peeled sugar-cane and spitting the pith generously 
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about his path” (56). Although Satya Mohanty has stressed the social knowledge that enables 
Kim to identify various classes and professions on the Road, and Kim does do this, what we see 
at this point is not a young sahib categorizing, knowing, and mastering what he sees (319). 
Kim’s inability to articulate the beauty that the narrator expresses for him suggests that Kim’s 
aesthetic encounters with the phenomenal world resist the reifications of language. 
 The word “beautiful” is a sign of the Kantian charge in this passage, but it is the aesthetic 
judgment itself, not the result of the judgment, that is relevant to the practices of knowing I have 
been describing. In Loesberg’s view, the aesthetic is a mode of apprehending the world as if it 
were designed, with indifference to ontological or metaphysical questions of its actual existence 
or purposes, and is therefore the grounds of reading, interpreting, and theorizing. He explains the 
function of this indifference with reference to Kant’s examples: 
Hearing a bird’s song or seeing the palace or the ocean, we must identify it as a 
bird’s song, a palace, or the ocean to get the effect of seeing purposiveness, and so 
we cannot see any of those objects without any regard to their concepts. But in 
attributing gladsomeness to the song, we surely are also not drawing conclusions 
about its natural causes, about any real meaning it might have, about what the bird 
or even a more primary creator might intend. In this sense, we attend to its surface 
appearance, to which we attribute meaning, rather than to the conditions of its 
existence. And caring, as we do, for the attributed significance rather than for the 
actual causes of the song, in this sense, we are indifferent to its existence. (107, 
author’s emphasis) 
 It may appear that what I have been painting as a novelistic dialogue between two 
epistemologies is about to turn out to be a dialectic, with the aesthetic as the third term. The 
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gnomic modes of knowing, including imperial ethnology and proverbial wisdom, require an 
expert ability to read appearances, but usually refer these appearances to ontological categories 
and use their knowledge to reinforce those categories. The lama’s philosophy is one of pure 
appearances, but on principle he does not care about those appearances, unlike Loesberg’s 
aesthetic reader, and therefore Teshoo avoids aesthetic apprehension, passing along the Grand 
Trunk Road “never rais[ing] his eyes” (Kipling, Kim 56). In attributing to Kim something like a 
flâneur identity, Taylor associates him with fin-de-siècle attempts to fashion modes of being 
around the aesthetic. Yet Kim does not articulate, and it is not apparent that he subscribes to, an 
ideology of aestheticism like the one Oscar Wilde develops and performs. Aesthetics does not 
offer for Kim a sustained alternative to the means of knowing available to him, but an exception 
to them. The aesthetic judgment need not be a permanent way of seeing; it can be bounded, 
exercised temporarily, and its hypothetical mode lends itself to such circumscription. Often the 
aesthetic judgment occurs in moments—moments in which one perceives the beautiful, or the 
sublime, or the ridiculous. A lively sense of humour is a kind of aesthetic susceptibility: when 
Kim laughs at the “sprawling, chubby legs” of the toppling child, it is a way of seeing the world 
as if it were designed for his pleasure. 
 The ridiculous in particular exemplifies how one can be startled into an aesthetic 
apprehension that re-orders one’s vision of the world, affecting one’s ontological commitments 
even though the apprehension itself brackets ontological commitments. Loesberg identifies as 
aesthetic indifference the irresponsible laughter, provoked by Borges, that Foucault records in 
The Order of Things. I will reproduce here the passage from Foucault, which is pertinent not 
only to the role of the aesthetic in Kim, but to this dissertation’s persistent concern with the 
dialogical function of humour in practices of wise folly: 
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This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, 
as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought—our thought, the 
thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography—breaking up all the 
ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the 
wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and 
threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. 
This passage quotes a “certain Chinese encyclopaedia” in which it is written that 
“animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, 
(d) suckling pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the 
present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine 
camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that 
from a long way off look like flies.” In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the 
thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is 
demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of 
our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that. (xv) 
Foucault’s aesthetic apprehension is not free of ideology, since to exercise a hypothetical mode 
of apprehension, especially to sustain it, requires an ethical irresponsibility: 
What makes it [Foucault’s “project of calling into question the foundations of 
knowledge”] irresponsible is again what makes it aesthetic. It is distance in the 
manner of the artificially assumed, Kantian indifference to the object’s existence, 
an objectivity that matches all too well with Foucault’s pre-existent desire to see 
modernity as only one possible formation. And yet it remains a virtually 
paradigmatic objectivity, a perceptual stance that begins in trying to presume 
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nothing, or more accurately, in trying to rid oneself of any presumption one 
already has. The problem with postmodern relativism, at least as Foucault 
embodies it here, is not that it is subjectively excitable. Rather, it is all too 
objective; it recognizes the roots of its objectivity in aesthetics and thus accepts 
(or imposes) a status of artwork on the knowledge and politics it analyzes. 
(Loesberg 162) 
The aesthetic is, however, meta-ideological: “Nietzsche has taken the aesthetics of Kant, Hegel, 
and even Schopenhauer despite himself and made of it not a particular position from which to 
look at objects and concepts differently (because indifferently), but the only perspective that 
recognizes perspective as a limit. One cannot argue that the perspective is self-contradictory 
since it claims not to be seeing truth but only appearance” (140). The wise folly I have been 
tracing in British realist novels, like Foucault’s account of the human sciences, is a form of 
aestheticism. In novels the conventions of fiction itself provide the necessary ethic of 
irresponsibility. Fiction also provides the boundaries that contain this ethic, while the 
hypothetical, winking analogies of realism point beyond those boundaries, towards the outside 
that, with respect to the fiction, constitutes the reader’s reality. Realist novels invite readers to 
enter an aesthetic play in which children and adults alike make believe, not necessarily 
suspending our disbelief, but temporarily bracketing ontology. 
Eventually children grow up and readers finish books: significantly, Kipling offers a 
return to ontology in the final chapter of Kim. In a crisis of identity, which is directly presaged by 
his attempt to grapple with Hurree’s paradoxical identity, and an ensuing resolve to “get into the 
world again,” Kim first feels, “though he could not put it into words, that his soul was out of gear 
with its surroundings—a cog-wheel unconnected with any machinery” (Kipling, Kim 234). Sick 
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of the Great Game, Kim has retreated into a sightless pre-aesthetic vision that cannot even 
apprehend “the size and proportion” let alone the “use of things” (234). Gradually, however, 
Kim “felt the wheels of his being lock up anew on the world without. Things that rode 
meaningless on the eyeball an instant before slid into proper proportion. Roads were meant to be 
walked upon, houses to be lived in, cattle to be driven, fields to be tilled, and men and women to 
be talked to. They were all real and true—solidly planted upon the feet—perfectly 
comprehensible—clay of his clay, neither more nor less” (234). Many have read this restoration 
of the purposes of things as Kim’s recommitment to imperial service, to the mechanism of the 
Game, but in noting that roads are for walking on and people for talking to Kim is not operating 
at the Game’s level of abstract and absolute knowledge. Kim returns to a world of purposes, but 
not necessarily of categorical truth: “As the ‘gear’ imagery makes clear,” Kinkead-Weekes 
writes, “this is commitment not to the Game, with which we are no longer concerned, but, at a 
far more fundamental level, to the Wheel of earthly and human life, against the view which holds 
that all these things are illusion, and one must keep oneself apart from them” (231). James 
Thrall, likewise, emphasizes that Kim’s reconnection is to the physical world, not specifically to 
a colonial program (61). 
Many critics have wondered what happens next. We follow Kim’s enlightenment, then 
learn of the lama’s, and we know that the two are different. But we do not see Kim’s final 
response to the lama. Sara Suleri considers the “chilling conclusion” of the novel to represent the 
lama’s domination of Kim, his chela, but this argument is plausible only if we take the ultimate 
sentence, “He crossed his hands on his lap and smiled, as a man may who has won salvation for 
himself and his beloved,” seriously and without irony (Suleri 130; Kipling, Kim 240). The 
humour of the last few pages, and indeed of the lama’s relationship to Kim in general, works 
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against such a reading. Whether the lama has attained enlightenment or merely had a swim, Kim 
certainly seems to think he is as mad as ever, which means that the lama’s claim is only what it 
was all along—a claim of affection, not of mastery. In contrast with Suleri, Zohreh T. Sullivan 
reads this final irony as an unsettling subversion of the lama’s “powers of contemplation, 
meditation, vision, repose, and nonaction” (449). Does Kim, then, turn from the lama to rejoin 
the Game? Or does he become something else altogether? We do not know.
10
 It is also 
significant that Kim’s crisis is narrated in words that are explicitly the narrator’s own: Kim 
“could not put [his feeling] into words” (Kipling, Kim 234). The overt mediation again relegates 
Kim’s actual experience to the inaccessible interiority where it so often resides. The ending of 
Kim is not a victory for the imperial forms of knowledge or the lama’s ideology of ignorance, but 
neither is it a synthesis of conflicting epistemologies. Kim slips through the cracks of the 
dialogue between them, and we do not know the outcome of his education. 
The novel, therefore, is neither the narrative of a boy’s maturation into a man nor of a 
street urchin’s metamorphosis into a sahib: the epistemologies of absolute knowledge and 
absolute ignorance both eliminate, in antithetical ways, the possibility of escaping childhood and 
subalterity. Sitting under a banyan tree and a wooden cart, Kim affirms the physicality of 
“Mother Earth” and enjoys the “good clean dust,” “fe[eling] it between his toes, pat[ting] it with 
his palms,” and falling asleep (235). The scene, which echoes but does not necessarily emulate 
Gautama Buddha’s meditation under the bodhi tree, is a symbolic rebirth that suggests but does 
not promise a way out of the bind: “The many-rooted tree above him, and even the dead man-
handled wood beside, knew what he sought, as he himself did not know” (235). After his sleep of 
“a hundred years,” Kim issues “from those deep wells” with a reconfigured epistemology, saying 
                                                     
10
 For an account of and another challenge to the common assumption that Kim turns back to the empire the end of 
the novel, see Clara Claiborne Park. 
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to the lama: “I know nothing, but that I have not seen thee in a monkey’s age” (238). Kim’s new-
found ignorance is not the lama’s. While the lama narrates his own enlightenment, Kim shows 
merely a puckish interest in peripheral details, especially what the Sahiba said about the lama’s 
dousing, which we can only imagine would have been keenly phrased. John Lockwood Kipling’s 
clay relief illustration, entitled “The End of the Search,” emphasizes the difference between the 
lama’s “end” and Kim’s.11 In the middle ground the lama sits beneath a tree in the posture of a 
Buddha while the wheel of a cart behind him forms a halo around his head. Kim reclines in the 
foreground languidly, but seems alert nonetheless, his attention captured not by the lama but by 
something unseen beyond the right frame of the image. Mahbub Ali, his head just visible over a 
mound in the background, also looks off to the right. Kim’s novel of education, beginning in its 
final pages, looks forward to what we will never see: Kim has found both the Great Game and 
the lama’s rejection of the Wheel of Things unsatisfactory, and it remains for him to become an 
adult on his own terms if he can. If we are expecting closure, we might find the ending itself 
unsatisfactory, but it allows Kipling to write a novel about a child without finally claiming to 
know him, a novel that offers us, more than particular knowledge about Kim, boys, India or 
anything else, an encounter with the challenges of knowing. 
 
Coda 
This chapter can be understood as an encounter with certain challenges of reading, which 
resemble the challenges of knowing in Kim. Although my title may indicate that a direct analysis 
of the relationship between aesthetics and ideology is forthcoming, the theory of aesthetics that I 
have been applying suggests that this relationship is worked out in the act of reading, and can be 
                                                     
11
 The illustration is reproduced in the illustrated Macmillan editions of Kim, p. 404. in the 1901 edition. I am 
grateful to an anonymous reader for SEL, who pointed me towards this wonderful illustration and whose helpful 
response to my article is reflected in this chapter. 
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worked out different ways. The empirical question of how readers have read belongs to the 
growing field of the history of reading, and the current project points towards a future one that 
will seek possible answers to this question in the archives. The argument of this chapter, 
however, consists primarily in a reading, a total aesthetic apprehension of the design of a work 
organized around those moments of sustained apprehension that are usually called “close 
readings,” and the value of my theoretical approach to aesthetics and ideology stands or falls 
with the value of the reading that accompanies it. This is not to say that the reading seeks to be 
true: as an aesthetic apprehension, the mode of this reading is hypothetical, and it proceeds as if 
Kim were designed to do what I say it does, just as this dissertation proceeds as if the realist 
novel were designed to create space for the dialogical position of the reader through the devices 
of wise folly. The claims of this dissertation have the form of ontological statements, but are not: 
really I am arguing for the advantages of seeing things in certain ways, and those advantages do 
not lie in one particular understanding of Kim or the realist novel that results but in the kinds of 
understanding that are facilitated by these ways of seeing. This brief coda, then, will be 
methodological—a theoretical discussion of practice, inseparable from the foregoing examples 
of that practice. 
As I remarked at the beginning of this chapter, the dialogue of reading involves a power 
differential in which the reader or the work may be dominant. Which voice is dominant depends 
on the method of reading. This priority of reading in a relationship in which the reader may 
nevertheless yield up power reflects the role of the reader’s “active responsive understanding” in 
dialogue, without which the dialogue does not exist (Bakhtin, Speech Genres 71). Dialogic 
theory, therefore, shares with Loesberg’s aesthetic theory a recognition both of the construction 
that the listener, perceiver, or reader performs, as well as something other to the reader that is 
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being read, and that may act on the reader. Certain kinds of devotional reading treat the work as 
monologic and inviolable, consisting of what Bakhtin calls “authoritative discourse”: 
“authoritative discourse permits no play with the context framing it, no play with its borders, no 
gradual and flexible transitions, no spontaneously creative stylizing variants on it. It enters our 
verbal consciousness as a compact and indivisible mass; one must either totally affirm it, or 
totally reject it” (Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination 343). Similar but less extreme are the 
practices of identification usually associated with the consumption of popular entertainment, 
including fiction—the search for the “relatable,” for images of oneself, images into which one 
may project oneself, or images which one may assume as part of one’s identity. The straw man 
of this kind of reading is the Quixote. Alluding to that ingenious hidalgo, Said roots Orientalism 
in a “textual attitude,” that is, a Quixotic assumption “that the swarming, unpredictable, and 
problematic mess in which human beings live can be understood on the basis of what books—
texts—say” (Orientalism 93). This opposition between the tidy text and messy humanity leads 
Said to recommend direct experience as an alternative to textuality: “It seems a common human 
failing to prefer the schematic authority of a text to the disorientations of direct encounters with 
the human” (93). Considered through a post-structuralist suspicion of the hors-texte, this solution 
is unconvincing: the problem with Quixote is not that he needs to experience more, but that he 
absorbs discourses and other forms from the romances he reads without applying these forms 
flexibly and selectively to help him read what he experiences. As an example of the reader who 
asserts discursive dominance, one might oppose to Quixote a caricature of Freud, a practitioner 
of what Eve Sedgwick calls “paranoid reading.” As Sedgwick notes, the paranoid reader must 
establish priority, in a temporal sense, over the text: “The unidirectionally future-oriented 
vigilance of paranoia generates, paradoxically, a complex relation to temporality that burrows 
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both backward and forward: because there must be no bad surprises, and because learning of the 
possibility of a bad surprise would itself constitute a bad surprise, paranoia requires that bad 
news always already be known” (130). The danger of this priority is tautological reading, from 
which nothing can be learned that is not (always) already known by virtue of the systems through 
which objects are read (132). 
The difference between these poles could be framed as greater and lesser degrees of 
closeness to the text or fidelity to it: as Sedgwick writes, “of all forms of love, paranoia is the 
most ascetic, the love that demands least from its object” (132, author’s italics). Yet Quixotic 
reading, though it is often also emotionally attached, does not necessarily demand more from its 
object than paranoid reading does. If Freud is the figure for the paranoid reader, Quixote is the 
figure for the paranoiac-as-reader—the difference is the location of the windmills. John Farrell 
remarks:  
The self-heroizing wit with which Freud admits his likeness with the paranoid 
schizophrenic Judge Schreber, for instance, was part of a rhetorical game he 
learned from Swift and Cervantes. Freud saw himself in Oedipus’s crime, in 
Narcissus’ mirror, in the antics of Quixote, and in Schreber’s delusions, and he 
made a grandiose point of pride out of his ability to accept these distorted 
reflections as his own. In his usage, paranoia becomes a comic self-reflection that 
one cannot repudiate. (5-6) 
The language of pathological reading I have borrowed from Sedgwick places us back in Plato’s 
pharmacy, attempting to tell apart two seemingly opposite but obstinately similar reflections in 
order to diagnose them and propose an alternative (Derrida 169-71). In fact, the problem of these 
two kinds of reading resembles the ethical problem that we have seen George Eliot wrestle with: 
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one can be an egoist by failing to imagine what the world might look like from someone else’s 
centre of self, or by imagining it too confidently. Submitting to the otherness of a text may also 
be a way of dominating it. 
If the reader is an egoist, an ethnologist, a paranoiac, a fool, then aesthetics is a wise 
folly, a means to mitigate this folly by casting judgments in the hypothetical mode while 
paradoxically enabling a kind of fidelity to the text, which is construed as a work with a design. 
This fidelity is that of formalism, but while traditional formalisms have couched their aims in the 
language of devotional reading, logic, or closeness, labelling deviations of reading as heresies or 
fallacies, aestheticism springs from irresponsibility. This irresponsibility enables one to set aside 
evidence of authorial intention in order to describe the appearance of a design, but also to use 
whatever evidence is available in service of that description; to bracket concerns of historical 
synchronicity in order to make broader diachronic connections between texts, or to devote most 
of one’s attention to tracing synchronic metonymic relations, as Elaine Freedgood does when 
reading “fugitive meanings” in The Ideas in Things. The possible means are diverse, but the end 
I am identifying is above all a rich understanding of the appearances of design in literary works 
and in categories of them, an understanding of literary form. 
In describing the form of realist novels, I have been seeing faces in clouds; but, as 
Loesberg argues, this activity need not be mere subjectivism or impressionism (97).The clouds, I 
take it, are there to be seen, and describing the faces is a way of seeing, and talking about, the 
appearance of the clouds. The faces I have described in this particular class of cloud, the British 
realist novel, have been the faces of wise fools: in arguing that gnomic speech in Meredith is a 
device of his ambivalent narrative authority, that the ethics of sympathy in Eliot makes a case for 
its constitutive other, that literary education and quotation in Scott and Meredith are kinds of 
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dialogic horse-jumping that reflect the process of reading novels, and that a profound distrust of 
knowledge informs the practices of knowing in Kipling, I have construed designing intelligences 
that are playing the fool, hypothetically exploring the interpenetration of wisdom and folly, 
broadly conceived, in all human endeavour. I hope that these arguments constitute convincing 
descriptions, that the dialogue between myself and my readers, as we apprehend these novels 
together, has contained moments of agreement and recognition (though not too many). I also 
hope that, by demonstrating how the British realist novel invites disagreement and engages the 
reader’s disagreement—by demonstrating that one may apply formalist and resistant modes of 
reading, at once and without contradiction, to the British realist novel—I have suggested the 
persistent value of this form for readers at the present time. I have attempted to ask the most of 
my objects of study, and to show how these objects are capable of rising to the challenge. Like 
Harry Shaw, I believe that “realist novels ask to be read in quite complex and interactive ways,” 
and that we may “engage realist novels in a dialogue concerning the issues that most concern us” 
(Narrating Reality 36, 37, author’s emphasis). These novels do not tell us what wisdom is, 
because they do not know, but if we are prepared to imagine with them that we do not know 
either, they are prepared to inquire with us what wisdom might be. 
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